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Abstract 
Information disclosure is crucial especially considering the functioning of market 
efficiency suggested by finance theories and the need of market regulation required by 
authorities. However, over a long period of time, financial institutions have held 
ambiguous attitudes towards the regulation of information disclosure such that 
financial institutions always seek the business environment with more economic 
freedom and less regulation of information disclosure. In particular, the banking 
industry is always an opaque sector in our economy even though the banking industry 
is always under strict scrutiny from authorities. Inappropriate regulation of the banking 
industry was blamed for the 2008 financial crisis which originated in the US, as poor 
information reporting and intended information makeup had fooled the market which 
resulted in the abrupt market turmoil in 2008. 
Considering the profound meaning of information disclosure in finance and the 
significant role of the banking industry in our economy, this thesis investigates issues 
regarding information disclosure in the banking industry.  
This research finds that the banking industry has positively responded to the call from 
the Basel Committee for the past two decades by enhancing banking information 
disclosures. Whilst, on average, there is a negative impact on stock price by the release 
of annual reports in the banking industry, which implies that the market generally 
views the information within the annual reports as bad news over this period. Moreover, 
the negative response to the annual report release demonstrates a time-lagged manner, 
which brings us more to think about market behaviours when processing complicated 
information and the definition of market efficiency. Investors in the market can treat 
this finding as a potential ‘calendar effect’ and manage their risks more carefully 
around the date of annual report release. 
Two relationships are tested using the data of the banking industry, which are the 
relationship between market valuation and information disclosure and the relationship 
between stock return volatility and information disclosure. Contrary to the general 
finding in previous research which suggests that increased information disclosure is 
associated with higher market valuation, the empirical finding in the current research 
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indicates that increased information disclosure is associated with lower market 
valuation. The argument which states that increased information disclosure is helpful 
to boost market valuation probably omits the nature of the information (bad news or 
good news), and the banks in the studying period of the argument were filled with 
good news, which leads to a biased conclusion. Meanwhile, the empirical finding in 
the current research suggests that increased information disclosure is associated with 
lower stock return volatility, which provides additional evidence to the debatable issue 
whether increased information disclosure would mitigate stock return volatility. 
Although, both the event study and the regression analysis have triggered doubts about 
the beneficial impact on market valuation by increased information disclosures, 
alongside the concerns of privacy and cost when disclosing information suggested by 
previous research, this research still firmly believes that the potential benefits of 
information disclosure would outweigh the disadvantages of information disclosure 
particularly considering the overall stability and safety of our economy. Maybe the 
statement by Faust and Svensson (2001) can be applied here that increased information 
disclosure in the banking industry is generally and socially beneficial but frequently 
bad for banks. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Information is crucial for the functioning of an efficient market, in which market 
participates can better make investment decisions and allocate capital resources by 
information transparency. From a regulation perspective, financial policymakers 
believe that information transparency will help to prevent systemic risk. Numerous 
financial regulations such as US GAAP 1  and IFRS 2  all require a high level of 
information disclosure in a hope to better safeguard the health and stability of business 
environment. However, over a long period of time, financial institutions have held 
ambiguous attitudes towards the regulation of information disclosure that financial 
institutions always seek the business environment with more economic freedom and 
less regulation of information disclosure. 
In particular, the banking industry is always an opaque sector in our economy even 
though the banking industry is always under strict scrutiny from authorities. 
Inappropriate regulation of the banking industry is blamed for the 2008 financial crisis 
which originated in the US. Poor information reporting and intended information 
makeup have fooled the market which results in the abrupt market turmoil in 2008 
                                                          
1  Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, also called US GAAP or GAAP, are the generally 
accepted accounting principles adopted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
2 International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS Standards) is a single set of accounting standards, 
which is developed and maintained by the International Accounting Standards Board with the intention 
to be applied globally. IFRS advocates the disclosure of high quality and reliable financial information 
in capital markets. 
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(Barth and Landsman, 2010). However, this is not the first time the importance of 
information transparency has been emphasised in preventing systemic risk that history 
just repeats itself, Vishwanath and Kaufmann (2001) point out that the Asian financial 
crisis in the late 1990s was the consequence of information opacity and advocate that 
information disclosure in the financial market should possess desirable characteristics: 
access, timeliness, relevance, and quality. Financial regulators should take information 
transparency into account when viewing issues about macroeconomic policy and 
economic development, which means that financial regulators should promote 
information transparency by implementing incentives for disclosure and establishing 
regulations to minimize perverse incentives.  Bertomeu and Magee (2011) find that 
the quality of information disclosure is interlinked with the economic cycle. As the 
economy moves downward from good times, banks move from good quality in 
information disclosure to bad quality in information disclosure, in which the pressure 
of this shift in the quality of information disclosure originates from bad loans and 
interest rates. Under recession periods, banks are likely to conserve information about 
the condition of their existing loans, those with bad loans will most likely decrease the 
quality of information disclosure so that they may hide their poor financial status. The 
larger amounts of bad loans, the less likely a bank will maintain high quality in 
information disclosure. On the other hand, those banks with good loans will maintain 
high quality in information disclosure so that they may demonstrate their strong 
financial status. Fortunately, it seems that the Basel Committee3 senses the potential 
                                                          
3 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provides a forum for central banks around the world 
addressing banking supervisory matters. The Basel Committee maintains its secretariat in Basel, 
Switzerland, and the committee normally meets there. The objective of the Basel Committee is to 
enhance understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the quality of banking supervision 
worldwide. The Committee's members come from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
China, European Union, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Further information can be traced 
through https://www.bis.org/bcbs/. 
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problem of this inconsistent voluntary disclosure by providing the Basel Accord4 
which requires banks to mandatorily disclose certain risk information in order to 
prevent systemic risk. 
Besides this subtle relationship between economic health and information disclosure, 
other issues surrounding information disclosure have also attracted attention in the 
research of finance. Elliott and Jacobson (1994) argue that some parties might benefit 
from information disclosures, some parties might suffer from information disclosures, 
and others might be affected by both the benefits and costs of information disclosures. 
For example, the cost of information disclosure is borne by companies, but the 
companies might be also beneficiaries of the information disclosure they paid for. In 
addition, we should be aware that sometimes information disclosure is immaterial in 
cost which means that it is hard to measure the economic utility of information 
disclosure. The types of costs and benefits in information disclosure could be 
economic, political, social, and ethical. Yosha (1995) raises a concern about the 
privacy issue when a company discloses information to the market, as company 
competitors could take advantage of the disclosed information. Hope (2003) finds that 
firm-level information disclosure is positively related to forecasting accuracy, which 
implies that information disclosure provides useful material to analyst evaluation. 
Moreover, strong enforcement is associated with higher information disclosure, since 
enforcement encourages company managers to follow prescribed accounting standards, 
which in turn reduces analysts' uncertainty about future company earnings. Eng and 
Mak (2003) find that increased information disclosure is associated with lower 
                                                          
4 The Basel Accord is a set of information disclosure standards proposed by the Basel Committee in 
order to improve the quality and quantity of information disclosures in the banking industry and to 
prevent systemic risk in our economy. Till present, the Basel Accord I and Basel Accord II have been 
formulated and promoted to the world, and the updated Basel Accord III is expected to be available by 
the end of 2019. 
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managerial ownership, and larger firms and firms with lower debt have greater 
information disclosure. Bushee and Leuz (2005) examine the economic consequences 
of a regulatory change mandating firms to comply with reporting requirements under 
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act 5 , and find that the imposition of disclosure 
requirements leads to significant costs for smaller firms. However, the imposition of 
disclosure requirements has also significant benefits that the firms complied with the 
1934 Securities Exchange act have experienced positive stock returns and permanent 
increases in liquidity, indicating positive externalities from disclosure regulation and 
reduced information asymmetry. Bertrand and Morse (2011) find that information 
disclosure makes people think less narrowly and consider the long-term effect on 
finance costs, which leads to less loan-borrowing. Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) 
show that greater information disclosure tends to raise CEO compensation and can 
create additional or exacerbate existing agency problems. Therefore, even ignoring the 
direct costs of information disclosure (e.g., meeting stricter accounting standards, 
maintaining better records), there could be external costs of information disclosure. 
On the opposite of Hermalin and Weisbach (2012), the research conducted by 
Armstrong et al. (2012) suggests that information disclosure serves as an important 
substitute for governance mechanism and is particularly helpful in mitigating agency 
problems. Dhaliwal et al. (2014) find a negative association between the disclosure of 
financial and corporate social responsibility (CSR) information and the cost of equity 
capital, in which this negative relationship is more pronounced in stakeholder-oriented 
countries. Luo et al. (2014) demonstrate that security analysts observe corporate social 
performance and take it into consideration when recommending stocks to general 
investors. In particular, as corporate social performance is often ambiguous and 
                                                          
5 The 1934 Securities Exchange Act was created to govern securities transactions on the secondary 
market, in a purpose of ensuring greater financial transparency and less financial fraud.  
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uncertain to general investors, security analysts may serve as an informational pathway 
connecting companies to general investors. Therefore, the observation by security 
analysts provides additional information to general investors and affects the stock 
performance of a company. Martínez‐Ferrero et al. (2015) observe that the information 
disclosure in corporate social responsibility (CSR) has increased in recent years. This 
increase has pushed companies to set aside the classic economic view and to 
comprehensively report social, environmental, and financial information in order to 
satisfy the needs of their stakeholders. Companies that provide high-quality financial 
information tend to be more conservative in reporting their earnings and less inclined 
to carry out unethical practices such as earnings manipulation. Accordingly, 
companies that provide high-quality financial information are more socially 
responsible.  
It is clearly impossible to list all relevant issues surrounding information disclosure, 
as the wide range of issues surrounding information disclosure are complex and 
enormous and the research field of information disclosure in finance is constantly 
extending new horizons. 
1.2 Motivations and Research Objectives 
Considering the profound meaning of information disclosure in finance and the 
significant role of the banking industry in the economy, this research decides to 
investigate issues regarding information disclosure in the banking industry.  
First, this research intends to investigate the general impact of information disclosure 
on the banking industry. As the annual report is the most important means to 
communicate company performance and governance to the market, this research 
decides to employ the annual report as the proxy of information disclosure. Event study 
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will be conducted to test the impact of annual report disclosure on stock price. Through 
this process, this research can also test market efficiency by seeing how quickly the 
market responds to the annual report disclosure. 
Second, as inappropriate information disclosure is an underlying reason for financial 
crisis (Vishwanath and Kaufmann, 2001; Barth and Landsman, 2010) and the call from 
the Basel Committee for the disclosure of regulated risk information in preventing 
financial crisis, this research decides to investigate issues regarding the disclosure of 
risk information in the banking industry. A picture depicting the disclosure status of 
risk information will be drawn in order to see whether the banking industry has 
responded to the urge from the Basel Committee by increasing the disclosure of risk 
information.  
Third, this research intends to test whether the change of risk information disclosure 
has any impacts on these banks. Market valuation is clearly an important concern for 
every company that every company wants to be favourably valued by the market, 
hence one testing perspective will be the impact of risk information disclosure on 
market valuation. Together with the impact of general information disclosure on stock 
price conducted by the event study previously, this research wants to provide some 
empirical evidence regarding the impacts of information disclosures on company 
valuation. By doing so, this research might explain if there are any underlying reasons 
that a bank tends to hide information by avoiding tighter regulations of information 
disclosure. 
Fourth, as financial crisis always comes along with severe market volatility, this 
research intends to test whether the change of risk information disclosure has any 
impact on market volatility, which will provide indirect evidence for whether enhanced 
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risk information disclosure would prevent systemic risk suggested by the Basel 
Committee. 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
This thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 unveils the thesis by introducing the 
‘handbook’ of banking information disclosure – the Basel Accord and the significant 
role of banking information disclosure in maintaining systemic stability for our 
economy. Chapter 3 tests the general impact of banking information disclosure on 
stock price by using the method of event study. Chapter 4 narrows down the research 
scope by drawing a picture depicting the status of risk information disclosures in the 
banking industry over the past two decades. Chapter 5 investigates the relationship 
between risk information disclosures and market valuation in the banking industry, 
which aims to find what kind of impacts the change of risk information disclosure will 
have on market valuation. Chapter 6 investigates the relationship between risk 
information disclosures and market volatility in the banking industry, which aims to 
find what kind of impacts the change of risk information disclosure will have on 
market volatility. Finally, chapter 7 summarises the whole thesis by providing 
implications for policymakers and indicating directions for future research. 
In terms of research purpose, chapter 3 will target our first research objective, chapter 
4 will target our second research objective, chapter 5 will target our third research 
objective, and chapter 6 will target our fourth research objective. 
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Chapter 2  
The Call from the Basel Committee to Increase 
Banking Information Disclosure 
2.1 Introduction 
The banking industry is important for our economy, therefore financial regulators 
implement a tight control over the banking industry to avoid financial turmoil. One 
requirement for banks is to maintain a certain degree of information disclosure. 
Financial regulators believe that the safety of the banking industry is based upon its 
information transparency. Although financial regulators around the world have not 
achieved a common platform in guiding the banking information disclosure, more and 
more countries have paid attention to the Basel Accord which specifies information 
disclosure particularly in the aspect of risk information for the banking industry.  
This chapter provides a broad context for this research by pointing out the importance 
of banking information disclosure. Section two briefly discusses the importance of the 
banking industry. Section three introduces the guidance of banking information 
disclosure – the Basel Accord and the development of the Basel Accord. Through the 
suggestion by the Basel Committee and the relevant literature of banking information 
disclosure, section four reveals the principal purpose of information transparency in 
the banking industry - maintaining systemic stability. Section five pays attention to the 
potential concerns of banking information disclosure. Section six takes a look at the 
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status of the recent banking information disclosures. While section seven summarises 
this chapter in the end. 
2.2 The Importance of the Banking Industry  
The banking industry is, without a doubt, one of the most important sectors in any 
economy. ING Group 6  suggests that banks have three basic functions: 1. Being 
responsible for the payment system. Since the world is in a digital era and people use 
less cash during transactions, electronic payments like card payments, online payments, 
transfers, etc. are becoming more popular and important. Banks are in charge of the 
smoothness and security of these transactions. 2. Storing savings for people. Banks are 
where people can safely deposit their savings, which banks then pay interest on. If 
there were no banks, people would have to store and protect their savings themselves, 
which would involve a lot of hassles and risks. 3. Financing the needs of daily life for 
people and the needs of business development for companies by issuing loans to them. 
Without loans from banks, it would be very hard for people to buy a house, or for 
companies to develop their business plans. Besides these three basic functions, the 
modern banking industry extends its business to a variety of other things, such as asset 
management for people and companies, with a lot of investment banks specializing in 
this area. This can range from gaining access to capital for growth and investments, to 
assisting in mergers and acquisitions, to converting currencies. Our economy could 
not function without the existence of the banking industry, and banks are the oil for 
the wheels that keep the economy turning.  
                                                          
6 The ING Group is a Dutch international banking and financial servicing corporation headquartered in 
Amsterdam. The detailed information regarding the banking function suggested by the ING Group can 
be traced through https://www.ing.com/About-us/Profile-Fast-facts/The-role-of-banks.htm. 
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2.3 Basel Accords – One of the Banking Information Disclosure 
Handbooks 
To protect the safety and security of the financial system, a range of international 
organizations – the Basel Committee, G8 Finance Groups, the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank are constantly developing guidelines to help central banks 
around the world to regulate their own banking industries. One of the most influential 
organizations is the Basel Committee, and one of the most influential banking 
supervision principles is the Basel Accord proposed by the Basel Committee. The 
Basel Committee is based in Basel, Switzerland, thus titled the name of the committee 
with its located city. There were only 10 members7 when the Basel Committee was 
initially established in 1974. The member number of the Basel Committee has 
gradually increased after that, and nowadays there are 27 members8  in the Basel 
Committee. 
The Basel Accord is a comprehensive handbook that guides banks to release crucial 
information to the public. Before the appearance of the Basel Accord, there were more 
than eight banking regulation standards spread around the world. After the release of 
the Basel Accord I in 1988, the Basel framework has steadily become popular as a 
common approach for banking regulation in the world.  
In 1988, the Basel Committee put forward the first regulation standard the Basel 
Accord I, which details the guideline to set up the capital requirement according to 
                                                          
7  The 10 members are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
8 The 27 members are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong 
Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. 
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bank’s credit risk. Following the Basel Accord I, the Basel Committee introduced the 
Basel Accord II9 in 2004. This deepened the regulation standard by looking out not 
only the capital requirement about bank’s credit risk but also the capital requirements 
about bank’s operational and market risks. Basel II has three pillars to strengthen its 
existence: The first pillar deals with the capital requirements of credit risk, operational 
risk and market risk. The core idea of the first pillar is that the greater the risk a bank 
takes, the more risk-weighted capital the bank should maintain. The second pillar 
addresses the credit risk, operational risk and market risk in more detailed sub-
categories such as pension risk, strategic risk, reputational risk and legal risk. The third 
pillar is a complimentary pillar for the previous two pillars and designed as a 
framework for banking regulators to execute regulations over the banking industry in 
a detailed manner. Basel II was intended to replace Basel I by upgrading the banking 
regulations. Following the 2008 financial crisis, however, the effectiveness of Basel II 
has been doubted. In order to modify the perceived deficiencies of Basel II, the Basel 
Accord III is planned to replace Basel II in 2019. The updated feature of Basel III is to 
further strengthen capital requirements by increasing liquidity and decreasing leverage 
in the banking industry. 
2.4 Maintaining Systemic Stability: The Principal Purpose of Banking 
Information Disclosure 
Before the 1980s, there used to exist a trend of loose control over the market. However, 
as the banking industry thrived by the emergence of newly designed financial products 
and innovative financial instruments, this lose control brought up financial turmoil in 
                                                          
9 The Basel Accord II was firstly proposed by the Basel committee in 1999 and the refined Basel Accord 
II was released in 2004 with enhanced information disclosure requirements. 
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a number of countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The introduction of the Basel 
Accord I aimed to control this kind of financial turmoil derived from the banking 
industry. The core value of the Basel Accord is to make the banking information more 
transparent to the public, with a hope of bringing safety and stability to our financial 
system.  
Why do we need a global standard such as the Basel Accord to guide banks to release 
information properly in order to achieve safety and stability in our financial system? 
The Basel Committee believes that there are mainly two answers for this question: 
First, the banking system is very complex and fragile. If different countries use 
different banking regulation standards, it would make the complex and fragile banking 
system even more complex and fragile. It is hard to figure out the real risk by 
comparing the information of incompatible reporting systems. A lot of loopholes 
would emerge from the gaps between different reporting systems. By adopting a 
standardised common framework such as the Basel Accord, the contents of 
information in the banking disclosure will be comparable across different countries 
and over different periods. Second, the banking system is very crucial for society. 
Tchana (2008) also states that the banking system is too important to fail, hence society 
should prevent banking crises from happening at all costs. The report of Basel 
Committee (1998) -- ‘Enhancing Bank Transparency’ encourages a single, standard 
and comprehensive information disclosure by banks around the world. The report 
believes that the transparency of banking information is so important that the 
underlying market discipline should be enforced by financial regulators in such a way 
as to reward those banks managing risks effectively and penalise those disclosing 
imprudent information. The report addresses the issue of banking information 
disclosure from six categories: financial performance, financial position (capital 
13 
 
requirement, solvency, and liquidity), risk management strategy, risk exposure, 
accounting policy, and business governance. The reporting quality of these six 
categories should follow the characteristics of comprehensiveness, relevance, 
timeliness, reliability, comparability and materiality, and financial regulators around 
the world should always take these characteristics into account when implementing 
policies. 
Boro (1986) believes that the most crucial point of establishing a transparency regime 
in the banking industry is to ensure its safety and stability. A mandatory disclosure 
requirement in the US initially designed for retail banks has proved efficient in 
preventing the big losses of the American banking industry in the 1970s. The risk of 
over-withdrawals was the major challenge faced by the retail banks in the US at that 
time. After the improvement of information disclosure, depositors felt safer about their 
asset placements in banks, and the cases of large over-withdrawals had decreased. In 
addition, Boro (1986) suggests that the US Federal Reserve could use the disclosed 
information to better control the banking risk by charging a higher default rate from 
the banks taking extra risks. The banks that have been charged a higher default rate 
would be less likely to take additional risks. The US Federal Reserve could also use 
the disclosed information to better implement policies.  
Higher stock return volatility is associated with higher market risk. Baumann and Nier 
(2004) find that the information transparency level is negatively related to the stock 
return volatility by testing a sample of 600 banks in 31 countries over the period 1993-
2000. The transparency level is measured through three indices, and each of the three 
indices is a self-sufficient measurement of information transparency: the first one is an 
index composited by the Center for International Financial Analysis Research (CIFAR) 
which measures the information transparency level for all industries globally in the 
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1990s; the second index is a dummy variable which identifies whether a bank is listed 
on the US stock market; the third index is designed by Baumann and Nier (2004) which 
contains items which may affect stock return volatility including loans by maturity, 
loans by type, loans by counterparty, problem loans, problem loans by type, securities 
by type, securities by holding purpose, deposits by maturity, deposits by type of 
customer, money market funding, long-term funding, reserves, capital, contingent 
liabilities, off-balance sheet items, non-interest income and loan loss provisions. Each 
of the three indices is individually regressed with additional control variables to test 
the relationship between stock return volatility and information disclosure. Baumann 
and Nier (2004) employ the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to obtain the 
results, and the results show that in general each of the three indices is significantly 
and negatively related to the stock return volatility. That is to say, a higher level of 
information disclosure is associated with a lower level of stock return volatility. A 
more specific regression analysis is conducted in order to further test the disclosure 
impacts of individual items. For the individual items composing the third index, 
information disclosures about securities by type, securities by holding period, deposits 
by type of customer, long-term funding, contingent liabilities, off-balance sheet items 
and non-interest income are all associated with reduced levels of stock return volatility. 
Barth et al. (2004) demonstrate that increased information disclosure is helpful to 
mitigate systemic risk by drawing on their new database on bank regulation and 
supervision in 107 countries among the years of 1998, 1999 and 2000. First, Barth et 
al. (2004) assess two competing theories of government regulation: the helping-hand 
approach and the grabbing-hand approach. The helping-hand approach refers to the 
government regulation by correcting market failures, and the grabbing-hand approach 
refers to the government regulation by supporting political constituencies. Second, 
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Barth et al. (2004) assess the relationship between the regulatory and supervisory 
policies and the development and fragility of the banking industry. The results suggest 
that the grabbing-hand approach is more effective in preventing systemic risk by 
providing effective regulatory and supervisory practices. The effective regulatory and 
supervisory practices are those that force accurate information disclosure, empower 
private sector monitoring of banks, and foster incentives for private agents to exert 
corporate control. 
Nier (2005) investigates the potential trade-off of information disclosure by examining 
a large sample of banks globally during the period 1994-2000, whether information 
transparency increases or decreases the chance of severe banking problems. Through 
the regression analysis by controlling other bank variables, the empirical results 
suggest that the banks disclosing more information are less likely at the risk of falling 
into crisis, in which large changes in banks’ stock prices are used as the indicator of 
financial crisis and a disclosure index covering 17 dimensions of accounting 
information is used as the indicator of information transparency. This result implies 
that information transparency is able to bring major dividends for overall financial 
stability and reduce the incidence of the banking crisis. 
By looking through capital buffers against portfolio risk derived from adverse 
selection, Nier and Baumann (2006) find that the information disclosure disciplined 
by the government is effective in limiting the risk of bankruptcy in the banking 
industry. Additionally, the bank itself will be more morally responsible when issuing 
loans to borrowers, in which the careful loan generating process mitigates the potential 
risk from adverse selection caused by borrowers. This empirical research is based on 
a large cross-country panel data with observations of 729 individual banks from 32 
different countries over the years 1993 to 2000.  
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Cuoco and Liu (2006) study the behaviour of a financial institution if there is a VaR10 
reporting from the institution. A higher capital requirement will be enforced by 
financial regulators if a financial institution reports a higher VaR. Thus, the capital 
requirement subject to its reported VaR is a good cushion for buffering the risk faced 
by a financial institution. Cuoco and Liu (2006) suggest that the capital requirements 
related to VaR and the associated back-testing are an effective way to curb the market 
risk in the banking industry, and a plausible approach to reveal the potential risk of 
individual banks. 
Tadesse (2006) investigates the relationship between banking information 
transparency and systemic stability, and the relationship between systemic stability 
and the stringent degree of regulatory regimes. Tadesse (2006) finds that both of these 
two relationships are positive. That is to say, the more transparent a banking system is, 
the less likely a country will suffer from a financial crisis; and the more stringent the 
regulatory regime a country has, the less likely a country will suffer from a financial 
crisis. The most important four characteristics that will help to prevent financial crisis 
are: 1) comprehensive disclosure procedure; 2) timing financial control; 3) informative 
reporting system; 4) credible information disclosure.  
Hirtle (2007) tests the relationship between the amount of information disclosed by 
US banks and their subsequent stock return volatility. Using the data extracted from 
the annual reports of these banks, an index is composited for measuring the market 
risk information disclosure of these banks. The regression analysis conducted by Hirtle 
(2007) shows that a higher level of information disclosure is associated with a lower 
                                                          
10 The Value-at-Risk methodology (VaR) is a forward-looking way to measure market risk, which states 
the probability of losing a certain amount of money on an investment over a given time period. This 
thesis will give a comprehensive description of the VaR method in chapter 4. 
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level of stock return volatility, and in turn with a higher risk-adjusted return. These 
findings also suggest that enhanced information disclosure is associated with more 
efficient risk taking and thus improved risk-return trade-offs, although the direction of 
causation is unclear. 
Ahrend et al. (2011) investigate whether banking systems in countries with more 
stringent prudential information reporting have proved more stable during the recent 
financial crisis. Ahrend et al. (2011) find that the stringent level of information 
reporting is positively correlated with the extent to which countries have escaped 
damage during the recent financial crisis, as measured either by the degree of equity 
value destruction in the banking industry or by the fiscal cost of financial sector rescue. 
This empirical result suggests that the banking system in countries with enhanced 
information reporting were less affected by the recent financial crisis. Although 
numerous factors have influenced the impact of the financial crisis in a given country, 
the findings provide evidence that even in a world where a country may not be able to 
fully insulate from the global financial crisis, its system of prudential information 
reporting can still be important in mitigating the impact of the financial crisis.  
The stability of the banking industry depends on the stability of its deposit status, Wu 
and Bowe (2012) investigate the relationship between information disclosure and 
depositor behaviour in the Chinese banking sector. In particular, Wu and Bowe (2012) 
enquire whether enhanced information disclosure enables investors to more effectively 
assess a bank’s risk profile, thereby influencing their deposit decisions. By utilizing 
the unbalanced panel data incorporating 169 Chinese banks over the period of 1998–
2009 and employing the generalised-method-of-moments (GMM) estimation, Wu and 
Bowe (2012) find that: (i) the growth rate of deposits is sensitive to bank fundamentals 
after controlling for macroeconomic factors, diversity in ownership structure, and 
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government intervention; (ii) the more information transparency of a bank, the more 
likely the bank will experience growth in its deposit base; and (iii) the more 
information transparency of a bank, the more likely the bank will offer loans with 
higher interest rates. 
Sowerbutts et al. (2013) argue that inadequate public disclosure by banks has 
contributed to the financial crisis. This is because those investors are unable to judge 
the risks which banks are bearing in times of systemic stress, which leads to over-
withdrawals. Sowerbutts et al. (2013) advocate that policymakers should continue 
encouraging the banking industry to enhance information disclosure, which should 
help reduce excessive risk-taking by banks and lead to positive outcomes for financial 
stability. 
2.5 Major Concerns of Banking Information Disclosure 
2.5.1 Costs Arising from Information Disclosure 
The theoretical discussion by Shaffer (1995) states that mandatory information 
disclosure is very costly in practice and whether the benefit is over the cost of doing 
so is doubtful. Some companies voluntarily disclose their inside information in a hope 
to attract more investors and reduce the cost of capital, as these companies believe that 
investors like to invest in the company with a comprehensive information disclosure 
and will require a higher risk premium if a company is in an opaque status. However, 
once a certain amount of information is disclosed, additional information will be 
redundant. In this kind of situation, the net benefit of mandatory information disclosure 
is negative since the market has already grasped sufficient information. Policymakers 
should analyse the scenarios from case to case when implementing the mandatory 
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disclosure policies and monitor the outcomes of the mandatory disclosure policies 
periodically.    
Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) point out that the cost of providing information is 
undertaken by individual banks, and the benefit of using information might be enjoyed 
by markets instead. Through the economic perspective, it is hard to figure out whether 
the overall benefit of providing information will outweigh the overall cost of 
assimilating information, since the principal party of providing information is different 
from the principal party of receiving information and there exists certain tracing 
difficulties of the benefit and cost of information disclosure. 
Hyytinen and Takalo (2002) assert that in order to achieve the status of comprehensive 
information transparency, banks should provide information on various sections 
including financial performance, liquidity, risk management, general strategy, etc. 
which is a complex and daunting task. Information disclosure will be very expensive 
especially when information disclosure becomes a routine procedure with constant 
information updating, as the regular routine of information disclosure will ask human 
resource department, internal system department, IT department, financial department 
and other crucial departments to co-ordinately work together. Implementing strict 
information transparency policy is unnecessary for small banks, because the 
bankruptcy of these small banks will not have a strong power to tumble down the 
whole financial system and the extensive information disclosure will be a substantial 
cost affecting the profit of these small banks. 
2.5.2 Privacy Breach by Information Disclosure 
Privacy is another concern derived from banking information disclosure. Linsley and 
Shrives (2005) argue that the private interest is not coincided with the public interest 
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at all times. The confidentiality of bank clients’ information will not be thoroughly 
maintained in the banking industry and certain rights of bank clients will be violated 
if the authority has the same right to know all the information. The account between 
the privacy of bank clients and the safety of the financial system is a hard task to 
balance off. The bank itself also has technologies and safety issues which are not 
suitable to disclose. In addition, improving information disclosure may affect banks’ 
plans and core interests, since its competitors could take advantage of sensitive 
information disclosure. The monitoring threat from bank’s competitors prevents a 
bank from broadening new services and finding new opportunities. Therefore, a strict 
request of information transparency will be an obstacle for financial innovation.  
2.6 Past Banking Disclosure Practices 
Despite the release of the Basel Accord I in 1988 and the call for enhanced information 
disclosure of the banking industry from the Basel Committee, a lack of information 
disclosure is still prevalent in the banking industry. It seems that there are still different 
levels of regulation enforcements around the world and there are still many countries 
that adopt an inactive attitude towards information disclosure in the banking industry. 
The Group of Ten (G-10)11 tried to enforce the Basel Accord I into a lawful regulation 
in 1992, but there were inconsistent opinions among these countries towards this 
proposal. 
The Basel Committee conducted surveys in the years of 1998, 1999 and 2001 for the 
status of information disclosure among banks across the globe. The information 
disclosure levels among banks had slightly risen over the period 1998-2001 across the 
                                                          
11 The Group of Ten (G-10) includes the countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
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globe. However, when compared to the requirement of the Basel Accord I, this 
information disclosure level is still very low. These surveys also show that banks tend 
to provide backward-looking information instead of forward-looking information. The 
Basel Committee (1998, 1999 and 2001) suspect that there are two reasons for this: 
one is that banks were fearful of providing incorrect forecasting information which 
could be criticized by markets later; the other one is that banks were fearful of the 
potential use of the forward-looking information by their competitors. 
Baumann and Nier (2003) find that the disclosure status of financial and accounting 
information for 600 banks around the world during the period 1993-2000 is varied not 
only from country to country but also within countries.  
By visiting banks’ websites during the first two weeks of 2006, Bonson-Ponte et al. 
(2006) compare the online information disclosure by principal European banks with 
the information disclosure required by the Basel Accord II, and find that on average 
the online information disclosure by these European banks has contained only thirty 
percent of the required information disclosure by the Basel Accord II. While the 
disclosure level of larger banks in Europe is thirty-seven percent which is higher than 
the average level. However, the variation of online information disclosure among 
European banks is huge even among those large European banks. Some banks in 
Europe only use their websites as an advertisement tool or a virtual shop. Bonson-
Ponte et al. (2006) believe that the different disclosure levels among these banks would 
raise a new competitive era and differentiate these banks’ attraction to investors, and 
suggest that the Basel Accord II should be put into a compulsory practice in the near 
future.  
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Helbok and Wagner (2006) take a look at the operational risk information disclosure 
in the banking industry around the world from 1998 to 2001. During the period of 
1998-2001, the disclosure of operational risk information was only suggested by the 
Basel Committee as a voluntary practice instead of a mandatory task. However, the 
finding by Helbok and Wagner (2006) suggests that, even in this voluntary period 
(1998-2001), both the extent and content of operational risk information disclosure in 
the banking industry had increased significantly. Since the voluntary information 
disclosure within the period 1998-2001 had experienced a large degree of freedom, 
Helbok and Wagner (2006) wish the emergence of the Basel Accord II in 2004 could 
possibly bring uniformity and comparability for the information disclosure in the 
banking industry.  
Hirtle (2007) shows that the information disclosure among banks in the US had 
increased between 1994 and 2004. The most significant increase of information 
disclosure is market risk information, which is likely caused by the law amendment in 
the US. The amended law asks US banks to mandatorily disclose certain market risk 
information and also encourages US banks to use the Value-at-Risk (VaR) method for 
measuring market risk. Meanwhile, it is a debatable issue whether the VaR method is 
prudent in reporting the risk faced by banks. Through the approach of econometric 
theory, Lucas (2001) evaluates the VaR method in conjunction with the proposed 
back-testing procedure. Lucas (2001) finds that the VaR has understated the risk faced 
by banks and suggests that banking regulators should modify the VaR method. On the 
other hand, through the approach of empirical study, Pérignon et al. (2008) find that 
the risk has been overstated by banks in Canada when adopting the VaR method, which 
means Canadian banks are overcautious about their market risks.  
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Oliveira et al. (2011) examine the risk-related reporting practices of 190 Portuguese 
banks based on a content analysis of banks’ 2006 annual reports. Risk-related 
disclosures within these banks are found to be incomparable, because there were 
different maturity time bands of exposures to credit, market and liquidity risks, 
different assumptions of Value-at-Risk and sensitivity analysis, and different forms of 
capital structure reporting. As the release of the standard disclosure requirement – the 
Basel Accord II, Oliveira et al. (2011) wish the Portuguese government could adopt 
more effective enforcement mechanisms such as Basel II to broker compliance with 
minimum mandatory risk disclosure requirements among these Portuguese banks. 
Mention (2011) examines the voluntary reporting practices of intellectual capital (IC) 
by leading European banks. The sample period of this empirical study is 2001–2009 
(prior and after the implementation of the Basel Accord II, in which the Basel Accord 
II was implemented in 2004). The finding indicates that the reporting of IC information 
occurs mainly in a narrative form among these European banks, and is seldom factual 
and verifiable. Forward-looking information is extremely rare, as well as quantified 
information. In relative terms, relational capital is the most reported category, followed 
by human and structural capital. Over the period of 2001–2009, a strong upward trend 
is observed for the reporting of structural capital, suggesting an increased awareness 
of the importance of strong management process and corporate culture. Disclosure 
levels of human and relational capital are also relatively high. Similar to Mention 
(2011), the study conducted by Ahmed Haji and Mubaraq (2012) examines the IC 
disclosure practices of Nigerian banks following the Nigerian restructuring exercise 
and subsequent policy changes in the banking industry. During the period of 2006‐
2009, the banking industry in Nigeria went through a consolidation exercise by 
introducing the mandatory code of corporate governance into the banking industry. A 
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self‐designed IC disclosure index by Ahmed Haji and Mubaraq (2012) is used to 
measure the extent of IC information disclosed in banks’ annual reports. The results 
indicate that the overall IC disclosures among the Nigerian banks had increased 
moderately over the period of 2006‐2009, and human and internal capital disclosures 
compose the main part of banks' IC disclosures.  
Sobhani et al. (2012) analyse the sustainability information disclosure among banks in 
Bangladesh during the year 2009, in which the sustainability information disclosure 
refers to the information disclosure concerning social welfare and green awareness. 
Sobhani et al. (2012) reveal that the information disclosure in these banks’ annual 
reports has more sustainability feature than the information disclosure in these banks’ 
websites. Furthermore, the newly established banks perform better in comparison to 
the long established banks, and the Islamic banks perform better in comparison to the 
conventional banks in this respect.  
2.7 Summary 
Through reviewing the literature, it seems that the call from the Basel Committee for 
an increase of banking information disclosure has been positively responded by the 
banking industry. This increased information disclosure in the banking industry is 
essential and meaningful, since banking information disclosure brings stability and 
safety to our economy. While there exist concerns of banking information disclosure 
such as the cost and privacy issues. Financial regulators, therefore, should be made 
aware of this, especially when designing new policies. The process of refining the 
regulation of banking information disclosure is still going today, as we see that the 
Basel Accord III is under drawing and intended to replace the Basel Accord II in 2019. 
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Hopefully, the concerns of banking information disclosure can be partially addressed 
by the Basel Accord III in the future. 
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Chapter 3 
 Short-Term Impact of Annual Report Disclosure on 
Bank’s Stock Price - An Event Study 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, this research has reviewed the broad literature regarding 
banking information disclosure. Though this research has been informed by previous 
literature that increased banking information disclosure is beneficial to maintain 
systemic stability, there is a lack of research addressing the direct impact of banking 
information disclosure on bank’s stock price. In order to fill the gap by figuring out 
the immediate impact of banking information disclosure on bank’s stock price, this 
research undertakes an event study by using the occasion of annual report disclosure. 
The annual report is released yearly which covers comprehensive information12 of a 
bank, therefore it is a perfect proxy of information disclosure in conducting the event 
study.  
The remaining chapter will be outlined as follows: section two introduces the event 
study and its use in testing market efficiency; section three details the procedure of 
conducting an event study; section four describes the data used in the current research 
                                                          
12 The annual report is one of the most important information disclosure documents to communicate 
with shareholders, which covers comprehensive information of financial statement, shareholder 
information, governance, strategic report, risk review, and management duty. Among the reported 
elements of the annual report by a bank, the information disclosure of risk review and management duty 
has an international guideline ‘Basel Accord’ that directs the banking industry to report the information 
in a standard and rigid manner. Nowadays, more and more banks have started to comply with the 
principle and reporting standards in the Basel Accord when reporting their risk information. 
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to test market efficiency and the impact of annual report disclosure on bank’s stock 
price; section five produces the empirical result; section six discusses the empirical 
meaning of the result and provides possible underlying reasons for the result; while 
section seven concludes this chapter in the end. 
3.2 The Motivation of Conducting Event Study about Bank’s Annual 
Report Disclosure  
When talking about information disclosure, people would very easily associate it with 
its subsequent market reaction. The stock price itself is a reflection of numerous 
amounts of information. The market efficiency theory assumes that stock price has 
fully reflected all available market information and the change in stock price is caused 
by the emergence of new information. Fama (1970) states that there are three forms of 
market efficiency, namely weak form, semi-strong form and strong form. The weak 
form of market efficiency implies that stock price fully reflects all historical market 
information. The semi-strong form of market efficiency implies that stock price fully 
reflects all publically available information including historical market information 
and current market information. The strong form of market efficiency implies that 
stock price fully reflects all publically available information and private information 
including historical market information, current market information, and company 
inside information. Fama (1970) believes that market efficiency should exist at the 
level of the semi-strong form, which means, in general, stock price should fully reflect 
historical market information and current market information. For the strong form of 
market efficiency, as we have difficulty in obtaining the inside information of a 
company, it is difficult to verify its existence. In general, there are three impacts of 
newly arrived information on stock price - positive impact, negative impact or no 
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impact. We should be aware that although newly arrived information could have a 
significant impact on stock price, this impact might be temporary. In the longer term, 
there are numerous factors that can potentially affect stock price. Therefore, event 
study is mostly used to decide the short-term impact of newly arrived information on 
stock price (Kraus and Stoll, 1972; Elton et al., 2001). Bank’s annual report disclosure 
can be treated as an occasion to conduct event study in testing the information impact 
on stock price, as annual report is one of the main vehicles to deliver information to 
the public. 
 
Figure 3.1 Market Efficiency Forms  
This graph shows the relationships among three different forms of market efficiency. The weak form of 
market efficiency suggests that stock price only reflects historical market information. The semi-strong 
form of market efficiency implies that stock price fully reflects all publically available information 
including historical market information and current market information. The strong form of market 
efficiency implies that stock price fully reflects all publically available information and private 
information including historical market information, current market information, and company inside 
information.  
 
Besides testing the impact of annual report disclosure on bank’s stock price, another 
motivation of conducting event study is to test the hypothesis of market efficiency by 
seeing how quickly and how efficiently the market responds to newly arrived 
information. There are several studies using event study which are in support of market 
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efficiency. Grier and Albin (1973) analyse the impact of block trading13 on the New 
York Stock Exchange, which shows that stock price would adjust to a significant 
change either in a positive or in a negative way within minutes after the announcement 
of block trading by institutional investors. Dodd and Ruback (1997) analyse the impact 
of announcement by the company which intends to bid the tender offer14, and find that 
the company which has the intention to bid the tender offer would experience a 
significant increase in its stock price. The abnormal return has been observed days 
before the successful bidding of the tender offer which is due to information leakage, 
while additional abnormal return quickly ceases after the announcement of the bidding 
result. Thus, the phenomenon demonstrated by Dodd and Ruback (1997) is in support 
of market efficiency. Another evidence in support of market efficiency is shown in the 
case of takeover. Firth (1975) examines market efficiency with respect to the 
announcement of takeover, which points out that the market views the purchase of a 
substantial percentage of a company as a good signal for the company that intends to 
acquire. Similarly, for the company that to be acquired, positive abnormal returns on 
stock price are observed days before the announcement of takeover. Firth (1975) 
argues that the appearance of abnormal returns before the announcement does not 
violate market efficiency, it only reflects the fact that the market efficiently anticipates 
the event of takeover. After the announcement of takeover, additional abnormal return 
quickly ceases and the cumulative abnormal return levels off which suggests that the 
                                                          
13 The block trading stands for an order of sale or purchase for a significantly large amount of securities 
on the stock market. The block trading is often undertaken by institutional investors in a purpose of 
capital restructuring. 
14 A tender offer is a type of public takeover bid, which is a public open announcement (normally 
announced through media channels) by a prospective acquirer to the stockholders of a publicly listed 
company to tender their stocks for sale at a certain price during a certain time period. The prospective 
acquirer usually offers a higher stock price than the current stock price for the company that to be 
acquired. 
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market is efficient in reflecting the fact of takeover and no more adjustments are 
needed.  
Two cases used very often by event study to test market efficiency are dividend 
payment and stock split. In general, both dividend payment and stock split would have 
a positive impact on stock price which leads to positive abnormal returns. The impact 
has been manifested within days after the announcement of dividend payment or stock 
split, which are in support of market efficiency. Examples of using event study in 
testing market efficiency through the case of dividend payment can be found in Pettit 
(1972), Watts (1973), Aharony and Swary (1980), and Dasilas and Leventis (2011). 
Examples of using event study in testing market efficiency through the case of stock 
split can be found in Charest (1978), and Lamoureux and Poon (1987), and Ikenberry 
and Ramnath (2002). 
On the other hand, using event study also produces evidence in refutation of market 
efficiency, in which the two most salient market anomalies against market efficiency 
are market over-reaction and market under-reaction.  
Numerous empirical studies using event study such as Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987), 
Chopra et al. (1992), Govindaraj et al. (2004), and Boubaker et al. (2015) demonstrate 
the phenomenon of market over-reaction, as there are significant abnormal reversals 
followed by significant abnormal returns. Researchers collectively attribute the 
reasons of market overreaction to cognitive biases such as minimising regret and 
maximising self-esteem. Kahneman and Tversky (1982) argue that the market over-
reaction is caused by the abrupt appearance of news which is not in line with investors’ 
expectations, no matter whether the news is good or bad. Griffin and Tversky (1992), 
and Barberis et al. (1998) attribute the reason for market over-reaction to people’s 
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overconfidence in their initial judgments on market information, which the initial 
judgment is short of comprehensive and rigid analysis. Moreover, the bias of 
overconfidence escalates market volatility, since under a market with a certain amount 
of overconfident traders, smart traders namely the professional stock analysts could 
only play a limited role in leading the right direction for the market.  
In the meantime, numerous studies using event study such as Ikenberry et al. (1995), 
Ikenberry and Ramnath (2002), and Frazzini (2006) demonstrate the phenomenon of 
market under-reaction, as there are continuous abnormal drifts in return followed by 
an event. Behaviour explanations are also proposed to interpret the market under-
reaction. Daniel et al. (1998) believe that investors suffer from the self-attribution bias 
who put a lot of weight on their initial belief and are reluctant to acknowledge newly 
arrived information changes. Only by encountering extreme contradictory information 
with the previous belief, investors would try to adjust their behaviours. Besides the 
self-attribution bias, the overconfidence bias also contributes to the phenomenon of 
market under-reaction such that investors overestimate their own ability and are 
overconfident in their intuitive judgment. Barberis et al. (1998) attribute the reason of 
market under-reaction to the conservatism bias meaning that investors are slow in 
responding to newly arrived information. Hong and Stein (1999) explain the market 
under-reaction by analysing the behaviours of two heterogeneous groups – bearish 
investors15 and bullish investors16. Bearish investors will be reluctant to invest in the 
market initially. As positive news diffuses around the market, bearish investors will 
slowly change their minds and take investing activities. Therefore, the action 
                                                          
15 Bearish investors stand for the people who hold a pessimistic view of the market and believe stock 
price will decrease in the coming period. 
16 Bullish investors stand for the people who hold an optimistic view of the market and believe stock 
price will increase in the coming period. 
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conducted by the bearish investor results in market momentum, and the market 
momentum is one kind of market under-reaction. 
Conducting event study about bank’s annual report disclosure forms a novel edge for 
the current research and adds new visions to the research domain of event study, since 
past literature has not viewed event study from the perspective of annual report 
disclosure. The past literature of event study basically covers two types of events – the 
economy-wide event such as market shocks, regulatory changes, and extraordinary 
events, and the corporate event such as debt or equity issues, mergers and acquisitions, 
corporate reorganisations, and investment decisions (McKinley, 1997). Under the 
category of the corporate event, no research has touched upon the annual report 
disclosure yet. 
3.3 The Testing Procedure of Event Study 
 
Figure 3.2 The Time Framework of Event Study 
(Source: MacKinlasy, 1997) 
The figure above demonstrates the time framework when conducting an event study. The model in 
predicting the expected return is estimated under the estimation window. The estimated regression 
model can be the constant mean return model which assumes that the expected return is the average 
return of the estimation period, or the market model which correlates the security return with the market 
index return, or the economic model such as CAPM and APT, etc. The event window is used to get the 
abnormal return by calculating the difference between the actual return and the abnormal return. The 
event date is normally in the middle of the event window. The post-event window is made redundant in 
most event studies, though under several cases the post-event window can also be used as the function 
of the estimation window. The data used under the time framework of event study is normally daily 
data. The time period of the estimation window, which is the period from 𝑇0  to 𝑇1,  is generally 
composed of the daily data spanning the period of several hundred days such as 100 days, 250 days, etc. 
The time period of the event window, which is the period from 𝑇1 to 𝑇2,  is generally composed of the 
daily data spanning the period of several days such as 11 days, 31 days, etc. 
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A. Research Sample 
The first step in conducting an event study is to construct a research sample. The event 
study is one of many tools to test market efficiency, thus the research sample should 
be built around the goal to test how the market responds to newly arrived information. 
The newly arrived information can be the announcement of stock dividend, stock split, 
earnings, etc. and the newly arrived information can be more comprehensive like the 
annual report of a company. The newly arrived information can also be very occasional 
as in the case of the 911 terrorist attack in New York. A group of companies which 
have a common exposure to a certain event can be put into the data pool of an event 
study. 
B. Determining the Event Date 
Determining the event date is crucial in event study, since the study is conducted 
around the time when a specific event happens. In general, the event date is chosen as 
the day when the event happens such as the announcement day of stock dividend, the 
announcement day of stock split, the announcement day of earnings, etc., though in 
several cases the event timing can also be the minute or the month when the event 
happens17. In the usual case when choosing the event date as a specific day, the event 
study will designate the event date as day zero and put this date in the middle of the 
event window.  
 
 
                                                          
17 In most cases, the event study chooses daily data for analysis. The adaptation of monthly data is 
observed in several event studies if the event has a significant and in-depth meaning that lingers into 
the future. However, the adoption of monthly data in event study has a potential bias, since there are 
many factors in the longer term that can potentially affect the stock price besides the designated event. 
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C. Defining the Period to Be Analysed 
There are two periods that need to be specified in event study. One is the estimation 
period (estimation window) which is the period used to get the regression model in 
order to calculate the expected return. The other is the event period (event window) 
which is the period used to calculate the abnormal return which is the difference 
between the actual return and the expected return. The visualised image of the 
estimation period and event period is shown in figure 3.2. The estimation period is 
from 𝑇0 to 𝑇1, in which the time length of the estimation period can be up to 100 days 
or even 250 days. The event period is from 𝑇1 to 𝑇2, in which the time length of the 
event period can be up to 16 days or even 31 days. 
D. Choosing an Equilibrium Model under the Estimation Window 
In order to get the expected return, an equilibrium regression model should be applied. 
The regression model is obtained through the estimation window. A number of 
regression models can be assumed under the estimation window such as the constant 
mean return model, the factor model, the market model, the capital asset pricing model, 
and the arbitrage pricing model. These regression models can be loosely categorized 
into two groups: the statistical model and the economic model. The statistical model 
such as the constant mean return model assumes that individual returns are jointly 
multivariate normally distributed across the defined time period. The economic model 
such as the asset pricing model not only considers the statistical meaning of the model 
but also considers the reality meaning of the model (Campbell et al., 1997).  
Shown below, this research introduces several commonly used models in estimating 
the expected return: 
 The constant mean return model  
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                                                         𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                    (3.1) 
The constant mean return model is the simplest model in estimating the expected return 
of a given security. In equation 3.1,  𝑢𝑖 stands for the mathematical mean return during 
a specific time period, in which the specific time period is the defined estimation 
window in event study. The time length of the estimation window in calculating the 
mean return varies in previous research, for example, Campbell, Lo, and MacKinaly 
(1997) uses 250 days as the estimation window to calculate the mean return, 
MacKinlay (1997) uses 120 trading days as the estimation window to calculate the 
mean return, and Masulis (1980) uses two separate periods which are 60 days before 
and 60 days after the event window as the estimation window to calculate the mean 
return. 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Under the constant mean return model, the expected return 
is assumed to be constant throughout the event window. Although the constant mean 
return model seems very simple, several empirical studies (e.g. Lakonishok and 
Vermaelen, 1990; MacKinlay, 1997) have proved that the constant mean return model 
has similar estimation power to other complicated models in return prediction.  
 The market index model18 
                                                 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                      (3.2) 
The market index model correlates the individual security return with the market index 
return. As shown in equation 3.2, 𝛼𝑖 is the intercept of the regression model, 𝛽𝑖 is the 
coefficient of the market index return relating to the individual security return, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is 
the market index return, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is the error term. Under the estimation window, the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method is usually applied in finding the parameters of 
this regression model. A higher R-squared value of this model suggests a higher 
                                                          
18 This research will adopt the market index model in estimating the expected return.  
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explaining role and a greater variance reduction. Campbell et al. (1997) believe that 
the market index model has a significant improvement in measuring the expected 
return than the constant mean return model, since the market index model greatly 
reduces the variance of expected return by considering the correlation between 
individual stock return and market return.  
 The capital asset pricing model  
As shown in equation 3.3, the expected return 𝐸(𝑅𝑖) can be divided into two parts: the 
expected risk-free rate 𝐸(𝑅0) and the expected return rewarded from bearing market 
risk  𝛽[𝐸(𝑅𝑚) − 𝐸(𝑅0)]. 𝛽 is the coefficient of the expected market risk premium. A 
stock with higher beta represents a higher risk but may compensate investors a higher 
return. [𝐸(𝑅𝑚) − 𝐸(𝑅0)]  is the expected risk premium.  
                                        𝐸(𝑅𝑖) = 𝐸(𝑅0) + 𝛽[𝐸(𝑅𝑚) − 𝐸(𝑅0)]                           (3.3) 
The modern CAPM is written as equation 3.4, where 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) stands for the expected 
return, (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) is the market risk factor, 𝛼𝑖  is the intercept which stands for 
factors that are unable to be explained by the market risk, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 stands for the market 
return, 𝑅𝑓𝑡 stands for the risk-free rate, 𝛽𝑖 stands for the stock sensitivity to the market 
risk premium and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 stands for the error term. 
                                     𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝑅𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                         (3.4) 
Compared to the market index model, Brown and Warner (1985) have found no 
evidence indicating that the CAPM is superior in predicting the expected return, and 
believe that the CAPM could be regarded as a special case of the market index model. 
 The arbitrage pricing model in estimating the expected return 
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Ross (1976) presents the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) derived from the law of one 
price: if two items are the same, they cannot be sold at different prices. Unlike the 
CAPM, the assumption of a mean-variance market portfolio is not needed in deriving 
the APT. The APT uses different economic variables to predict the stock return. The 
model is shown in equation 3.5, where 𝑎𝑖 is the constant term,  𝐼 stands for different 
economic factors that could affect the expected return, 𝑏  is the coefficient of the 
economic factor, and 𝑒𝑖 is the error term. The economic factor should be significant in 
explaining the expected return, and different economic factors should not be correlated 
with each other. The economic factors can be inflation, GDP growth, interest rate, etc. 
The company specific variables are not included in the context of the APT. Chen et al. 
(1986) find that industrial production, inflation, shifting in the yield curve and change 
in the risk premium of corporate bonds are significantly economic factors in explaining 
the variation of expected return. The APT can be treated as a special case of the multi-
factor model under the context of arbitrage equilibrium. 
                        𝐸(𝑅𝑖) = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏1𝑖𝐼1 + 𝑏2𝑖𝐼2 + 𝑏3𝑖𝐼3 +⋅⋅⋅ +𝑏𝑗𝑖𝐼𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖                     (3.5) 
Any model described above can be used as an equilibrium model in estimating the 
expected return, though the market index model is the most popular one used by the 
previous research in estimating the expected return. 
E. Calculating the Abnormal Return and Its Statistical Significance 
The method to calculate the abnormal return is shown in equation 3.6, where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 
stands for the abnormal return, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 stands for the actual return and 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 stands for the 
expected return. The expected return is estimated by one of the equilibrium models 
described above. The corresponding period of equation 3.6 is the event window. 
                                                  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡                                                    (3.6) 
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Normally, one event observation is not enough to give a conclusive result, and thus we 
need several event observations. After calculating the abnormal returns through these 
event observations, we need to aggregate these individual abnormal returns together. 
The average abnormal return for each day in the event window should be calculated 
through this method. 
Shown by equation 3.7, if sampling a large amount of abnormal returns, the 
distribution of these abnormal returns should follow the normal distribution.                                              
                                             𝐴𝑅𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2(𝐴𝑅𝑖))                                                     (3.7) 
While analysing the variance, it often uses the t-test to judge the significance of the 
variance of abnormal returns. The t-statistic can be calculated as equation 3.8, in which 
the abnormal return is divided by the standard deviation of abnormal returns in the 
estimation window. 
                                              t − statistic =
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖
                                                    (3.8) 
However, the traditional t-test which is shown in equation 3.8 may overlook the issues 
of cross-sectional correlation of abnormal returns and distortions from event-induced 
volatility changes, leading to an over-rejection of the null hypothesis of zero average 
abnormal returns (Kolari and Pynnönen, 2010). There are several attempts to modify 
the shortcomings of the t-test. Patell (1976) suggests standardising each  𝐴𝑅𝑖 before 
the test statistic by the forecast-error corrected standard deviation. The standardised 
abnormal return ( 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡) can be calculated as below. 
                                              𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =
 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
                                                         (3.9) 
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Patell (1976) adjusts the standard error by the forecast error, since the event-window 
abnormal returns are out-of-sample predictions. As shown in equation 3.10, 𝑇0 is the 
first day of the estimation window, 𝑇1 is the last day of the estimation window,  𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖 
is the standard deviation of abnormal returns in the estimation window,  𝑀𝑖  is the 
number of matched returns in the estimation window,  𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the matched return in 
the estimation window, and ?̅?𝑚  is the average value of the matched returns in the 
estimation window.  
                             𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2 = 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖
2 (1 +
1
 𝑀𝑖
+
 (𝑅𝑚,𝑡−?̅?𝑚)
2
∑  (𝑅𝑚,𝑡−?̅?𝑚)2
𝑇1
𝑡=𝑇0
)                               (3.10) 
The Patell or the standardised residual test statistic on day t during the event window 
can be calculated by equation 3.11, where 𝑀𝑖 is the number of matched returns in the 
estimation window,  𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is distributed as a t-distribution with  𝑀𝑖 − 2 degrees of 
freedom under the null hypothesis of 𝑆𝐴𝑅 = 0,  𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡 is the sum of the standardised 
abnormal returns over the sample and  𝑆𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑙−𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡 can be obtained through equation 
3.12. 
                                          𝑍𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑙 =
 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡
 𝑆𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑙−𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡
                                                 (3.11) 
                                       𝑆𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑙−𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡
2 = ∑
𝑀𝑖−2
𝑀𝑖−4
𝑁
𝑖=1                                               (3.12) 
Similarly, Boehmer et al. (1991) propose a standardised cross-sectional test which is 
robust to the variance induced by the event. The Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen 
(BMP) test statistic on day t during the event window can be calculated by equation 
3.13, where N stands for the number of events,  𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡 is defined as the same in the 
Patell test, and  𝑆𝐵𝑀𝑃−𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡 can be obtained through equation 3.14. 
                                            𝑍𝐵𝑀𝑃 =
 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡
 √𝑁𝑆𝐵𝑀𝑃−𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡
                                              (3.13) 
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                      𝑆𝐵𝑀𝑃−𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡
2 =
1
𝑁−1
∑ ( 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 −
1
𝑁
∑  𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 )
𝑁
𝑖=1                         (3.14) 
Furthermore, Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) propose an adjusted model to the BMP 
model which takes into account the cross-correlation of abnormal returns. The 
adjusted-BMP (ADJ-BMP) test statistic on day t during the event window can be 
calculated by equation 3.15, where N stands for the number of events,  𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡  is 
defined as the same in the Patell test, 𝑆𝐵𝑀𝑃−𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡 can be obtained through equation 
3.14, and ?̅? is the average value of the sample cross-correlation of the estimation period 
abnormal returns. 
                               𝑍𝐴𝐷𝐽−𝐵𝑀𝑃 =
 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡
 √𝑁𝑆𝐵𝑀𝑃−𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡
√
1−?̅?
1+(𝑁−1)?̅?
                                   (3.15) 
F. Calculating the Cumulative Abnormal Return 
Besides the abnormal return, the cumulative abnormal return is crucial in estimating 
the impact of an event. If we choose daily data in analysis, the cumulative abnormal 
return is the sum of abnormal returns of each individual day. 
G. Examining and Discussing the Result 
The final step of event study is to analyse and discuss the empirical result. 
3.4 Sample Design and Data 
The current research uses the event study to investigate the impact of information 
disclosure on the stock price of the banking industry. The disclosure of annual report 
is considered as the occasion of an “event” to conduct the study.  
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We choose the top sixty banks internationally19 by the rank of their asset size at the 
end of 2013 as the research sample. Most of the banks have been listed on stock 
markets, but there are still ten banks among the full sample not being listed on any 
stock market. The unlisted ten banks20 within the top sixty are relatively small banks. 
Some large banks are not listed on stock markets, such as Group BPCE21 which is due 
to its newly establishment. Therefore, the sample has a total of fifty banks out of the 
top sixty banks.  
The event study designates the disclosure date of the annual report for each of the 
banks in the sample as day 0. The current research has tried its best to find the exact 
disclosure date of annual report for each of the banks in the sample from the year 1996 
to the year 2013. However, not all the disclosure dates of annual reports are traceable22. 
The event window includes a total of 11 days, where the interval of the event window 
is (-5, +5). We follow Brown and Warner (1985) to designate the interval span of the 
event window as the (-5, +5) interval, since they report that the testing power decreases 
when the abnormal return occurs beyond the (-5, +5) interval. The estimation window 
for the regression model is 120 days before the event window.  
                                                          
19 Further information regarding the rank of the world’s top banks can be traced through the website 
http://www.relbanks.com/worlds-top-banks/assets-2013. 
20 The ten banks out of the top sixty not being listed on the market are: Japan Post Bank (from Japan, 
ranked 13th), Groupe BPCE (from France, ranked 18th), Rabobank Group (from Netherlands, ranked 
29th), Postal Savings Bank of China (from China, ranked 30th), Credit Mutuel Group (from France, 
ranked 32nd), Norinchukin Bank (from Japan, ranked 36th), KfW Group (from Germany, ranked 46th), 
DZ Bank AG (from Germany, ranked 55th), La Caixa Group (from Spain, ranked 59th), and Cassa 
Depositi e Prestiti (from Italy, ranked 60th). 
21 As a result of the 2008 financial crisis, Caisse Nationale des Caisses D'épargne (CNCD) and Banque 
Fédérale des Banques Populaires (BFBP) merged in the year 2009 to become the second largest bank 
in France known as Group BPCE. 
22 The current research has tried its best to look through the historical record of bank’s website to trace 
the disclosure date of the annual report. Banks may clearly indicate the exact disclosure date in its annual 
report. Another way to find the disclosure date of the annual report is through bank’s website, there is 
an event calendar under the section of investor relation in bank’s website, and the event calendar 
contains the historical disclosure date of annual report. 
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The daily stock return of the event study is calculated through the daily stock price, in 
which the model is shown as equation 3.9. The stock price (RI) that includes the 
dividend as reinvestment is obtained from DataStream. 
                                                     𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = ln(𝑝𝑖,𝑡 /𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1)                                          (3.16) 
The stock price of each bank is chosen from the market where the bank is 
headquartered. For those Chinese banks listed on both Shanghai Stock Exchange (‘A’ 
share) and Hong Kong Stock Exchange (‘H’ share), we choose the market in which 
the stock has a longer listing period.  
Since this research has decided to use the market index model which is equation 3.2 to 
estimate the expected return, the market index becomes crucial in utilising the equation. 
The market indices chosen in this research include Hang Seng (Hong Kong), FTSE 
100 (UK), CAC 40 (French), Nikkei 225 (Japan), S&P 500 (USA), DAX (Germany), 
IBEX 35 (Spain), FTSE MIB (Italy), SMI (Switzerland), AEX (Netherlands), OMX 
(Sweden), S&P TSX (Canada), S&P ASX 200 (Australia), Shanghai Composite Index 
(China), OMXC 20 (Denmark), and Russian MICEX (Russia). Again, all the data of 
these market indices are downloaded from DataStream and calculated into the return 
form by equation 3.9. The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with clustered 
standard errors is used to find the corresponding parameters when utilising equation 
3.2. 
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3.5 Empirical Results 
 
Table 3.1 The Empirical Result of the Event Study 
The table above demonstrates the empirical result of the event study which includes abnormal return, 
ADJ-BMP test statistic of abnormal return, and cumulative abnormal return. *, **, *** denote the 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. The event date is the disclosure date of 
the annual report by a bank. The sample comprises fifty world’s top banks (by asset size in 2013) and 
the sample period is 1996-2013. Considering the data availability regarding the listing status of banks 
and the traceable disclosure date of annual reports, this research has obtained 416 event observations. 
The estimation window is 120 days ahead of the event window. The regression model is the market 
index model and the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with clustered standard errors is used to 
find the corresponding parameters of the market index model. 
 
The abnormal return and the cumulative abnormal return are both the average figures 
that are based on the 416 event observations23. As shown in the table above, within the 
event window, only day 3 has the abnormal return –0.25% with statistical significance 
at 5% level. The cumulative abnormal return in day 3 is – 0.0011. Before day 3, the 
cumulative abnormal return is positive, and after day 3, the cumulative abnormal return 
turns out to be negative. Within the event window of the 11 days, there are 6 days with 
a negative abnormal return and 5 days with a positive abnormal return. The signs of 
these abnormal returns within the event window have no clear pattern.  
                                                          
23 Considering the data availability with regard to the listing status of banks and the traceable disclosure 
date of annual reports, this research has obtained 416 event observations. 
Event Window Abnormal Return ADJ-BMP Test Statistic Cumulative Abnormal Return
-5 0.0010 0.77 0.0010
-4 0.0002 0.11 0.0012
-3 -0.0005 -0.34 0.0007
-2 0.0012 0.91 0.0019
-1 -0.0004 -0.32 0.0014
0 -0.0006 -0.43 0.0008
1 -0.0004 -0.28 0.0005
2 0.0009 0.71 0.0014
3 -0.0025  -1.98** -0.0011
4 -0.0006 -0.39 -0.0017
5 0.0006 0.45 -0.0011
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Figure 3.3 The Average Cumulative Abnormal Return 
The figure above visualises the average cumulative abnormal return for the sample of 416 event 
observations. The horizontal axis designates the day within the event window, and the vertical axis 
designates the percentage ratio of the average cumulative abnormal return. The sample is comprised of 
the world’s top sixty banks (by the asset size of 2013) and the sample period is 1996-2013. The event 
date is the disclosure date of the annual report by a bank. The event window has a total of 11 days that 
includes the event day itself. The estimation window is 120 days ahead of the event window. The 
regression model is the market index model and the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with 
clustered standard errors is applied to find the parameters of the market index model. 
 
Figure 3.3 depicts the change of the average cumulative abnormal returns across the 
event window. From this visualised image, it is not hard to find that day 3 has 
experienced a sharp decline of the average cumulative abnormal return, which drives 
the average cumulative abnormal return from approximately 0.15% in day 2 to 
approximately -0.10% in day 3. Before day 3, the average cumulative abnormal return 
is levelled around 0.10%, and after day 3, the average cumulative abnormal return is 
levelled around -0.125%. 
3.6 Discussion 
From the empirical result, over the period 1996-2013, the disclosure of annual report 
in the banking industry has shown a negative impact on stock price. This negative 
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impact has not been reflected in the stock price immediately by the release of the 
annual report, in which the negative impact is shown three days after the event. This 
empirical finding suggests that the market on average views the information within the 
annual reports of these banks as bad news over the period 1996-2013.  
Moreover, based on the pattern of the cumulative abnormal returns over the event 
window, this research has not been able to find the evidence in support of market 
efficiency which claims that the stock price has instantly and sufficiently reflected the 
newly arrived information. The pattern shown in figure 3.3, however, indicates that 
the market under-reacts to the newly arrived information. The content of information 
in bank’s annual report is massive and includes financial statement, shareholder 
information, governance, strategic report, risk review and management. The current 
result has no power to indicate which set of information specifically in bank’s annual 
report plays a negative role in reducing the stock price, but one thing for sure is that 
the general content of information in bank’s annual report has an overall negative 
impact on bank’s stock price.  
Among the existing literature, there is no research using event study to examine the 
immediate impact of annual report disclosure on stock price, therefore there is a lack 
of references to compare. However, this research has found several studies which can 
explain the empirical result derived from the current research in certain aspects. 
Brown et al. (1988) find that investors generally respond in a negative way to uncertain 
information which is due to the psychological need of risk aversion. The release of 
uncertain information will make investors feel higher uncertainty of the prospect of a 
company, and this higher uncertainty will make investors require a higher return by 
holding the stock of the company which drives down its stock price. The event study 
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carried out by Brown et al. (1988) also shows that the market usually responds to 
uncertain information in a time-lagged manner, though Brown et al. (1988) have not 
explained in detail the reasons for the lagged response. 
Campbell and Hentschel (1992) document the phenomenon which has been mentioned 
in previous studies – ‘no news is good news’. It seems plausible that market volatility 
will be raised by newly appeared information. Higher volatility is a potential risk for 
investors, therefore a higher expected return will be imposed on the stock and a lower 
current stock price will be materialized. Using the model of changing variance (a 
quadratic generalised autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic or QGACH model), 
Campbell and Hentschel (1992) prove that the volatility feedback effect is important 
during the high volatility period. Under the case of annual report disclosure, the release 
of the annual report has the power to increase the stock return volatility of a company, 
which will subsequently raise the expected return and decrease the value of its current 
stock price. 
Compared to good news, it seems that the market needs more time to assimilate and 
accept bad news. Taffler et al. (2004) analyse the stock price reaction to the disclosure 
of UK going-concern audit report in the calendar year subsequent to the report 
disclosure year. Over this period, the firms in the sample underperformed by between 
24% and 31% compared with their expected returns. The phenomenon of market 
under-reaction to such report release contained with bad news is demonstrated by the 
post-earning announcement drifts in stock return. Whatever the reasons for such stock 
mispricing, Taffler et al. (2004) believe that the costly arbitrage which prevents 
rational investors bringing stock prices back to fundamental values could not be 
neglected. Meanwhile, Taffler et al. (2004) do not reject the behavioural proposition 
that investors are, in fact, biased in their ability to process the bad news conveyed by 
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the going-concern audit report. Frazzini (2006) points out that the market under-
reaction to bad news is caused by the disposition effect, which states that investors are 
unwilling to recognize losses and willing to realise gains. Using the event study with 
a sample of firms from the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) Korea in 2008 and 2009, 
Lee et al. (2015) investigate the market response to firms' voluntary carbon 
information disclosure. Their empirical result suggests that the market is likely to 
respond in a negative way to firms' carbon disclosure, implying that investors tend to 
perceive carbon disclosure as bad news and care about potential costs facing firms for 
addressing the issue of carbon disclosure. In addition, the drifts of negative return are 
also observed following the carbon disclosure, which suggests that the market under-
reacts to the bad news contained within the CDP.  
However, we should note that the event study is only useful in determining the short-
term impact of a certain event on stock price. From the empirical result of the current 
research, the disclosure of annual report has a short-term detrimental impact on bank’s 
stock price. Whereas, the impact of the annual report disclosure in the longer term 
might be positive on bank’s stock price. Bhat (2008) finds a positive association 
between information disclosure and stock’s fair value. Bhat (2008) quantifies the 
information disclosure of sampled banks into an index and uses regression analysis to 
test the coefficient of the index. Several control variables are also added into the 
regression model. Since the coefficient of the index is positive and statistically 
significant, Bhat (2008) argues that information disclosure is helpful to increase 
stock’s fair value and aid market participants in estimating share prices. In particular, 
the modified banking estimation sensitivity disclosure by SFAS 24  assists market 
                                                          
24 The SFAS stands for the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards, which details policies and 
accounting rules in the financial report of a company. 
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participants in interpreting financial information and forecasting future share price. 
Bhattacharya et al. (2002) explore the link between the earning opacity and the trading 
volume in different countries. Bhattacharya et al. (2002) have measured three 
dimensions of the earning opacity which are earning aggressiveness, loss avoidance, 
and earning smoothing. By controlling the influence of other financial variables, the 
general finding is that an increase of the earning opacity leads to a decrease of stock 
trading volume and an increase of stock fair value. Dye (1985) analyses the impact of 
information disclosure on stock price, in which he finds that shareholders prefer the 
company which has disclosed relatively large amounts of information. If there is no 
information disclosure for a specific company, the company stock will become less 
popular in the market and lead to a lower market price. A company with a popular 
market focus is easier to raise demand for its stock and result in a higher market price. 
Baumann and Nier (2004) investigate the relationship between the stock return 
volatility and the information disclosure of a bank, and find that the bank which has 
disclosed more information will have a lower stock return volatility. The lower stock 
return volatility offers the bank a lower cost of capital and a higher market valuation 
when it seeks to finance from the market. 
Besides investigating the short-term impact of annual report disclosure, another goal 
of this research is to examine the market efficiency theory by seeing how quickly the 
market responds to the release of annual reports. The current research has not found 
evidence in support of the semi-strong form of market efficiency which claims that the 
market instantly and sufficiently reflects all the historical and current market 
information, since there is a lagged response to the release of annual reports. An 
intuitively possible explanation might be that the annual report is a comprehensive 
document depicting all sides of bank’s performance, therefore the market needs some 
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time to digest the information of annual report and this digestion has caused this delay 
in response. The previous research using event study (e.g.  Grier and Albin, 1973; Firth, 
1975; Dodd and Ruback, 1997) has found evidence in support of the semi-strong form 
of market efficiency, in which the event itself in these studies is relatively simple and 
straightforward to comprehend by the market such as earning statement, dividend 
payment, stock split. Compared to these events, the event in the current research 
obviously needs more time and effort to be interpreted by the market.  
Meanwhile, a new theory may shed fresh light on the definition of market efficiency. 
Lo (2004, 2005) reconciles the market efficiency with market anomalies by proposing 
the adaptive market hypothesis. Lo (2004, 2005) argues that market efficiency and 
market anomalies are not contradictory to each other, but they are compatible like two 
sides of a coin. Lo (2004, 2005) describes the financial world is like an ecosystem and 
the market investor is like a creature trying to survive in this ecosystem. The cognitive 
biases which lead to market anomalies – loss aversion, overconfidence, anchoring, 
mental accounting, etc. are like intuitive tactics to survive in this ecosystem. The 
financial analysis like the asset pricing model is the weapon used by investors in this 
ecosystem. The evolution of the financial system is constant just like the evolution of 
the ecosystem. Investors in the financial market always adjust their behaviours to the 
changing environment. As observed in the ecosystem and stated in the Charles 
Darwin’s theory, only the most suitable ones will survive, and this fact also applies to 
the financial world. If this theory applies, the timing of the market’s response to the 
newly arrived information might be varied from time to time, sometimes early, 
sometimes late. However, the direction of the trend in the change of the market is clear 
just like the change of the season in weather. Although the adaptive market hypothesis 
50 
 
is still at a very rudimentary stage with a qualitative phrase, Lo (2012) believes that 
this theory will have a profound impact on the financial world in the future. 
3.7 Conclusion 
Through the event study of annual report disclosure in the banking industry, this 
chapter has two findings to contribute.  
First, the market on average views the information within the annual reports by banks 
as bad news over the period 1996-2013, since shortly after the annual report release, 
the stock price has been significantly and negatively affected. However, the event 
study could only target the short term impact, the impact of information disclosure 
might be different in the longer term.  
Second, the empirical result of the event study does not fully support the semi-strong 
form of market efficiency, since there is a lagged response to the information 
disclosure. Two reasons are proposed to explain the lagged response. One is drawn 
from the behaviour perspective which suggests that the market is in general reluctant 
to accept bad news and thus needs more time to assimilate bad news into stock pricing. 
The other one is the intuitive speculation, which assumes that the depth and amount of 
information in bank’s annual report needs more time and effort to be digested by the 
market compared to a relatively simple feature event such as dividend payment and 
stock split.  
The annual report concludes all-around and comprehensive information of a bank. In 
the following chapters, this research will specifically look at the risk information 
disclosure, with the focus on the risk information disclosure status and its association 
with bank’s performance. 
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Chapter 4  
Risk Information Disclosure Status among World’s 
Top Banks 
A Look from the Perspectives of  
Market and Operational Risk Information Disclosures 
4.1 Introduction  
Traditionally, credit risk that a borrower fails to meet the obligation under a contract 
is regarded as the biggest threat facing a bank. Among the existing literature, there is 
a relatively thorough discussion of credit risk and how to manage credit risk in the 
banking industry (e.g. Berger and Udell, 1990; Wong, 1997; Altman and Saunders, 
1998; Jiménez and Saurina, 2004, 2006). In the modern banking industry, risk 
management is no longer only about credit risk. However, besides credit risk, other 
risk disclosures in the banking industry are rarely tackled by previous studies. 
Therefore, this research decides to take a look at other risk disclosures which are the 
market and operational risks in the banking industry. This chapter will present the 
disclosure status regarding the market and operational risks in the banking industry.  
The most influential banking regulation guidance is the Basel Accord. The Basel 
Accord II was put forward in 2004. Compared to the Basel Accord I which only 
specifies the information disclosure of credit risk, the Basel Accord II has added the 
information disclosures of market risk and operational risk into regulations. Market 
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risk means the risk derived from the movements of market factors including interest 
rates, foreign exchange rates, credit spreads, commodity prices and equity prices, 
which may reduce asset value. Operational risk is the potential loss derived from 
inadequate processes including incidents related to people, systems or external events, 
which may also reduce asset value. In addition, operational risk covers several sub-
categories, in which the two most important ones are reputation risk, and legal risk. 
Reputation risk derived from an event, action, investment or transaction can shake the 
trust of clients, shareholders, employees or broader public in the firm’s competence 
and integrity. Legal risk is the loss derived from failures in complying with contractual 
obligations or in complying with regulations which the firm is subject to.  
This research adopts the Value-at-Risk disclosure index (VaRDI) from Pérignon and 
Smith (2010) to measure the market risk information disclosure, and adopts the 
operational risk disclosure index (ORDI) from Goyal and Wu (2007) to measure the 
operational risk information disclosure. The research sample covers the world’s top 
sixty banks ranked by asset size in 2013. The correlation between VaRDI and ORDI 
across the sample is 0.66 with 1% statistical significance. 
This chapter is outlined as follows. Section two reviews several indices designed to 
measure the information disclosure in corporate finance. Section three introduces the 
VaRDI, and section four introduces the ORDI. Section five illustrates the data 
gathering process which includes data selection, data period and data sources. Section 
six and section seven present the statistical description of VaRDI and ORDI 
respectively for the world’s top sixty banks and the average value for the 
corresponding countries which these banks originate from. Section eight is a 
comparison part in terms of the status of risk information disclosures with Pérignon 
and Smith (2010). As with Pérignon and Smith (2010), this comparison pays particular 
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attention to the banking industries in the US and Canada. Section nine briefly 
summarizes the findings of this chapter at the end. 
4.2 Designed Indices in Measuring Information Disclosures 
A designed index is widely used in the research of corporate finance to measure 
information disclosures:  
To measure a certain amount of information released by manufacturing companies, 
Botosan (1997) designs a disclosure index covering six main elements of a company 
which are background information, ten or five-year summary of historical results, key 
non-financial statistics, projected information, and management discussion and 
analysis. The index is composited by analysing the information from the annual reports 
of manufacturing companies.  
La Porta et al. (1998) investigate the protection level of corporate law on company’s 
shareholders and creditors. In order to compare the difference of the protection among 
companies in different countries, La Porta et al. (1998) use six parameters to measure 
the rights of shareholders. Each parameter reflects one principle in protecting the rights 
of shareholders, and each parameter has a binary answer which is zero or one. If the 
law of a company has covered the issue relating to one specific parameter, the company 
will get one point from that parameter. In theory, the index in measuring the protection 
level could be scored from zero to six. However, in reality, La Porta et al. (1998) find 
no company scored over five. 
To analyse the effect of information disclosures on stock return volatility, Bushee and 
Noe (2000) use the index from the Association for Investment and Management 
Research (AIMR). The AIMR published the disclosure practice index for 4314 firms 
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between 1982 and 1996. The goal of the index provided by the AIMR is to improve 
communications between company’s governance and investment community. The 
AIMR disclosure index has not only focused on the information disclosure from firms’ 
annual reports but also captured analysts’ views and assessments. 
Similar to the AIMR index, the Center for International Financial Analysis and 
Research (CIFAR) produced the corporate information disclosure index for 1000 
companies around the world between 1993 and 1995. The CIFAR index considers 
seven main aspects of corporate information disclosures: general information, income 
statement, balance sheet, cash statement, accounting policy, stakeholder information, 
and supplementary information. Each aspect of the seven has its own sub-elements 
that a total of eighty-five variables are included in the index. Both of the indices 
provided from AIMR and CIFAR are in percentage terms. A higher percentage 
indicates a higher level of information disclosure. Theoretically, the highest score of 
the index is 100%. In the editing process of CIFAR, if a company has released 
information covering one variable of the total eighty-five variables, the index will add 
one point into the nominator, and the denominator is eighty-five which stands for all 
the eighty-five variables. If a specific item of the eighty-five variables is not applicable 
to the company, the index reduces one point from the denominator but the nominator 
remains unchanged. This step in editing the CIFAR index is not a fully satisfactory 
procedure, since it does not penalise the company which has not disclosed non-
applicable items and the line between the non-applicable and the unavailable item is 
sometimes blurred. Despite this drawback, the CIFAR index is widely used in research. 
For instance, Hope (2003) uses the CIFAR index to find that an enhanced information 
disclosure would be helpful to increase the accuracy of analysts’ estimations. 
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Khanna et al. (2004) use two indices to analyse the relationship between information 
disclosure and foreign firm’s interaction with the US economy. The disclosure index 
in Khanna et al. (2004) is borrowed from the survey conducted by Standard and Poor 
(hereafter, S&P) in 2002 ‘Transparency and Disclosure Survey for companies in 
various countries around the world’. The Transparency and Disclosure index of S&P 
(2002) provides information disclosure ratings for 794 firms in 24 countries. The S&P 
created the index by examining company’s annual reports and regulatory filings of 98 
items. Under the S&P index, three main elements are considered and each main 
element contains several sub-elements: financial transparency and information 
disclosure (35 items), board and management (35 items) and ownership structure (28 
items). The S&P index is a company-level index, Khanna et al. (2004) transform the 
company-level index into a country-level index. In measuring the intensity of market 
interaction, Khanna et al. (2004) design an index themselves by considering three 
factors which are capital, product, and labour. The sub-elements of the three main 
factors include a total of eleven variables, such as whether a company has been listed 
on US markets, whether a company has a direct investment in the US, whether a 
company has exported or imported from the US, etc. Each of the eleven sub-elements 
has a binary answer which is zero or one that contributes to the total score of the index.  
The banking information disclosure could also be measured using composite indices. 
Baumann and Nier (2003, 2004) test the impacts of information transparency by a 
sample of six-hundred banks in thirty-one countries over the period 1993-2000. The 
transparency level is measured by three indices respectively. The first one is the index 
adopted from the Center for International Financial Analysis Research (CIFAR) which 
measures the transparency level for 1000 companies over the world in the 1990s. The 
second index is a binary index which only considers whether a bank has been listed on 
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the US stock market. The US stock market requires a significantly comprehensive 
information disclosure, thus the company listed on the US stock market is a good sign 
of a higher level of information disclosures. The third index is designed by Baumann 
and Nier (2003, 2004) which is an aggregate disclosure index. There are seventeen 
items under the index, which includes loans by maturity, loans by type, loans by 
counterparty, problem loans, problem loans by type, securities by type, securities by 
holding purpose, deposits by maturity, deposits by type of customer, money market 
funding, long-term funding, reserves, capital, contingent liabilities, off-balance sheet 
items, non-interest income and loan loss provisions. A designed disclosure index 
looking at the market risk information is exhibited in Hirtle (2007). Compared to the 
index of Baumann and Nier (2003, 2004) looking at a general information disclosure 
in the banking industry, the index of Hirtle (2007) looks specifically at the disclosures 
of market risk information in the banking industry. The information about the Value-
at-Risk25 is the main focus in composing this index. There are five categories in the 
index: the first category is an overall description of VaR which includes items of 
holding period, confidence level, yearly average VaR, year-end VaR, minimum and 
maximum of VaR, VaR limit, and histogram of VaRs. The second category is the VaR 
by its risk type seeing whether a bank has disclosed the risk type information about 
yearly average VaR, year-end VaR, and minimum and maximum VaR. The third 
category is the back-testing of VaR including the chart of daily profits and losses (P&L) 
versus daily VaR, and the number of days which the loss has exceeded VaR. The fourth 
category is related to market movements including the histogram of daily trading P&L, 
and the value of the largest daily loss. The fifth category considers the stress test of 
VaR, which includes items of stress test mentioning, stress test description, and stress 
                                                          
25 The Value-at-Risk methodology is a forward-looking way to measure market risk, which states that 
the probability of loss on a portfolio over a given time horizon exceeds a certain amount of value is p.   
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test result. Each item will grant one point into the index if the bank has disclosed or 
presented relevant information in its annual report. 
4.3 A Proposed Approach to Measure the Disclosure Level of Market 
Risk Information in the Banking Industry 
In the Basel Accord II, the suggested approach by the Basel Committee to measure the 
market risk information disclosure is the Value-at-Risk analysis. The degree of 
transparency regarding the market risk information can be analysed around the issue 
of Value-at-Risk (VaR). VaR is a forward-looking method of measuring market risk, 
which gives investors an advantage to manage market risk and also helps financial 
regulators to better formulate policies. Financial analysts can also use the disclosed 
VaR information to compare the risk profiles among different assets.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Value-at-Risk 
(Source: Culp et al., 1998) 
This graph illustrates the 5% probability of VaR at n-period is -$10X, which means that in the future n-
period, there is a 5% probability the principal of an investment will lose $10X or more. 
 
The graph shown above (Culp et al., 1998) gives a flavour of the basic idea about the 
theory of Value-at-Risk. The VaR distribution represents the distribution of returns for 
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an investment portfolio. In figure 5.1, a 5% confidence interval corresponds to the 
$10X loss, which means that there is a 5% chance that the investment will loss $10X 
or more in the future n-period.  
There are mainly two ways for companies and banks to measure VaR, which are the 
historical simulation and the Monte-Carlo simulation. The historical simulation 
method predicts the future return by using the fact of the previous return, which 
assumes that the historical data has the capability to manifest the future performance. 
The Monte-Carlo simulation method predicts the future return by using computer 
software to randomly generate n26 future returns based on an assumed distribution 
hypothesis, in which the distribution hypothesis can be a normal distribution but not 
necessarily be a normal distribution. Both of these two ways are widely adopted by 
banks. Each method has its own advantage: the historical method is relatively easy to 
implement; the Monte-Carlo simulation method can use any distribution hypothesis to 
model unlimited hypothetical returns, and the Monte-Carlo simulation method is 
especially useful when we conduct stress test. 
Because of the emergence of the Basel Accord in the early 1990s, bank regulators have 
prodded the banking industry to adopt the VaR methodology to measure market risk. 
This strong recommendation of using VaR as the method to measure market risk has 
been slowly responded to by the banking industry. No banks in the early 1990s adopted 
the regulator’s recommendation by using the VaR method to measure market risk. 
After 1995, the phrase of ‘Value-at-Risk’ gradually showed in the annual reports of 
several large banks such as HSBC and Barclays. Nowadays, nearly all US banks have 
adopted the VaR method in measuring market risk, and the US Securities and 
                                                          
26 The number n can be 1000, 10,000 and even more, in which the bigger n will give a higher confidence 
level of prediction.  
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Exchange Commission (SEC) forcibly require all large and listed US banks to disclose 
the market risk information using the VaR method. 
Another advantage point of VaR is its power to predict stock return volatility. Jorion 
(2002a) shows that the Value-at-Risk is informative for future stock return volatility. 
Jorion (2002a) regresses the stock return volatility on the lagged Value-at-Risk. The 
result shows that the VaR is a statistically significant factor in explaining the variation 
of future stock return volatility, i.e., the information regarding VaR is helpful in 
predicting future stock return volatility. Therefore, investors could more efficiently 
hedge market risk by the information disclosures about VaR. Furthermore, Jorion 
(2002b) proves that the change of VaRs is also positively correlated with the change 
of a bank’s future trading revenues and that a bank which has reported a low VaR 
figure tends to have a limited downside risk in its future trading activity, and vice versa.  
Pérignon and Smith (2010) design the Value-at-Risk disclosure index (VaRDI) to 
measure the quality and quantity of market risk information disclosures among the 
world’s top banks. Our research adopts their method to measure the market risk 
information disclosures in the banking industry. By doing so, our research will give a 
comparison result with an updated period with Pérignon and Smith (2010). 
VaRDI has 6 categories which monitor 6 facets of the VaR reporting quantity and 
quality. 
 1. VaR characteristics (maximum 2 points) 
a. 1 point – the holding period (e.g. 1 day, 1 week) 
b. 1 point – the confidence level (e.g. 95%, 99%) 
 2. VaR statistics (maximum 4 points) 
a. 1 point – the high, low or average VaR 
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b. 1 point – the year-end VaR 
c. 1 point – the VaR risk category (e.g. currency, option, equity) 
d. 1 point – considering the diversification effect 
 3. Intertemporal comparison (maximum 1 point) 
a. 1 point – compared with the previous year VaR 
 4. Daily VaR graph (maximum 2 points) 
a. 1 point – the histogram about daily VaRs  
b. OR 2 points – the plot of daily VaRs  
 5. Trading revenues (maximum 4 points) 
a. 1 point – the hypothetical revenue 
b. 1 point – the revenues deducted from the trading costs 
c. 1 point – the histogram of daily revenues 
d. OR 2 points – the plot of daily revenues 
 6. Back-testing (maximum 2 points) 
a. 1 point – the number of exceptions or 2 points – zero exception 
b. 1 point – the explanation of exceptions 
Adding together the points each category graded, the highest score of VaRDI will be 
15 and the lowest score of VaRDI will be 0.  
The elements 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, 6a and 6b within the VaRDI have covered all the concepts 
of the required market risk disclosures under the Basel Accord II, while the elements 
1a, 1b, 2a and 3a within the VaRDI have covered certain concepts of the required 
market risk disclosures by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
Therefore, the VaRDI is a comprehensive disclosure index not only considering the 
market risk information disclosures required by the Basel Accord II but also 
considering the market risk information disclosures required by the SEC standard. The 
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requirements of market risk information disclosures are slightly different between the 
Basel Accord II and the SEC standard. The disclosure of the year-end VaR is required 
under the Basel Accord II but not required under the SEC standard. The back-testing 
of VaR is required under the Basel Accord II but not required under the SEC standard. 
The intertemporal comparison of VaR is required under the SEC standard but not 
required under the Basel Accord II.  
1a and 1b are the basic elements of VaR, which are required by both the Basel Accord 
II and the SEC standard. VaR assumes that an investment will not lose a certain amount 
of money in the future n-period under a certain confidence level (e.g. 95%). 1a reflects 
the holding period in the definition of VaR and awards a bank 1 point if the bank has 
reported the holding period of VaR, and 1b reflects the confidence level in the 
definition of VaR and awards a bank 1 point if the bank has reported the confidence 
level of VaR. 
2a awards 1 point to the bank which has reported the range of VaR (high, low or 
average). 2b awards 1 point to the bank which has reported the year-end figure of VaR. 
2c awards 1 point to the bank which has reported the category of VaR for different 
trading risks such as the trading risks regarding options, equities or bonds. Different 
assets may be correlated with each other, thus the bank is awarded 1 point (2d) if the 
bank has taken the consideration of the diversification effect of different assets into 
the calculation of VaR.  
The report of the comparison of VaR (3a) is awarded 1 point; it does not matter 
whether the comparison of VaR is between the current year and the year before, or the 
comparison of VaR is between the current year and several years in the past.   
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The graphic view of VaR gives investors a direct sense of VaR status, so the VaRDI 
awards the bank which has released the VaR diagram in the form of histogram or plot. 
The plot of VaRs shows the trend of VaR. The plot is much easier than the histogram 
to pinpoint the loss exceeding the hypothetical value. For this reason, the plot of VaRs 
(4b) is awarded 2 points higher than the histogram of VaRs (4a) which is awarded 1 
point.  
VaR is concerned with the loss of trading activities, but the back-testing of VaR 
requires using relevant hypothetical revenues. The VaRDI, therefore, awards points 
for the disclosures of hypothetical revenue: 5a awards a bank 1 point if the bank has 
released the information on hypothetical revenue, and 5b awards a bank 1 point if the 
bank has considered the trading cost in calculating the hypothetical revenue. 
Visualising the hypothetical revenue will get additional points for banks. The plot of 
daily revenues depicts the change of hypothetical revenues over time, which is superior 
to the histogram of hypothetical revenues. Therefore, 5d awards 2 points to the bank 
for the plot of hypothetical revenues and 5c awards 1 point to the bank for the 
histogram of hypothetical revenues.  
The category 6 of VaRDI deals with the VaR back-testing; 6a awards a bank 1 point 
if the bank has reported the number of exceptions when conducting the back-testing. 
In the case where there is zero exception under the back-testing which indicates that a 
bank is prudent in VaR reporting, 6a awards the bank 2 points. If a bank explains the 
reason behind the exceptions of VaR in a detailed manner, 6b awards the bank 1 point. 
The categories 4 and 5 of VaRDI should be paid specific attention when allocating 
points. The maximum score for category 4 is 2. If a bank releases both the histogram 
and the plot of daily VaRs at the same time, the VaRDI does not allocate 1 point to 4a 
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and 2 points to 4b, instead it only allocates 1 point to 4a and 1 point to 4b, which will 
help to keep the maximum score of category 4 as 2. The maximum score for category 
5 is 4. If a bank releases both the histogram and the plot of daily revenues at the same 
time, the VaRDI does not allocate 1 point to 5c and 2 points to 5d; instead it only 
allocates 1 point to 5c and 1 point to 5d, which will help to keep the maximum score 
of category 5 as 4. 
4.4 A Proposed Approach to Measure the Disclosure Level of 
Operational Risk Information in the Banking Industry 
As modern technology is widely implemented into the operation of the banking 
industry, the incidents related to people, systems or external events are becoming more 
likely than ever before. The concept of operational risk is new, but the facts the 
operational risks – at least part of them – have existed in the banking industry for 
decades. Many of the operational risks are due to the aftermath of the expansion of the 
banking industry, together with the fact that the banking industry in the twenty-first 
century is transforming itself into a digital stage. The subsequent legal and reputational 
risks derived from inappropriate operational procedures are detrimental to the health 
of the banking industry. The origins of legal and reputational risks are not fixed, and 
each incident has its own characteristics. As a comprehensive countermeasure, the 
Basel Accord II includes the operational risk disclosure as a mandatory disclosure 
practice for the banking industry. 
Operational risk involves complex activities, and the Basel Committee has illustrated 
guidelines for the disclosures of operational risks. The Basel Accord II suggests that 
the operational risk disclosures should also include the controlling methods for 
operational risks. Senior management in the banking industry should set up necessary 
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procedures for measuring, monitoring, and controlling operational risks, particularly 
estimating the size and probability of operational incidents. The approach by including 
the controlling methods in operational risk disclosures is preventive and sound. The 
controlling methods of operational risks should constitute the main part of operational 
risk disclosures. The Basel Accord II lists several crucial qualitative elements for an 
effective operational risk control, including good management information system, 
senior management involvement, personnel training, strong internal control, and 
contingency planning (Chorafas, 2003). Moreover, since the new capital adequacy 
framework in the Basel Accord II requires capital reserves for operational risk, an 
enhanced operational risk control also needs advanced quantitative models to calculate 
the amount of adequate capital reserves for operational risks. 
Our research adopts a composite index similar to the VaRDI to measure the quality 
and quantity of operational risk information disclosures among the world’s top banks, 
which is the operational risk disclosure index (ORDI), and the ORDI is originally 
developed by Goyal and Wu (2007). 
 1. Recognition and definition of operational risk (maximum 3 points) 
a. 1 point – recognition and definition of operational risk as a risk exposure 
b. 1 point – recognition and definition of reputational risk as a risk exposure 
c. 1 point – recognition and definition of legal risk as a risk exposure 
 2. Operational risk capital (maximum 3 points) 
a. 1 point – operational risk capital reported in percentage terms 
b. OR 2 points – operational risk capital reported in currency terms 
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c. 1 point – the calculation method of operational risk capital explained 
under the Basel Accord II 
 3. Intertemporal comparison (maximum 1 point) 
a. 1 point – operational risk capital reported for previous years 
 4. Governance (maximum 3 points) 
a. 1 point – operational risk responsibility adopted into the governance 
structure 
b. 1 point – reputational risk responsibility adopted into the governance 
structure 
c. 1 point – legal risk responsibility adopted into the governance structure 
 5. Methodology/reporting (maximum 5 points) 
a. 1 point – operational risk measurement or assessment methodology 
b. 1 point – reputational risk measurement or assessment methodology  
c. 1 point – legal risk measurement or assessment methodology 
d. 1 point – operational loss data collection process 
e. 1 point – operational risk internal reporting procedure 
Operational risk under the definition of the Basel Accord II is an unexpected loss that 
originates from people’s fault, internal systemic error, outside unforeseeable event, etc. 
during the operational procedure. The ORDI pays attention to three risk perspectives 
– operational risk, reputational risk, and legal risk. The information disclosures of 
operational and legal risks are required under the Basel Accord II. Although the 
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reputational risk is not required under the Basel Accord II, it is interlinked with the 
operational and legal risks. In banks’ annual reports, many banks clearly categorise the 
reputational risk as a sub-element of the operational risk or the legal risk. 
The category 1 of ORDI considers whether a bank has briefly mentioned the 
information disclosures regarding operational risk, legal risk, and reputational risk in 
its annual report. 1a awards a bank 1 point if the bank has briefly mentioned 
operational risk information in its annual report, 1b awards a bank 1 point if the bank 
has briefly mentioned reputational risk information in its annual report, and 1c awards 
a bank 1 point if the bank has briefly mentioned the legal risk information in its annual 
report. 
The category 2 of ORDI awards the report of the capital reserve for operational risks, 
which awards a bank 1 point if the bank has reported the required capital in percentage 
terms (2a) or 2 points if the bank has reported the required capital in currency terms 
(2b). The report of the operational risk capital indicates that the bank has used 
advanced technology and has hired skilful people in controlling operational risk. 
Additionally, 2c awards a bank 1 point if the bank has explained the calculation 
method using the suggested approach of the Basel Accord II. 
Investors feel easier to compare the change of operational risk capital reserves by 
giving time-variant data. Similar to the VaRDI that awards the bank which has 
presented inter-temporal data of VaR, the ORDI awards 1 point to the bank which has 
given the inter-temporal data of operational risk capital reserves (3a) no matter whether 
the report of the capital reserves is in the form of percentage or in the form of currency.  
The ORDI awards the bank which has embedded the control of operational risk, legal 
risk or reputational risk into its governance structure. This is because if the controls of 
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operational risk, legal risk, and reputational risk are embedded into a bank’s 
governance structure, the bank should have relevant professional teams specifically 
dealing with these risks, which gives the bank an extra strength in responding to these 
risks. 4a awards a bank 1 point if the bank has adopted the operational risk into its 
governance structure, 4b awards a bank 1 point if the bank has adopted the reputational 
risk into its governance structure, and 4c awards a bank 1 point if the bank has adopted 
the legal risk into its governance structure. 
The category 5 of ORDI awards the bank which has explained the methodology in 
measuring the operational risk, legal risk or reputational risk. 5a, 5d, and 5e are related 
to the operational risk measurement. 5a awards a bank 1 point if the bank has reported 
the methodology for operational risk. 5d awards the bank 1 point if the bank has 
reported the data collection process for operational loss. 5e awards a bank 1 point if 
the bank has reported the internal reporting procedure for operational risk. Meanwhile, 
5b is related to the reputational risk which awards a bank 1 point if the bank has 
reported the measurement methodology for reputational risk, and 5d is related to the 
legal risk which awards a bank 1 point if the bank has reported the measurement 
methodology for legal risk. 
4.5 Data 
4.5.1 Sample 
This research chooses the world’s top sixty banks as the sample to look at the risk 
information disclosures. The rank of the world’s top sixty banks are based on their 
asset size at the end of 2013. The largest bank by asset size in 2013 is Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) with a total asset of 3125.97 billion US dollars. 
The second largest bank by asset size in 2013 is HSBC with a total asset of 2617.32 
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billion US dollars. The third largest bank by asset size in 2013 is China Construction 
Bank with a total asset of 2538.62 billion US dollars. The total asset gap between the 
first largest and the second largest bank is nearly 500 billion US dollars which is very 
huge. The Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP) is an Italian bank that the total asset of CDP 
is 470.19 billion US dollars at the end of 2013. Among the world’s top sixty banks in 
the sample, the CDP is the smallest one by asset size. The average asset size of the 
world’s top sixty banks in 2013 is around 1244.85 billion US dollars.  
The world’s top sixty banks27 in 2013 are from a total of sixteen countries: Australia 
(4 banks), Brazil (1 bank), Canada (4 banks), China (12 banks), Denmark (1 bank), 
France (5 banks), Germany (4 banks), Italy (3 banks), Japan (5 banks), Netherlands (3 
banks), Russia (1 bank), Spain (3 banks), Sweden (1 bank), Switzerland (2 banks), UK 
(5 banks) and USA (6 banks).  
The electronical version of bank’s public document appeared around the year 1996 
with the time of internet popularization, and before the year 1996, only few documents 
were in electronical version. Therefore, the sample period of the current research starts 
from 1996 and lasts till 2013, which has covered nearly all available documents related 
to these banks.  
4.5.2 Data Sources in Extracting the Risk Information Disclosures 
Both indices – the value-at-risk disclosure index (VaRDI) and the operational risk 
disclosure index (ORDI) – extract data from banks’ public documents. The current 
research has mainly fetched up the original public documents from three channels: 
                                                          
27 Further information regarding the rank of the world’s top banks can be traced through the website 
http://www.relbanks.com/worlds-top-banks/assets-2013. 
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 Bank official websites, which contain the original annual reports and the 
related crucial information. 
 http://www.sec.gov/, which is the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
official website. The database of this website contains 10-K28, 10-Q29 and 20-
F30 forms for American companies. 
 https://bankscope.bvdinfo.com/, which is the database specially designated for 
the banking industry that contains the comprehensive information for 11,000 
banks globally. 
                                                          
28 The 10-K form is an annual comprehensive financial report required by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission to give shareholders detailed information for the listed American company. 
29 The 10-Q form is a quarterly comprehensive financial report required by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission to give shareholders detailed information for the listed American company. 
30 The 20-F form is a comprehensive financial report required by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission to give shareholders detailed information for the listed foreign company. 
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4.6 The Disclosure Status of Market Risk Information 
4.6.1 The Comprehensive Disclosure Status of VaRDI for the World’s Top Sixty Banks in 2013 
  
Rank Bank Name Country
Total Assets     
(US$ billion, 2013)
Holding 
Period 
Confidence 
Level
High, Low, 
Average
Year-End 
Var
Risk 
Category
Diversification Previous 
Year
Histogram 
Daily  VaR
Plot 
Daily Var
Hypothetical 
Revenue
No Trading 
Fees
Histogram 
Daily Rev.
Plot Daily 
Revenue
Exceptions Explanation 
Exceptions
VaRDI
1 Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) China 3,125.97 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
2 HSBC Holdings UK 2,617.32 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 2 0 11
3 China Construction Bank Corporation China 2,538.62 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
4 BNP Paribas France 2,486.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Japan 2,462.90 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
6 JPMorgan Chase&Co USA 2,415.69 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 12
7 Agricultural Bank of China China 2,406.24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 Credit Agricole Group France 2,356.45 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 10
9 Bank of China China 2,292.59 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
10 Deutche Bank Germany 2,225.35 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 14
11 Barclays PLC UK 2,164.60 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 11
12 Bank of America USA 2,102.27 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 2 0 13
13 Japan Post Bank Japan 1,939.89 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
14 Citigroup Inc USA  1,880.38 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 2 0 12
15 Mizuho Financial Group Japan            1,794.54 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 9
16 Societe Generale       France                1,705.90 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 8
17 Royal Bank of Scotland Group  UK      1,695.50 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 1 13
18 Groupe BPCE      France       1,551.59 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 2 2 0 12
19 Banco Santander Spain         1,540.70 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 1 14
20 Wells Fargo  USA  1,527.02 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 13
21 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Japan   1,497.16 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7
22 Lloyds Banking Group  UK        1,397.19 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
23 China Development Bank   China               1,352.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
24 UniCredit S.p.A     Italy        1,168.11 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 2 0 12
25 UBS AG   Switzerland 1,138.26 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 12
26 ING Bank N.V. Netherlands   1,087.63 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 0 2 2 0 15
27 Bank of Communications China         984.99 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
28 Credit Suisse Group Switzerland   983.78 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 11
29 Rabobank Group Netherlands  983.99 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
30 Postal Savings Bank of China    China    922.04 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 Goldman Sachs Group     USA          911.51 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 10
32 Credit Mutuel Group               France   891.05 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
33 Nordea Bank    Sweden      870.63 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
34 Intesa Sanpaolo         Italy      864.90 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 2 1 1 13
35 Morgan Stanley   USA       832.70 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 11
36 Norinchukin Bank    Japan                823.98 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
37 Toronto-Dominion Bank  Canada     810.67 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 2 0 14
38 Royal Bank of Canada Canada     808.66 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 2 0 14
39 BBVA        Spain       804.54 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 2 2 0 13
40 CommerzbankAG Germany           759.09 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
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Table 4.1The Comprehensive Disclosure Status of VaRDI for the World’s Top Sixty Banks in 2013 
The VaRDI is an adopted index from Pérignon and Smith (2010) to measure the market risk information disclosure of banks. The VaRDI covers 6 facets of Value-
at-Risk (VaR) disclosures including 15 individual components. The VaRDI awards the corresponding score to the bank if the bank has disclosed the following 
information in its annual report: 1. Var characteristics (1 point if holding period and 1 point if confidence level e.g. 99%, 95%). 2. Summarized VaR characteristics 
(1 point if high, low, average VaR, 1 point if year-end VaR, 1 point if risk category and 1 point if diversification). 3. Intertemporal comparison (1 point if previous 
year). 4. Daily VaR figures (1 point if there is a histogram of daily VaRs and 1 point if plotting daily VaRs in the meantime; or 1 point if there is a histogram of daily 
VaRs and 0 points if no plot of daily VaRs; or 0 points if no histogram of daily VaRs and 2 points if plotting daily VaRs). 5. Trading revenues (1 point if hypothetical 
trading revenue, 1 point if considering trading fees in hypothetical trading revenue, 1 point if there is a histogram of daily trading revenues and 1 point if plotting 
daily trading revenues in the meantime; or 1 point if there is a histogram of daily trading revenues and 0 points if no plot of daily trading revenues; or 0 points if no 
histogram of daily trading revenues and 2 points if plotting daily trading revenues). 6. Exceptions (1 point if stating the number of exceptions and 1 point if explaining 
the exceptions; or 2 points if no exceptions). The theoretical score of VaRDI ranges from 0 (minimum) to 15 (maximum). The information about the rank of these 
banks at the end of 2013 can be traced through the website http://www.relbanks.com/worlds-top-banks/assets-2013. 
 
Rank Bank Name Country
Total Assets     
(US$ billion, 2013)
Holding 
Period 
Confidence 
Level
High, Low, 
Average
Year-End 
Var
Risk 
Category
Diversification Previous 
Year
Histogram 
Daily  VaR
Plot 
Daily Var
Hypothetical 
Revenue
No Trading 
Fees
Histogram 
Daily Rev.
Plot Daily 
Revenue
Exceptions Explanation 
Exceptions
VaRDI
41 National Australia Bank   Australia  772.39 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
42 Bank of Nova Scotia  Canada     698.72 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 2 0 14
43 Commenwealth Bank of Australia             Australia             697.80 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
44 Standard Charted Plc       UK           674.38 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7
45 China Merchants Bank China 663.67 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
46 KfW Group             Germany     641.89 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
47 Australia & Newzealand Banking Group   Australia   627.06 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
48 Westpac Banking Corp  Australia  625.37 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
49 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank       China        608.10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 Industrial Bank Co. Ltd      China           607.66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
51 China CITIC Bank Corp      China     601.67 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 2 0 12
52 Danske Bank     Denmark   597.47 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 1 0 13
53 Sberbank Bank     Russia         557.18 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
54 Banco do Brazil SA    Brazil       552.67 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
55 DZ Bank AG   Germany          534.42 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 10
56 China Minsheng Banking Corp        China          533.10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
57 ABN AMRO Group NV       Netherlands       513.77 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
58 Bank of Montreal          Canada             504.74 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 11
59 La Caixa Group  Spain    485.11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
60 Cassa Depositi e Prestiti(CDP)            Italy       470.19 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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Table 4.1 demonstrates the market risk information disclosure status for the world’s 
top sixty banks in 2013. This market risk information disclosure is measured by the 
VaRDI which is a composite index designed by Pérignon and Smith (2010).  
There are fifteen elements composing the VaRDI: holding period, confidence level, 
high low average of VaR, year-end VaR, risk category, diversification, previous year, 
histogram daily VaR, plot daily VaR, hypothetical revenue, no trading fees, histogram 
daily revenue, plot daily revenue, exceptions, and explanation exceptions. Section 4.3 
has given a detailed explanation for all the fifteen elements. The highest score of 
VaRDI is 15 and the lowest score of VaRDI is 0. The disclosure rates for these fifteen 
VaRDI elements across all the banks in 2013 are 82% (holding period of VaR), 87% 
(confidence level of VaR), 73% (high low average of VaR), 75% (year-end VaR), 70% 
(risk category of VaR), 48% (diversification effect), 72% (previous year VaR), 5% 
(histogram daily VaR), 93% (plot daily VaR), 13% (hypothetical revenue), 7% (no 
trading fees), 23% (histogram daily revenue), 50% (plot daily revenue), 63% 
(exceptions) and 8% (explanation exceptions). Surprisingly, the highest disclosure rate 
among the fifteen elements is the plot of daily VaRs, which suggests that most banks 
have disclosed the plot depicting the change of VaRs. The holding period of VaR and 
the confidence level of VaR are two basic conditions of VaR. However, there are still 
banks not explicitly stating these two basic conditions, such that the disclosure rates 
of these two conditions are 82% and 87% respectively. For the banks which have 
disclosed these two conditions, the one-day holding period is used as the most common 
one for the time length of VaR, and the 99% confidence interval is used as the most 
common one for the confidence level of VaR. For other VaR descriptions such as high 
low average of VaR, year-end VaR, risk category of VaR and previous year VaR, the 
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disclosure rates are all above 70% but below 80%. Additionally, more than half of the 
banks have provided the back-testing information of VaR. 
Only one bank among the top sixty has disclosed all VaRDI elements, which is the 
ING Bank in the Netherlands. There are five banks achieving fourteen points - only 
one point away from full disclosure of VaRDI. These banks are Deutsche bank 
(Germany), Banco Santander (Spain), Toronto-Dominion Bank (Canada), Royal Bank 
of Canada (Canada), and Bank of Nova Scotia (Canada). In the meantime, eight banks 
have not disclosed any information related to VaR. These banks are BNP Paribas 
(France), Agricultural Bank of China (China), China Development Bank (China), 
Postal Savings Bank of China (China), Shanghai Pudong Development Bank (China), 
Industrial Bank Co. Ltd (China), China Minsheng Banking Corporation (China), and 
La Caixa Group (Spain). The average score of VaRDI for the world’s top sixty banks 
is 7.7. 
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4.6.2 VaRDI for the World’s Top Sixty Banks in the Period 1996-2013 
 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average Median
Standard 
Error 
1 Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) China N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 6 6 6 6 2.2 0.0 0.73
2 HSBC Holdings UK 5 4 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 9 7 9 6 9 10 11 11 7.4 7.0 0.51
3 China Construction Bank Corporation China N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 3 0 2 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 3.4 4.5 0.70
4 BNP Paribas France N/A 0 2 9 10 11 11 9 12 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.5 0.0 1.30
5 Mitsubishi UFL Financial Group Japan N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.00
6 JPMorgan Chase&Co USA 3 6 9 10 7 9 11 11 11 11 11 11 9 9 11 10 11 12 9.6 10.5 0.53
7 Agricultural Bank of China China N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.00
8 Credit Agricole Group France N/A N/A 2 2 2 5 7 6 6 7 7 10 10 11 10 10 10 10 7.2 7.0 0.79
9 Bank of China China N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 3.1 3.0 0.79
10 Deutsche Bank Germany N/A N/A 11 13 14 14 13 14 14 14 14 13 14 13 14 14 14 14 13.6 14.0 0.20
11 Barclays PLC UK 5 7 8 9 11 11 11 12 11 12 12 9 11 11 11 11 11 11 10.2 11.0 0.45
12 Bank of America USA N/A N/A 0 0 0 12 9 8 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 9.3 12.0 1.18
13 Japan Post Bank Japan N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 0 4 4 4 4 3.3 4.0 0.67
14 Citigroup Inc USA  0 3 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 12 12 7.5 8.0 0.63
15 Mizuho Financial Group Japan            N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 5 7 7 8 9 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 8.2 9.0 0.54
16 Societe Generale       France                N/A N/A 7 7 7 0 0 N/A 12 11 11 11 12 11 6 6 7 8 7.7 7.0 0.99
17 Royal Bank of Scotland Group  UK      N/A N/A 5 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 10 7 9 9 10 11 10 13 8.4 7.5 0.51
18 Groupe BPCE      France       N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 12 12 2 5 12 8.6 12.0 2.14
19 Banco Santander Spain         N/A N/A N/A 8 8 8 8 11 11 11 12 13 13 13 13 13 14 14 11.3 12.0 0.59
20 Wells Fargo  USA  N/A N/A 0 0 0 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 12 13 3.4 3.0 0.93
21 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Japan   N/A N/A N/A N/A 11 9 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 8 8 8 8 7 7.1 6.5 0.45
22 Lloyds Banking Group  UK        N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5.6 6.0 0.23
23 China Development Bank   China               N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.00
24 UniCredit S.p.A     Italy        N/A N/A 0 2 3 3 3 3 5 9 12 12 12 10 12 10 12 12 7.5 9.5 1.14
25 UBS AG   Switzerland N/A N/A 6 13 3 4 4 4 0 4 5 8 10 10 13 13 12 12 7.6 7.0 1.08
26 ING Bank N.V. Netherlands   N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 7 0 7 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 15 15 11.3 13.0 1.27
27 Bank of Communications China         N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 0.7 0.0 0.47
28 Credit Suisse Group Switzerland   N/A N/A 0 0 12 12 12 13 12 13 12 12 12 12 12 12 11 11 10.5 12.0 1.03
29 Rabobank Group Netherlands  N/A N/A N/A 3 2 1 1 1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 5.9 8.0 0.82
30 Postal Savings Bank of China    China    N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.00
31 Goldman Sachs Group     USA          N/A N/A N/A 11 12 11 11 12 11 12 11 11 11 11 12 11 11 10 11.2 11.0 0.14
32 Credit Mutuel Group               France   N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 2 3 0.8 0.0 0.54
33 Nordea Bank    Sweden      N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 2 8 8 12 12 12 8 12 7 7 7 7 7 7.9 7.5 0.88
34 Intesa Sanpaolo         Italy      N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 9 12 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 12.4 13.0 0.44
35 Morgan Stanley   USA       N/A 6 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 11 12 12 12 12 11 12 11 11.4 12.0 0.35
Value at Risk Disclosure Index (VaRDI)
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Table 4.2 VaRDI for the World’s Top Sixty Banks during the Period 1996-2013 
The table above is the summary of VaRDI for the world’s top sixty banks during the period 1996-2013. The rank of these banks is based on the asset size of 2013. 
The original country and the asset size for each of these banks are shown alongside the bank’s name. The average, median and standard error of VaRDI for each 
individual bank during the period 1996-2013 are shown at the end of each line. N/A stands for not available, in which the reasons might be no available document of 
the bank at that time, the bank was not existed at that time, etc. The VaRDI covers 6 facets of Value-at-Risk (VaR) disclosures including 15 individual elements. The 
VaRDI awards the corresponding score to the bank if the bank has disclosed the following information in its annual report: 1. Var characteristics (1 point if holding 
period and 1 point if confidence level e.g. 99%, 95%). 2. Summarized VaR characteristics (1 point if high, low, average VaR, 1 point if year-end VaR, 1 point if risk 
category and 1 point if diversification). 3. Intertemporal comparison (1 point if previous year). 4. Daily VaR figures (1 point if there is a histogram of daily VaRs and 
1 point if plotting daily VaRs in the meantime; or 1 point if there is a histogram of daily VaRs and 0 points if no plot of daily VaRs; or 0 points if no histogram of 
daily VaRs and 2 points if plotting daily VaRs). 5. Trading revenues (1 point if hypothetical trading revenue, 1 point if considering trading fees in hypothetical trading 
revenue, 1 point if there is a histogram of daily trading revenues and 1 point if plotting daily trading revenues in the meantime; or 1 point if there is a histogram of 
daily trading revenues and 0 points if no plot of daily trading revenues; or 0 points if no histogram of daily trading revenues and 2 points if plotting daily trading 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average Median
Standard 
Error 
36 Norinchukin Bank    Japan                N/A N/A 5 2 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 4.1 4.0 0.24
37 Toronto-Dominion Bank  Canada     N/A N/A 3 3 6 8 8 8 5 4 9 9 12 14 14 14 14 14 9.1 8.5 1.04
38 Royal Bank of Canada Canada     N/A N/A 7 9 13 13 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 12 12 14 12.9 14.0 0.52
39 BBVA        Spain       N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 9 9 9 10 10 10 7 10 8 10 10 13 9.6 10.0 0.42
40 CommerzbankAG Germany           4 4 5 5 5 7 10 12 8 8 6 6 5 6 10 6 6 6 6.6 6.0 0.52
41 National Australia Bank   Australia  3 3 4 4 4 5 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5.9 7.0 0.37
42 Bank of Nova Scotia  Canada     N/A 3 6 6 4 5 12 10 11 12 12 14 14 14 12 13 14 14 10.4 12.0 0.95
43 Commenwealth Bank of Australia             Australia             N/A N/A 0 2 9 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5.6 6.0 0.49
44 Standard Charted Plc       UK           N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 8 7 6.6 7.0 0.18
45 China Merchants Bank China N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 0.6 0.0 0.24
46 KfW Group             Germany     N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.1 0.0 0.09
47 Australia & Newzealand Banking Group   Australia   5 5 2 1 0 0 0 0 2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 4.3 6.0 0.73
48 Westpac Banking Corp  Australia  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 7 7 4.8 7.0 0.95
49 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank       China        N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.00
50 Industrial Bank Co. Ltd      China           N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.00
51 China CITIC Bank Corp      China     N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 6 11 12 12 12 12 4.8 2.5 1.34
52 Danske Bank     Denmark   N/A 0 0 4 6 4 5 4 4 5 3 10 13 13 13 13 13 13 7.2 5.0 1.19
53 Sberbank Bank     Russia         N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 4.1 7.0 1.04
54 Banco do Brazil SA    Brazil       N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.1 0.0 0.09
55 DZ Bank AG   Germany          N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 8 8 7 6 6 6 8 6 8 8 10 10 10 7.8 8.0 0.43
56 China Minsheng Banking Corp        China          N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.00
57 ABN AMRO Group NV       Netherlands       N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 6 6 6 2 5.0 6.0 1.00
58 Bank of Montreal          Canada             N/A 1 2 4 6 12 12 12 12 11 13 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 9.5 11.0 0.91
59 La Caixa Group  Spain    N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 9 9 10 10 2 0 6.7 9.0 1.82
60 Cassa Depositi e Prestiti(CDP)            Italy       N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A 0 N/A 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 1.3 2.0 0.28
Value at Risk Disclosure Index (VaRDI)
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revenues). 6. Exceptions (1 point if stating the number of exceptions and 1 point if explaining the exceptions; or 2 points if no exceptions). The theoretical score of 
VaRDI ranges from 0 (minimum) to 15 (maximum). The VaRDI is an adopted index from Pérignon and Smith (2010) which measures the market risk disclosures.  
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Table 4.2 tabulates the scores of VaRDI for the world’s top sixty banks during the 
period 1996-2013. Due to data limitation, the score of VaRDI is not available for 
several banks in certain years. There are mainly two reasons for this data limitation, 
which are that either the annual report is not in English or the annual report is not 
available online. Moreover, the restructuring31 within the banking industry has caused 
additional data imbalance. 
Based on the existing data for the period 1996-2013, Deutsche Bank (Germany) has 
the highest average score of VaRDI which is 13.6. The average score of VaRDI for 
the sample is above ten and there are several banks disclosing relatively high amounts 
of information related to VaR, these banks are JPMorgan Chase & Co (USA), Barclays 
PLC (UK), Banco Santander (Spain), ING Bank N.V. (Netherlands), Credit Suisse 
Group (Switzerland), Goldman Sachs Group (USA), Intesa Sanpaolo (Italy), Morgan 
Stanley (USA), Royal Bank of Canada (Canada), and Bank of Nova Scotia (Canada). 
In the meantime, there are several banks disclosing no, or nearly no, information 
related to VaR such that the average score of VaRDI is close to zero. These banks are 
Agricultural Bank of China (China), China Development Bank (China), Postal Savings 
Bank of China (China), KfW Group (Germany), Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 
(China), Industrial Bank Co. Ltd (China), Banco do Brazil SA (Brazil), and China 
Minsheng Banking Corp (China).  
                                                          
31 Mitsubishi UFL Financial Group is a Japanese bank which was the product of the merger between 
the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi and UFJ Group in 2006. Many European banks had also been 
restructured after the 2008 financial crisis by merger or by acquisition, such as Credit Mutuel Group 
(France) and ABN ARMO Group NV (Netherlands).  
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Figure 4.2 The Average Score Trend of VaRDI during the Period 1996-2013 
The figure above plots the average scores of VaRDI across all the sixty banks during the period 1996-
2013. These sixty banks are the world’s largest sixty banks ranked by asset size in 2013. The data panel 
is unbalanced. 
 
As shown in the figure above, there is an upward trend for the average scores of VaRDI 
for the world’s top sixty banks across the period 1996-2013. The average score of 
VaRDI for the world’s top sixty banks is only 3.1 in 1996, whilst the average score of 
VaRDI for the world’s top sixty banks increases to 7.7 in 2013. 
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4.6.3 VaRDI for the Country Average during the Period 1996-2013 
Table 4.3 tabulates the scores for the country average VaRDI based on the world’s top 
sixty banks during the period 1996-2013. The world’s top sixty banks are from sixteen 
countries. During the period 1996-2013, although there is rise and fall, the average 
score of VaRDI has generally increased for every country. 
During the period 1996-2013, in terms of the average score of VaRDI, Brazil and 
China have relatively low values which are 0.13 and 1.23 respectively. Canada has the 
highest value which is 10.16. Spain, Switzerland and the USA have relatively high 
values followed by Canada which are 9.66, 9.03 and 8.30 respectively.  
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Table 4.3 VaRDI for the Country Average during the Period 1996-2013 
The table above is the summary of VaRDI for the country average based on the world’s top sixty banks (by the asset size of 2013) during the period 1996-2013. The 
number of banks for each country within the top sixty banks is also shown in the table. The average value of VaRDI for each country within the period 1996-2013 is 
shown at the end of each line. The VaRDI covers 6 facets of Value-at-Risk (VaR) disclosures including 15 individual elements. The VaRDI awards the corresponding 
score to the bank if the bank has disclosed the following information in its annual report: 1. Var characteristics (1 point if holding period and 1 point if confidence 
level e.g. 99%, 95%). 2. Summarized VaR characteristics (1 point if high, low, average VaR, 1 point if year-end VaR, 1 point if risk category and 1 point if 
diversification). 3. Intertemporal comparison (1 point if previous year). 4. Daily VaR figures (1 point if there is a histogram of daily VaRs and 1 point if plotting daily 
VaRs in the meantime; or 1 point if there is a histogram of daily VaRs and 0 points if no plot of daily VaRs; or 0 points if no histogram of daily VaRs and 2 points if 
plotting daily VaRs). 5. Trading revenues (1 point if hypothetical trading revenue, 1 point if considering trading fees in hypothetical trading revenue, 1 point if there 
is a histogram of daily trading revenues and 1 point if plotting daily trading revenues in the meantime; or 1 point if there is a histogram of daily trading revenues and 
0 points if no plot of daily trading revenues; or 0 points if no histogram of daily trading revenues and 2 points if plotting daily trading revenues). 6. Exceptions (1 
point if stating the number of exceptions and 1 point if explaining the exceptions; or 2 points if no exceptions). The theoretical score of VaRDI ranges from 0 
(minimum) to 15 (maximum). The VaRDI is an adopted index from Pérignon and Smith (2010) which measures the market risk disclosure. 
 
Country
Number of Banks in 
the Top 60 (2013)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average
Australia 4 2.67 2.67 1.50 1.75 3.25 2.75 3.00 5.50 6.00 7.25 7.25 7.25 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 5.07
Brazil 1 N/A N/A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.13
Canada 4 N/A 2.00 4.00 5.50 7.25 9.50 11.50 11.00 10.50 10.25 12.00 12.00 12.75 13.25 12.75 12.50 12.75 13.25 10.16
China 12 N/A N/A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.17 0.17 1.42 1.58 1.92 2.58 2.67 2.67 3.08 3.17 1.23
Denmark 1 N/A 0.00 0.00 4.00 6.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 3.00 10.00 13.00 13.00 13.00 13.00 13.00 13.00 7.24
France 5 N/A 0.00 2.00 5.50 6.00 8.00 9.00 7.50 8.75 8.75 6.75 7.75 6.00 6.80 5.60 3.60 4.80 6.60 6.08
Germany 4 4.00 4.00 5.33 6.00 6.33 7.25 7.75 8.25 7.00 7.00 6.50 6.75 6.25 6.75 8.00 7.50 7.75 7.75 6.68
Italy 3 N/A N/A 0.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 1.50 3.00 3.50 6.67 8.67 9.00 8.33 7.67 9.00 8.33 9.00 9.00 5.73
Japan 5 N/A N/A 5.00 2.00 8.00 6.00 5.00 5.67 5.67 6.00 5.00 5.25 4.80 4.40 5.20 4.80 4.80 4.60 5.14
Netherlands 3 N/A N/A N/A 3.00 2.00 1.00 4.00 0.50 7.50 10.50 10.50 10.50 10.50 10.50 9.00 9.00 9.67 8.33 7.10
Russia 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 4.08
Spain 3 N/A N/A N/A 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.50 10.00 10.00 10.50 11.00 11.50 9.67 10.67 10.33 11.00 8.67 9.00 9.66
Sweden 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.00 2.00 8.00 8.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 8.00 12.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.93
Switzerland 2 N/A N/A 3.00 6.50 7.50 8.00 8.00 8.50 6.00 8.50 8.50 10.00 11.00 11.00 12.50 12.50 11.50 11.50 9.03
UK 5 5.00 5.50 5.33 7.67 7.25 7.00 7.00 7.60 7.40 7.80 8.60 7.20 8.40 7.80 8.60 9.00 9.20 9.60 7.55
USA 6 1.50 5.00 5.00 6.67 6.33 8.83 8.67 8.83 9.33 9.67 9.33 9.50 9.17 9.17 9.67 9.33 11.67 11.67 8.30
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4.7 The Disclosure Status of Operational Risk Information 
4.7.1 The Comprehensive Disclosure Status of ORDI for the World’s Top Sixty Banks in 2013 
 
 
Rank Bank Name Country
Total Assets     
(US$ billion, 
2013)
Operational 
Risk
Reputation 
Risk 
Legal 
Risk
Portion Risk 
Capital         
(1:%, 2: $)
Caculation 
Method
Previous 
Year 
Operational 
Governance 
Structure
Reputation 
Governance 
Structure
Legal 
Governance 
Structure
Operational 
Measurement
Reputation 
Measurement
Legal 
Measurement
Data 
Collection 
Process
Operational 
Reporting 
Procedures
ORDI
1 Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) China 3,125.97 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 6
2 HSBC Holdings UK 2,617.32 1 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 14
3 China Construction Bank Corporation China 2,538.62 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 10
4 BNP Paribas France 2,486.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Japan 2,462.90 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 8
6 JPMorgan Chase&Co USA 2,415.69 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11
7 Agricultural Bank of China China 2,406.24 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 12
8 Credit Agricole Group France 2,356.45 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 11
9 Bank of China China 2,292.59 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 6
10 Deutche Bank Germany 2,225.35 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 10
11 Barclays PLC UK 2,164.60 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 13
12 Bank of America USA 2,102.27 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 6
13 Japan Post Bank Japan 1,939.89 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 11
14 Citigroup Inc USA  1,880.38 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 7
15 Mizuho Financial Group Japan            1,794.54 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 13
16 Societe Generale       France                1,705.90 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 14
17 Royal Bank of Scotland Group  UK      1,695.50 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 13
18 Groupe BPCE      France       1,551.59 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 12
19 Banco Santander Spain         1,540.70 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 8
20 Wells Fargo  USA  1,527.02 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 6
21 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Japan   1,497.16 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4
22 Lloyds Banking Group  UK        1,397.19 1 0 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 9
23 China Development Bank   China               1,352.99 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
24 UniCredit S.p.A     Italy        1,168.11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 12
25 UBS AG   Switzerland 1,138.26 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 10
26 ING Bank N.V. Netherlands   1,087.63 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 12
27 Bank of Communications China         984.99 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 5
28 Credit Suisse Group Switzerland   983.78 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 13
29 Rabobank Group Netherlands  983.99 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 7
30 Postal Savings Bank of China    China    922.04 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 Goldman Sachs Group     USA          911.51 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 9
32 Credit Mutuel Group               France   891.05 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 9
33 Nordea Bank    Sweden      870.63 1 0 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 9
34 Intesa Sanpaolo         Italy      864.90 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 13
35 Morgan Stanley   USA       832.70 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 8
36 Norinchukin Bank    Japan                823.98 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 12
37 Toronto-Dominion Bank  Canada     810.67 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 14
38 Royal Bank of Canada Canada     808.66 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 15
39 BBVA        Spain       804.54 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 8
40 CommerzbankAG Germany           759.09 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 13
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Table 4.4 The Comprehensive Disclosure Status of ORDI for the World’s Top Sixty Banks in 2013 
This is a table that tabulates the scores for ORDI and the composite elements of ORDI for the world’s top sixty banks in 2013. The ORDI is an adopted index from 
Goyal and Wu (2007) which measures the operational risk disclosure. The ORDI covers 5 facets of operational risk disclosures including 14 individual components. 
The ORDI awards the corresponding score to the bank if the bank has disclosed the following information in its annual report: 1. Recognition and definition of 
operational risk (1 point if recognition and definition of operational risk as a risk exposure, 1 point if recognition and definition of reputational risk as a risk exposure 
and 1 point if recognition and definition of legal risk as a risk exposure). 2. Operational risk capital (1 point if operational risk capital is reported in percentage terms 
or 2 points if operational risk capital is reported in currency terms, and 1 point if the calculation method of operational risk capital is explained under Basel II). 3. 
Intertemporal comparison (1 point if operational risk capital is reported for previous years). 4. Governance (1 point if operational risk responsibility is adopted into 
the governance structure, 1 point if reputational risk responsibility is adopted into the governance structure and 1 point if legal risk responsibility is adopted into the 
governance structure). 5. Methodology/reporting (1 point if operational risk measurement or assessment methodology, 1 point if reputational risk measurement or 
assessment methodology, 1 point if legal risk measurement or assessment methodology, 1 point if operational loss data collection process and 1 point if operational 
risk internal reporting procedures. The theoretical score of ORDI ranges from 0 (minimum) to 15 (maximum). The information about the rank of these banks at the 
end of 2013 can be traced from the website http://www.relbanks.com/worlds-top-banks/assets-2013. 
Rank Bank Name Country
Total Assets     
(US$ billion, 
2013)
Operational 
Risk
Reputation 
Risk 
Legal 
Risk
Portion Risk 
Capital         
(1:%, 2: $)
Caculation 
Method
Previous 
Year 
Operational 
Governance 
Structure
Reputation 
Governance 
Structure
Legal 
Governance 
Structure
Operational 
Measurement
Reputation 
Measurement
Legal 
Measurement
Data 
Collection 
Process
Operational 
Reporting 
Procedures
ORDI
41 National Australia Bank   Australia  772.39 1 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 7
42 Bank of Nova Scotia  Canada     698.72 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 11
43 Commenwealth Bank of Australia             Australia             697.80 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 8
44 Standard Charted Plc       UK           674.38 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 11
45 China Merchants Bank China 663.67 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 12
46 KfW Group             Germany     641.89 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 12
47 Australia & Newzealand Banking Group   Australia   627.06 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 11
48 Westpac Banking Corp  Australia  625.37 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 11
49 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank       China        608.10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 Industrial Bank Co. Ltd      China           607.66 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 5
51 China CITIC Bank Corp      China     601.67 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 11
52 Danske Bank     Denmark   597.47 1 0 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
53 Sberbank Bank     Russia         557.18 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 4
54 Banco do Brazil SA    Brazil       552.67 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
55 DZ Bank AG   Germany          534.42 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 15
56 China Minsheng Banking Corp        China          533.10 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 10
57 ABN AMRO Group NV       Netherlands       513.77 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 12
58 Bank of Montreal          Canada             504.74 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 12
59 La Caixa Group  Spain    485.11 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 10
60 Cassa Depositi e Prestiti(CDP)            Italy       470.19 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 6
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Table 4.4 demonstrates the operational risk information disclosure status for the 
world’s top sixty banks in 2013. This operational risk information disclosure status is 
measured by the ORDI which is a composite index originally designed by Goyal and 
Wu (2007).  
There are fourteen elements composing the ORDI: operational risk, reputation risk, 
legal risk, risk capital, calculation method, previous year risk capital, operational 
governance structure, reputation governance structure, legal governance structure, 
operational measurement, reputation measurement, legal measurement, data collection 
process, and operational reporting procedures. Section 4.4 has given a detailed 
explanation for all the fourteen elements. The highest score of ORDI is 15 and the 
lowest score of ORDI is 0. The disclosure rates for these fourteen ORDI elements are 
95% (operational risk), 67% (reputation risk), 72% (legal risk), 58% (risk capital), 73% 
(calculation method), 52% (previous year risk capital), 92% (operational governance 
structure), 38% (reputation governance structure), 18% (legal governance structure), 
92% (operational measurement), 45% (reputation measurement), 35% (legal 
measurement), 60% (data collection process), and 67% (operational reporting 
procedures).  
Five banks out of the top sixty have disclosed all the ORDI elements, which are HSBC 
Holdings (UK), Societe Generale (France), Toronto-Dominion Bank (Canada), Royal 
Bank Canada (Canada), and DZ Bank AG (Germany). Among the five banks, Royal 
Bank of Canada (Canada) and DZ Bank AG (Germany) have 15 points in the ORDI 
and the others have 14 points in the ORDI, since Royal Bank of Canada (Canada) and 
DZ Bank AG (Germany) have reported the risk capital in the form of currency and the 
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others have reported the risk capital in the form of percentage32. In the meantime, three 
banks have disclosed nothing under the elements of ORDI, these three banks are BNP 
Paribas (France), Postal Savings Bank of China (China), and Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank (China). The average score of ORDI for the world’s top sixty 
banks is 9.2. 
                                                          
32 The operational risk capital can be reported in two forms, which are either in the form of percentage 
or in the form of currency. If the operational risk capital is reported in the form of percentage, the ORDI 
will award the bank 1 point. If the operational risk capital is reported in the form of currency, the ORDI 
will award the bank 2 points. 
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4.7.2 ORDI for the World’s Top Sixty Banks in the Period 1996-2013 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average Median
Standard 
Error 
1 Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) China N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 6 6 6 6 2.7 3.0 0.58
2 HSBC Holdings UK 0 0 0 0 2 5 5 7 7 7 10 4 11 7 13 15 14 14 6.7 7.0 1.23
3 China Construction Bank Corporation China N/A N/A 0 2 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 7 8 10 10 5.1 5.0 0.66
4 BNP Paribas France N/A 0 3 4 6 8 9 8 8 10 5 2 4 2 2 0 0 0 4.2 4.0 0.84
5 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Japan N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 7.4 8.0 0.63
6 JPMorgan Chase&Co USA 0 0 0 2 3 6 8 11 10 13 12 12 12 12 12 12 14 11 8.3 11.0 1.19
7 Agricultural Bank of China China N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 2 4 4 5 6 8 9 9 12 5.9 5.5 1.15
8 Credit Agricole Group France N/A N/A 0 0 1 4 5 7 8 9 9 10 11 11 10 10 10 11 7.3 9.0 1.00
9 Bank of China China N/A N/A 0 0 0 2 2 2 4 4 5 4 4 6 7 7 6 6 3.7 4.0 0.61
10 Deutsche Bank Germany N/A N/A 8 3 7 7 9 7 7 8 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 8.3 9.0 0.46
11 Barclays PLC UK 2 4 4 5 6 5 6 6 2 11 11 11 11 12 11 12 12 13 8.0 8.5 0.91
12 Bank of America USA N/A N/A 0 0 0 2 4 3 3 4 3 4 4 5 6 6 6 6 3.5 4.0 0.53
13 Japan Post Bank Japan N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 9 10 11 11 11 11 10.5 11.0 0.34
14 Citigroup Inc USA  0 2 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 11 11 8 6 6 6 7 8 7 4.6 5.5 0.89
15 Mizuho Financial Group Japan            N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 4 6 5 7 7 7 13 13 13 13 13 13 9.1 7.0 1.08
16 Societe Generale       France                N/A N/A 2 3 3 5 4 N/A 6 7 9 9 9 10 14 13 14 14 8.1 9.0 1.10
17 Royal Bank of Scotland Group  UK      N/A N/A 2 2 2 1 3 4 4 4 4 4 10 12 12 12 13 13 6.4 4.0 1.16
18 Groupe BPCE      France       N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 11 12 12 12 12 11.8 12.0 0.20
19 Banco Santander Spain         N/A N/A N/A 2 4 2 4 10 9 11 10 10 9 9 8 8 8 8 7.5 8.0 0.77
20 Wells Fargo  USA  N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 3 4 5 6 6 1.8 1.0 0.56
21 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Japan   N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 2 1 5 7 7 10 11 10 7 7 7 6 4 6.1 7.0 0.82
22 Lloyds Banking Group  UK        N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 2 3 4 3 6 7 6 9 9 9 9 9 9 6.2 6.5 0.77
23 China Development Bank   China               N/A N/A N/A 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2.0 2.0 0.00
24 UniCredit S.p.A     Italy        N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1 4 5 6 8 9 9 12 12 12 12 12 6.6 7.0 1.17
25 UBS AG   Switzerland N/A N/A 4 3 4 4 7 8 8 8 6 6 9 9 9 9 9 10 7.1 8.0 0.57
26 ING Bank N.V. Netherlands   N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 2 2 6 4 7 11 12 10 12 12 12 7.7 8.5 1.25
27 Bank of Communications China         N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 5 5 5 5 2.5 3.0 0.47
28 Credit Suisse Group Switzerland   N/A N/A 5 5 5 5 4 6 6 11 14 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 9.5 12.0 1.01
29 Rabobank Group Netherlands  N/A N/A N/A 4 3 3 3 3 4 6 5 5 6 7 8 8 8 7 5.3 5.0 0.50
30 Postal Savings Bank of China    China    N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.00
31 Goldman Sachs Group     USA          N/A N/A N/A 4 4 4 5 7 7 7 8 8 10 9 10 9 9 9 7.3 8.0 0.56
32 Credit Mutuel Group               France   N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 8 9 8 9 10 9 8.8 9.0 0.31
33 Nordea Bank    Sweden      N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 5 6 6 6 6 7 9 11 9 9 9 9 9 7.5 8.0 0.54
34 Intesa Sanpaolo         Italy      N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 7 7 9 11 12 13 13 13 13 10.9 12.0 0.86
35 Morgan Stanley   USA       N/A 4 4 4 5 5 6 6 5 6 7 7 11 8 7 7 8 8 6.4 6.0 0.45
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Table 4.5 ORDI for the World’s Top Sixty Banks during the Period 1996-2013 
The table above is the summary of ORDI for the world’s top sixty banks during the period 1996-2013. The rank of the banks is based on the asset size of 2013. The 
original country and the asset size for each of the banks are shown alongside the bank’s name. The average, median and standard error of ORDI for the period 1996-
2013 of each individual bank are shown at the end of each line. N/A stands for not available, which the reasons might be no available documents of the bank at that 
time, the bank was not existed at that time, etc. The ORDI covers 5 facets of operational risk disclosures including 14 individual components. The ORDI awards the 
corresponding score to the bank if the bank has disclosed the following information in its annual report: 1. Recognition and definition of operational risk (1 point if 
recognition and definition of operational risk as a risk exposure, 1 point if recognition and definition of reputational risk as a risk exposure and 1 point if recognition 
and definition of legal risk as a risk exposure). 2. Operational risk capital (1 point if operational risk capital is reported in percentage terms or 2 points if operational 
risk capital is reported in currency terms, and 1 point if the calculation method of operational risk capital is explained under Basel II). 3. Intertemporal comparison (1 
point if operational risk capital is reported for previous years). 4. Governance (1 point if operational risk responsibility is adopted into the governance structure, 1 
point if reputational risk responsibility is adopted into the governance structure and 1 point if legal risk responsibility is adopted into the governance structure). 5. 
Methodology/reporting (1 point if operational risk measurement or assessment methodology, 1 point if reputational risk measurement or assessment methodology, 1 
point if legal risk measurement or assessment methodology, 1 point if operational loss data collection process and 1 point if operational risk internal reporting 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average Median
Standard 
Error 
36 Norinchukin Bank    Japan                N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 5 5 9 11 11 12 12 12 12 6.3 5.0 1.21
37 Toronto-Dominion Bank  Canada     N/A N/A 2 2 2 3 4 4 10 11 11 11 13 14 14 14 14 14 8.9 11.0 1.27
38 Royal Bank of Canada Canada     N/A N/A 2 2 2 2 7 7 7 9 15 15 14 15 15 15 15 15 9.8 11.5 1.41
39 BBVA        Spain       N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 6 7 7 7 9 9 10 9 12 7 8 7.9 7.5 0.60
40 CommerzbankAG Germany           0 0 0 7 8 9 9 14 15 15 15 11 12 13 8 8 8 13 9.2 9.0 1.18
41 National Australia Bank   Australia  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 9 7 7 6 6 7 6 7 4.8 3.5 0.48
42 Bank of Nova Scotia  Canada     N/A 4 2 2 3 3 4 9 8 9 9 9 11 11 11 11 11 11 7.5 9.0 0.87
43 Commenwealth Bank of Australia             Australia             N/A N/A 2 3 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 7 7 7 7 8 8 5.2 4.5 0.47
44 Standard Charted Plc       UK           N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 1 2 2 2 3 7 10 11 11 11 11 11 6.4 7.0 1.26
45 China Merchants Bank China N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 8 9 10 10 12 3.4 0.0 1.15
46 KfW Group             Germany     N/A N/A 0 0 0 3 4 4 5 6 6 7 7 8 10 11 11 12 5.9 6.0 0.99
47 Australia & Newzealand Banking Group   Australia   3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 7 9 11 11 11 11 5.6 3.0 0.81
48 Westpac Banking Corp  Australia  1 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 11 5.8 7.0 0.65
49 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank       China        N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.00
50 Industrial Bank Co. Ltd      China           N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 3 3 3 3 5 5 1.7 1.5 0.45
51 China CITIC Bank Corp      China     N/A N/A 0 0 1 2 3 4 7 7 7 10 11 11 11 12 12 11 6.8 7.0 1.13
52 Danske Bank     Denmark   N/A N/A 0 2 4 6 6 7 8 6 1 6 6 7 7 6 6 6 5.3 6.0 0.57
53 Sberbank Bank     Russia         N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 2.3 3.0 0.33
54 Banco do Brazil SA    Brazil       N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 1.3 1.5 0.25
55 DZ Bank AG   Germany          N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 5 8 9 9 10 10 9 13 13 13 13 15 10.1 10.0 0.91
56 China Minsheng Banking Corp        China          N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 10 1.4 0.0 0.77
57 ABN AMRO Group NV       Netherlands       N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 10 11 12 12 11.3 11.5 0.48
58 Bank of Montreal          Canada             N/A 2 3 3 3 6 5 5 9 7 7 7 9 10 12 12 12 12 7.3 7.0 0.85
59 La Caixa Group  Spain    N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 7 6 6 9 9 10 7.8 8.0 0.70
60 Cassa Depositi e Prestiti(CDP)            Italy       N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 4 6 6 2.6 3.0 0.63
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procedures. The theoretical score of ORDI ranges from 0 (minimum) to 15 (maximum). The ORDI is an adopted index from Goyal and Wu (2007) which measures 
the operational risk disclosure. 
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Table 4.5 tabulates the scores of ORDI for the world’s top sixty banks during the 
period 1996-2013. Due to data limitation, the score of ORDI is not available for several 
banks in certain years. There are mainly two reasons for this data limitation, which are 
either the annual report is not in English or the annual report is not available online. 
Moreover, the restructuring 33  within the banking industry causes additional data 
imbalance. 
Based on the existing data during the period 1996-2013, ABN AMRO Group NV 
(Netherlands) has the highest average score of ORDI which is 11.3. Besides ABN 
AMRO Group NV, there are several banks disclosing relatively high amounts of 
information about operational risks that the scores of ORDI for these banks are above 
ten, they are Japan Post Bank (Japan), Societe Generale (France), Groupe BPCE 
(France), Intesa Sanpaolo (Italy), CommerzbankAG (Germany), and DZ Bank AG 
(Germany). In the meantime, there is one bank disclosing no information about 
operational risks which is Shanghai Pudong Development Bank (China).  
                                                          
33  Mitsubishi UFL Financial Group is a Japanese bank which is merged by the Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi and UFJ Group in 2006. A lot of European banks have also been restructured after the 2008 
financial crisis by merger or by acquisition, such as Credit Mutuel Group (France) and ABN ARMO 
Group NV (Netherlands).  
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Figure 4.3 The Average Score Trend of ORDI during the Period 1996-2013 
This figure above plots the average scores of ORDI across all the sixty banks during the period 1996-
2013. These sixty banks are the world’s largest sixty banks ranked by asset size in 2013. The data panel 
is unbalanced. 
 
As shown in the figure above, there is an upward trend for the average scores of ORDI 
for the world’s top sixty banks across the period 1996-2013. The average score of 
ORDI for the world’s top sixty banks is only 1.1 in 1996, whilst the average score of 
ORDI for the world’s top sixty banks increases to 9.2 in 2013. 
4.7.3 ORDI for the Country Average during the Period 1996-2013 
Table 4.6 tabulates the scores for the country average of ORDI based on the world’s 
top sixty banks during the period 1996-2013. The world’s top sixty banks ranked by 
the asset size of 2013 are from a total of sixteen countries. During the period 1996-
2013, although there is rise and fall, the average score of ORDI has increased for every 
country. 
During the period 1996-2013, in terms of the average score of ORDI, Brazil, China 
and Russia have relatively low values which are 1.25, 2.61 and 2.33 respectively. 
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Switzerland has the highest value which is 8.28. Canada and Germany have relatively 
high values that followed by Canada which are 8.22 and 7.42 respectively.  
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Table 4.6 ORDI for the Country Average based on the World’s Top Sixty Banks during the Period 1996-2013 
The table above is the summary of ORDI for the country average based on the world’s top sixty banks (by the asset size of 2013) during the period 1996-2013. The 
number of banks for each country is also shown in the table. The average value of ORDI for each country within the period 1996-2013 is shown at the end of each 
line. The ORDI covers 5 facets of operational risk disclosures including 14 individual components. The ORDI awards the corresponding score to the bank if the bank 
has disclosed the following information in its annual report: 1. Recognition and definition of operational risk (1 point if recognition and definition of operational risk 
as a risk exposure, 1 point if recognition and definition of reputational risk as a risk exposure and 1 point if recognition and definition of legal risk as a risk exposure). 
2. Operational risk capital (1 point if operational risk capital is reported in percentage terms or 2 points if operational risk capital is reported in currency terms, and 1 
point if the calculation method of operational risk capital is explained under Basel II). 3. Intertemporal comparison (1 point if operational risk capital is reported for 
previous years). 4. Governance (1 point if operational risk responsibility is adopted into the governance structure, 1 point if reputational risk responsibility is adopted 
into the governance structure and 1 point if legal risk responsibility is adopted into the governance structure). 5. Methodology/reporting (1 point if operational risk 
measurement or assessment methodology, 1 point if reputational risk measurement or assessment methodology, 1 point if legal risk measurement or assessment 
methodology, 1 point if operational loss data collection process and 1 point if operational risk internal reporting procedures. The theoretical score of ORDI ranges 
from 0 (minimum) to 15 (maximum). The ORDI is an adopted index from Goyal and Wu (2007) which measures the operational risk disclosure. 
Country
Number of Banks in 
the Top 60 (2013)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average
Australia 4 2.33 3.00 2.00 2.25 3.00 2.75 3.25 3.50 4.50 4.50 6.25 6.00 7.25 7.50 8.00 8.25 8.25 9.25 5.10
Brazil 1 N/A N/A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 1.25
Canada 4 N/A 3.00 2.50 2.25 2.50 3.50 5.00 6.25 8.50 9.00 10.50 10.50 11.75 12.50 13.00 13.00 13.00 13.00 8.22
China 12 N/A N/A 0.00 0.17 0.33 0.67 0.92 1.17 1.67 2.17 2.58 2.75 2.75 3.83 4.83 5.67 5.75 6.58 2.61
Denmark 1 N/A N/A 0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 6.00 1.00 6.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 5.25
France 5 N/A 0.00 1.50 2.00 3.50 6.00 7.00 7.50 7.25 8.50 7.75 7.50 8.80 8.60 9.20 8.80 9.20 9.20 6.61
Germany 4 0.00 0.00 2.67 3.33 5.00 5.75 6.75 8.25 9.00 9.50 10.00 9.25 9.25 11.00 10.25 10.50 10.50 12.50 7.42
Italy 3 N/A N/A 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 4.00 2.50 4.33 6.00 7.00 7.67 9.00 9.33 9.67 10.33 10.33 5.29
Japan 5 N/A N/A 1.00 1.00 1.50 2.33 2.00 4.33 5.33 6.33 6.25 8.75 10.20 9.80 10.20 10.20 10.00 9.60 6.18
Netherlands 3 N/A N/A N/A 4.00 3.00 3.00 2.50 2.50 3.00 6.00 4.50 6.00 8.50 9.50 9.33 10.33 10.67 10.33 6.21
Russia 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 2.33
Spain 3 N/A N/A N/A 2.00 4.00 2.00 4.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 8.50 9.50 8.33 8.33 7.67 9.67 8.00 8.67 7.04
Sweden 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 7.00 9.00 11.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 7.50
Switzerland 2 N/A N/A 4.50 4.00 4.50 4.50 5.50 7.00 7.00 9.50 10.00 9.50 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.50 8.28
UK 5 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.33 3.00 2.80 3.60 4.60 3.60 6.00 7.00 6.40 10.20 10.20 11.20 11.80 11.80 12.00 6.20
USA 6 0.00 2.00 1.00 1.67 2.00 2.83 4.17 5.33 5.17 6.83 7.00 6.67 7.33 7.17 7.50 7.67 8.50 7.83 5.04
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4.8 A Comparison Work in Terms of the Status of Risk Information 
Disclosures with Pérignon and Smith (2010) 
Using data sampled annually from 1996 to 2005, Perigon and Smith (2010) examine 
the level and quality of market risk disclosures for the world’s top fifty banks measured 
by asset size. There exist differences in the level of market risk disclosures among the 
world’s top banks in 2005, and the data over the period 1996-2005 has shown a general 
increase in the level of market risk disclosures for the world’s top banks. In particular, 
banks in Netherlands and Spain stand out for their high transparency and high-quality 
reporting of VaR information. In addition, Pérignon and Smith (2010) compare the 
market risk disclosures by American banks with the banks from other countries such 
as Germany, France, UK, Canada, Japan, etc., which shows that although American 
banks have not a significant difference in the level of market risk disclosures from 
other countries, American banks are more reluctant to report sensitive and in-depth 
information about market risks compared with other countries. Especially, the level of 
market risk disclosures in American banks is considerably lower compared with 
nearby Canadian banks.  
After 2005, the global economy was severely shaken by the 2008 financial crisis 
derived from the US. As a result of the crisis, several top banks around the world went 
through takeover or reorganization 34 . Meanwhile, the rapid expansion and 
liberalisation of Chinese economy has triggered the emergence of several Chinese 
                                                          
34 After the US government intervention, Wachovia (USA) was acquired by Wells Fargo in 2008. Due 
to the trading loss made in 2008, Caisse Nationale d. Caisses (France) merged with Banque fédérale des 
banques populaires in July 2009 to become Groupe BPCE. After encountering the financial problem in 
2008, Fortis Bank NV/SA (Belgium) was sold its ownership to BNP Paribas in 2010. Calyon (France) 
was dissolved in 2008 and rebranded as Crédit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank in 2010. 
Dresdner Bank Group (Germany) was acquired by Commerzbank in December 2009.  
93 
 
banks into the list of the world’s top banks35. Therefore, it is worthwhile to take a 
further look in comparing the difference of risk information disclosures between the 
sample in the current research and the sample in Pérignon and Smith (2010). 
4.8.1 The Disclosure Indices and the Sample in the Comparison Research  
In order to generate comparable results, this comparison research employs the same 
metric quantifying the VaR disclosures as Perigon and Smith (2010). This metric is 
the composite index VaRDI capturing six facets of Value-at-Risk disclosures. The 
score of VaRDI ranges from the minimum 0 to the maximum 15. The detailed 
explanation of VaRDI can be found in section 4.3 or in Perigon and Smith (2010).  
In addition to using the VaRDI, this comparison research also acquires the composite 
index ORDI to further facilitate the comparison. The ORDI is the operational risk 
disclosure index designed by Goyal and Wu (2007). The detailed explanation of ORDI 
can be found in section 4.4 or in Goyal and Wu (2007).  
In Pérignon and Smith (2010), the sample consists of fifty world’s top commercial 
banks measured by asset size in 2005. Unlike the sample period in the study of 
Pérignon and Smith (2010), when it was relatively straightforward to distinguish a 
bank as an investment bank or a commercial bank, it is hard to do so nowadays with 
the emergence of the universal intermediary structure for large banking institutions. 
The intermediary structure is a mixed structure in banking businesses which may 
include both the retail and commercial banking business and the investment banking 
                                                          
35 In 2005, there are four Chinese banks within the world’s top fifty banks which are Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ranked 20th in 2005), Agriculture Bank of China (ranked 24th in 2005), 
Bank of China (ranked 33rd in 2005), and China Construction Bank (ranked 37th in 2005). In 2013, 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China has jumped to the top of the rank as the largest bank in the 
world, and the other three banks have also increased their world rank to 7th, 9th, and 3rd respectively. At 
the end of 2013, besides these four Chinese banks, there are six other Chinese banks in the world’s top 
fifty which are China Development Bank (ranked 23rd in 2013), Bank of Communications (ranked 27th 
in 2013), Postal Savings Bank of China (ranked 30th in 2013), Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 
(ranked 49th in 2013), and Industrial Bank Co. Ltd (ranked 50th in 2013). 
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business within a single enterprise. The world’s renowned banks like Citi Group, 
HSBC, Deutsche Bank, Royal Bank of Scotland, Wells Fargo, etc. are under the 
intermediary structure and do not limit their scope of activities to retail banking 
services, offering further services such as life assurance, retirement planning, and fund 
management. In reality, it is relatively unusual to observe large banking institutions 
that are focussed solely on traditional banking activities such as saving and lending. 
The mixed business in the banking industry is still a developing trend. Therefore, this 
comparison research has sampled both commercial and investment banks. Moreover, 
in order to produce a relatively comprehensive picture, this comparison research has 
slightly increased the sample size of the world’s banks to sixty instead of the sample 
size of fifty in Pérignon and Smith (2010).  Again, the rank of the top banks is based 
on bank’s asset size at the end of 201336. With the intention to give comparable results 
with Pérignon and Smith (2010) for the American banking industry and the Canadian 
banking industry, besides the world’s top sixty banks in 2013, Wachovia, U.S. Bank, 
Sun Trust, Key Bank, State Street, Bank of Nova Scotia, Bank of Montreal, CIBC and 
National Bank of Canada are added into the sample. Overall speaking, the sample 
collected under this comparison research contains approximately 80% of the banks in 
the sample of Pérignon and Smith (2010).   
4.8.2 The US Sample and the Evolution of VaR Disclosures in the US 
Pérignon and Smith (2010) have a special focus on the VaR disclosures for the 
American banking industry. Therefore, this section will present a comparable analysis 
with Pérignon and Smith (2010) on the VaR disclosures for the American banking 
industry over the period 2006-2013. 
                                                          
36 Further information with regard to the rank of the world’s top banks can be traced through the website 
http://www.relbanks.com/. 
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There were ten American banks shown in Pérignon and Smith (2010), namely Bank 
of America, JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Wachovia, Wells Fargo, U.S. Bank, Sun 
Trust, HSBC Bank, Key Bank and State Street. In contrast, the sample of world’s top 
sixty banks in 2013 contains six American banks, namely JPMorgan Chase, Bank of 
America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs Group and Morgan Stanley.  
Pérignon and Smith (2010) regard HSBC as an American bank. This comparison 
research has noticed that HSBC originated in the British former colony Hong Kong 
and now is being headquartered in London. Therefore, the current research regards 
HSBC as a British bank instead of an American bank. 
Among the world’s top sixty banks in 2013, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, 
Citigroup and Wells Fargo are American banks and have appeared in the sample of 
Pérignon and Smith (2010). Goldman Sachs Group and Morgan Stanley are solely 
investment banks which Pérignon and Smith (2010) have excluded but included in the 
current research. The intention to only look at the commercial banking sector like the 
previous research did is not realistic, since JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, 
Citigroup and Wells Fargo have all well involved in the investment business nowadays. 
The line between the investment bank and the commercial bank is blurred as banks 
around the world developed mixed businesses for their portfolios. For example, one of 
the American banks Wells Fargo used to be a traditional commercial bank but now 
generates a significant proportion of revenues from the investment banking business37.  
In addition to the six American banks within the world’s top sixty of 2013, this 
comparison research has added another five American banks into the US sample which 
                                                          
37 In 2009, Wells Fargo set up a division Wells Fargo Securities with a special focus on the investment 
banking business. The investment banking division has approximately 4,500 employees and generates 
revenue between $3 and $4 billion per year for Wells Fargo. 
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are not in the top sixty of 2013 but in the sample of Pérignon and Smith (2010). These 
five American banks are Wachovia, U.S. Bank, Sun Trust, Key Bank and State Street. 
In the period 2006-2007, the US sample by the current research consists of 11 banks 
which are JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs 
Group, Morgan Stanley, Wachovia, U.S. Bank, Sun Trust, Key Bank and State Street. 
Wachovia was acquired by Wells Fargo38  in 2008, thus from 2008 onwards, the US 
sample in the current research has cut out Wachovia. 
The table below is the summary statistics for the status of VaR disclosures for the top 
American banks within the period 2006-2013. Panel A of the table tabulates average 
VaRDI, standard deviation of VaRDI, and minimum and maximum VaRDI among 
these American banks for the period 2006-2013. Panel B of the table tabulates the 
disclosure ratios for the elements of VaR holding period, VaR confidence level, high 
low and average VaR, year-end VaR, risk category of VaR, diversification effect of 
VaR, previous year VaR, histogram daily VaR, plot daily VaR, hypothetical trading 
revenue, no trading fees, histogram of daily trading revenue, plot of daily trading 
revenue, exceptions, and explanation of exceptions among these American banks for 
the period 2006-2013. 
 
                                                          
38 Due to the heavy loss of the subprime mortgage crisis, Wachovia was acquired by Wells Fargo in 
2008, and consequently Wachovia was delisted from the stock market in 2008. Therefore, there are no 
available documents for Wachovia after 2008 and the VaRDI is not able to be composited for Wachovia 
after 2008. 
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Table 4.7 VaR Disclosure of Top US Banks (10+1) during the Period 2006-2013 
This table presents the summary statistics about the VaR disclosures among the top banks in the US for 
the period 2006-2013. This is a comparison table with table 1 in Pérignon and Smith (2010). Therefore, 
the sample consists of similar banks in the previous research. Meanwhile, the sample has adjusted the 
sample by considering the sample change in 2008 due to the acquisition of Wachovia by Wells Fargo. 
In the period 2006-2007, the sample consists of 11 banks which are JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, 
Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs Group, Morgan Stanley, Wachovia, U.S. Bank, Sun Trust, Key 
Bank and State Street. From 2008 onwards, the sample has cut out Wachovia since Wachovia was 
acquired by Wells Fargo in 2008. The VaR disclosure index (VaRDI) is adopted from Periogon and 
Smith (2010) which measures 6 features of Value-at-Risk Disclosure. The VaRDI awards the 
corresponding score to the bank if the bank has disclosed the following information in its annual report: 
1. VaR characteristics (holding period and confidence level e.g. 99%, 95%). 2. Summarized VaR 
characteristics (high low average VaR, year-end VaR, risk category and diversification). 3. 
Intertemporal comparison (previous year). 4. Daily VaR figures (histogram of daily VaRs and plot of 
daily VaRs). 5. Trading revenues (hypothetical trading revenue, no trading fees in revenue, histogram 
of daily trading revenues and plot of daily trading revenues). 6. Exceptions (number of exceptions and 
explanation of exceptions). The theoretical score of VaRDI ranges from 0 (minimum) to 15 (maximum). 
The table consists of two panels. Panel A is about the summary scores of VaRDI which includes average 
VaRDI, standard deviation of VaRDI, and minimum and maximum VaRDI. Panel B is about the 
percentage ratios exhibiting the percentage rates for banks releasing each component, e.g. the 
percentage ratio 10% shown in the table indicates that 1 out of 10 banks releasing the corresponding 
component. 
VaR disclosure of US banks (10+1) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Panel A
Average VaRDI 8.1 8.2 7.6 7.6 7.9 7.6 9.1 9.2
Standard Deviation VaRDI 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.8 3.4 3.4 3.4
Minimum VaRDI 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0
Maximum VaRDI 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0
Panel B
Holding Period 91% 91% 90% 90% 90% 80% 80% 80%
Confidence Level 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
High, Low, Average VaR 91% 91% 90% 90% 90% 100% 100% 100%
Year-End VaR 82% 82% 80% 80% 80% 80% 90% 100%
Risk Category 64% 64% 60% 60% 60% 60% 80% 80%
Diversification 55% 55% 60% 60% 60% 60% 70% 70%
Previous Year 82% 82% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 100%
Histogram Daily VaR 18% 18% 20% 20% 20% 20% 30% 20%
Plot Daily VaR 27% 27% 20% 20% 20% 20% 40% 50%
Hypothetical Trading Revenue 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
No Trading Fees 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Histogram Daily Trading Revenue 55% 55% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 40%
Plot Daily Trading Revenue 19% 19% 10% 10% 10% 10% 30% 40%
Exceptions 45% 45% 40% 40% 50% 50% 50% 50%
Explanation of Exceptions 0% 27% 20% 10% 0% 10% 0% 0%
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Table 4.8 VaR Disclosure of Top Ten American Banks during the Period 1996-2005 
Source: Pérignon and Smith (2010)  
This table is extracted from Pérignon and Smith (2010). Table 4.7 is the comparison table with this one. 
 
The American banks in the sample of Pérignon and Smith (2010) and the American 
banks in the current research are more or less similar. In combination, table 4.7 and 
table 4.8 exhibit the status of VaR disclosures among these American banks during the 
period 1996-2013. The average score of VaRDI for these American banks is 0.4 in 
1996, while the average score of VaRDI for these American banks increases to 9.2 in 
2013. From 1996 to 2013, there is an increase of 8.8 points in the average score of 
VaRDI among these banks. This is consistent with the statement in Pérignon and Smith 
(2010) that there is an upward trend towards VaR disclosures amongst American banks. 
The sample of Pérignon and Smith (2010) ends in 2005 when the average score of 
VaRDI for these banks is 7.0. The new sample ends in 2013 when the average score 
of VaRDI for these banks is 9.2. Compared to 2005, the average score of VaRDI 
among these banks has increased 2.2 points in 2013. Though the increase of the 
average score of VaRDI during the period 2006-2013 demonstrates an improvement 
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in VaR disclosures among American banks, the t-test suggests that the increase of the 
average score of VaRDI during the period 1996-2005 is significantly larger than the 
increase of the average score of VaRDI during the period 2006-2013 among these 
banks. Moreover, the average score of VaRDI for these banks slightly decreases within 
the period 2007-2008, which coincides with the time frame of the financial crisis. By 
2012, the average score of VaRDI for these banks rebounds to 9.1, which is the score 
level before the financial crisis. 
The standard deviation of the scores of VaRDI among these American banks in each 
year ranges from 3.4 to 3.8. The score difference between the maximum and minimum 
score of VaRDI among these banks is 11 in 2005, while the score difference between 
the maximum and minimum of VaRDI among these banks is 9 in 2013. As before in 
the period 1996-2005, the difference for the disclosures of VaR information remains 
among these banks during the period 2006-2013. JP Morgan Chase and Bank of 
America have relatively high average scores of VaRDI in the period 2006-2013. U.S. 
Bank and Sun Trust have relatively low average scores of VaRDI in the period 2006-
2013. Pérignon and Smith (2010) believe that the difference in the disclosures of VaR 
information is related to bank’s size and bank’s involvement in trading activities. 
Panel B of table 4.7 presents the percentage ratios of VaRDI components among these 
American banks, which this part can be compared to the corresponding part of table 
4.8 in Pérignon and Smith (2010). With the exception of two components as yet 
unreported by any top American bank in 2013, generally speaking, there is an overall 
upward trend in each component. The first unreported component is hypothetical 
trading revenue which has not been reported by any top American bank through the 
period 2006-2013. Pérignon and Smith (2010) also find this lack reporting in 
hypothetical trading revenue among these banks through the period 1996-2005. The 
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absence of hypothetical trading revenue brings obstacles for investors evaluating the 
potential gain of investment and comparing with the potential maximum loss indicated 
by VaR. Another unreported component is the explanation of exceptions, which is 
rarely reported by any top American bank through the period 2006-2013. In 2007, 
2008, 2009 and 2011, there are 27%, 20%, 10% and 10% of these banks explaining 
the VaR violations respectively. In the rest years of the period 2006-2013, the 
percentage ratio of reporting the explanation of exceptions among these banks is 0%. 
Wachovia used to explain the VaR violations in 2007, after the merger with Wells 
Fargo in 2008, only Bank of America, and Morgan Stanley provide the explanation of 
exceptions in 2008. In 2009, only Morgan Stanley provides the explanation of VaR 
violations. Citi provides the explanation of VaR violations in 2011.  
Another relatively weak point in the VaR disclosure among these banks is around the 
issue of reporting daily VaR figures. In 2013, the percentage ratios for the disclosures 
of daily VaR histogram and daily VaR plot are 20% and 50% respectively. Although 
this is weak, when compared to the percentage ratios in 2005 which are 0% and 20% 
respectively, it still illustrates an upward trend in the disclosure of VaR figures among 
these banks.  
In terms of more basic information disclosures about VaR such as VaR characteristics, 
summarized VaR characteristics and intertemporal comparison of VaR, the disclosure 
levels are relatively high among these banks. Especially the sections like confidence 
level, high low average VaR, year-end VaR, and previous year VaR, all banks have 
reported them in 2013. In contrast, the percentage ratios for the disclosures of high low 
average VaR, year-end VaR, and previous year VaR in 2005 among these banks are 
80%, 80%, and 60% respectively. 
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Figure 4.4 VaR Disclosure Index Plot for 11 Top American Banks during the Period 2006-2013 
The figures above plot the VaR disclosure index (VaRDI) for 11 top banks in the US during the period 
2006-2013. Wachovia has been acquired by Wells Fargo in 2008, thus the plot for Wachovia only covers 
the period 2006-2007. 
 
A disaggregated view of VaR disclosures across these eleven top American banks is 
shown in figure 4.4, which provides a comparison to figure 1 in Pérignon and Smith 
(2010). Among these eleven banks, JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, U.S. 
Bank and Key Bank have shown increased scores of VaRDI in 2013 compared to 2006. 
Especially, Wells Fargo has a dramatic increase in the score of VaRDI in 2012, which 
is the biggest increase among these banks during the period 2006-2013. The disclosure 
status in other banks remains relatively stable during this period. Bank of America and 
Sun Trust have not shown any change in their scores of VaRDI such that the VaRDI 
plots of these two banks are flat during this period.  
The relatively large banks in the sample such as JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America 
and Citigroup exhibit constant higher scores of VaRDI during this period. On the other 
hand, the relatively small banks such as U.S. Bank, Sun Trust and Key bank exhibit 
constant lower scores of VaRDI during this period. The difference between the 
minimum and maximum score of VaRDI in 2006 is 10 points, and in 2013 the 
difference between the minimum and maximum score of VaRDI only subsides by 1 
point which means the gap of VaR disclosures still remains among these American 
banks. 
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4.8.3 A Comparison of the VaR Disclosure between the US and Canada 
 
Figure 4.5 VaR Disclosure Index Plot in the US and in Canada during the Period 2006-2013 
The figure is based on the average scores of the Value-at-Risk Disclosure Index (VaRDI) for 11 
American banks and 6 Canadian banks within the period 2006-2013. The 11 banks composing the US 
sample are JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs Group, Morgan 
Stanley, Wachovia, U.S. Bank, Sun Trust, Key Bank and State Street. Wachovia has been cut out from 
the sample in 2008 and afterwards, since it has been acquired by Wells Fargo in 2008. The 6 banks 
composing the Canadian sample are Toronto-Dominion Bank, Royal Bank of Canada, Bank of Nova 
Scotia, Bank of Montreal, CIBC, and National Bank of Canada. 
 
Figure 4.6 VaRDI Plot in the US and Canada during the Period 1996-2005 
Source: Pérignon and Smith (2010) 
This figure is extracted from Pérignon and Smith (2010). The two plots exhibit the average scores of 
the Value-at-Risk Disclosure Index (VaRDI) in the US and Canada within the period 1996-2005. The 
US sample contains 10 banks which are Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Wachovia, 
Wells Fargo, U.S. Bank, Sun Trust, HSBC Bank, Key Bank and State Street. The Canadian sample 
contains 6 banks which are Royal Bank of Canada, Toronto-Dominion Bank, Bank of Nova Scotia, 
Bank of Montreal, CIBC, and National Bank of Canada. 
 
The Canadian sample is composed of the exact same Canadian banks in Pérignon and 
Smith (2010). Compared to 2005, in 2013 Toronto Dominion Bank has replaced Royal 
Bank of Canada as the biggest bank in Canada. 
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The average scores of VaRDI for these top American banks and these top Canadian 
banks during the period 2006-2013 are depicted in figure 4.5. Figure 4.6 is the 
comparison one for the period 1996-2005 extracted from Pérignon and Smith (2010). 
Figure 4.6 shows an incremental trend in VaR disclosures for both the US and Canada 
over the period 1996-2005, while figure 4.5 illustrates a relatively stable trend of VaR 
disclosures for both the US and Canada over the period 2006-2013. Canada maintains 
a high rate of VaR disclosures through the period 2006-2013 and there is a limited 
upside increase for Canada, as the average score of VaRDI in Canada has already been 
very high in 2005. The stable trend of VaR disclosures in Canada not only exists within 
the period 2006-2013, in figure 4.6, if we look at the section from 2002 onwards, that 
part of the figure also manifests a stable trend of VaR disclosures. The most significant 
increase of VaR disclosures for the US and Canada is in the period 1996-2002, in 
which both figures demonstrate a noticeable upward increase. There are only mere 
changes in the average scores of VaRDI for these two developed economies after 2002.  
The gap of VaR disclosures between American banks and Canadian banks still remains 
that Canadian banks generally have a higher rate of VaR disclosures than American 
banks. Pérignon and Smith (2010) believe that there are mainly two reasons for the 
higher disclosure of VaR information in Canada, one is the peculiar competition 
among Canadian banks, and the other is that American banks are mainly exposed to 
credit risk while Canadian banks are mainly exposed to currency risk.  
Barth et al. (2001) show that in 1999, the top ten banks in the US accounted for only 
21% of US deposits, while the top six banks in Canada held 76% of Canadian deposits. 
The banking industry is more concentrated in Canada compared to the US, which 
creates a high incentive for Canadian banks not to deviate from the industry norm of a 
higher market risk disclosure. Alternatively, the high concentration of deposits attracts 
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the attention of financial regulators in Canada to monitor the safety of the banking 
industry, which could be the potential reason for the higher market risk disclosure in 
Canada.  
4.8.4 The International Sample and the VaR Disclosure in the World 
Besides looking at the VaR disclosure in the US and Canada specifically, Pérignon 
and Smith (2010) also take a look at the VaR disclosure in the world using a sample 
consisting of the world’s top fifty banks (by the asset size) in 2005. This research has 
slightly increased the number of world banks from fifty to sixty, by doing so this 
research concludes more world banks than Pérignon and Smith (2010). In 2013, the 
world’s top sixty banks have more Chinese banks when comparing to the sample 
collected in Pérignon and Smith (2010). Due to bankruptcies and reorganizations, 
several banks in the top fifty at the time of Pérignon and Smith (2010) have no longer 
existed or been crowded out of the top sixty in 201339. 
                                                          
39Due to the financial crisis, a lot of banks have gone through reorganization. Wachovia (USA) was 
acquired by Wells Fargo in 2008. As a result of the trading loss in 2008, Caisse Nationale d. Caisses 
(France) merged with Banque fédérale des banques populaires in July 2009 to become Groupe BPCE. 
After encountering the financial problem in 2008, Fortis Bank NV/SA (Belgium) was sold its ownership 
to BNP Paribas in 2010. Calyon (France) was dissolved in 2008 and rebranded as Crédit Agricole 
Corporate and Investment Bank in 2010. Dresdner Bank Group (Germany) was acquired by 
Commerzbank in December 2009. Landesbank Baden-Wurtte (Germany) and Bayerische Landesbank 
(Germany) used to rank 34th and 41st in the sample of international banks in Pérignon and Smith (2010), 
but both have been crowded out of the world’s top sixty in 2013. 
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Rank Bank Name Country
Total Assets     
(US$ billion, 2013)
Holding 
Period 
Confidence 
Level
High, Low, 
Average
Year-End 
Var
Risk 
Category
Diversification Previous 
Year
Histogram 
Daily  VaR
Plot 
Daily Var
Hypothetical 
Revenue
No Trading 
Fees
Histogram 
Daily Rev.
Plot Daily 
Revenue
Exceptions Explanation 
Exceptions
VaRDI
1 JPMorgan Chase&Co USA 2,415.69 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 12
2 Bank of America USA 2,102.27 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 2 0 13
3 Citigroup Inc USA  1,880.38 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 2 0 12
4 Wells Fargo  USA  1,527.02 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 13
5 Goldman Sachs Group     USA          911.51 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 10
6 Morgan Stanley   USA       832.70 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 11
U.S. Bank USA 364.00 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
State Street USA 243.30 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Sun Trust USA 175.00 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Key Bank USA 91.00 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Wachovia USA N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1 Toronto-Dominion Bank  Canada     810.67 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 2 0 14
2 Royal Bank of Canada Canada     808.66 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 2 0 14
3 Bank of Nova Scotia  Canada     698.721 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 2 0 14
4 Bank of Montreal          Canada             504.743 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 11
CIBC Canada 398.39 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 2 0 14
National Bank of Canada Canada 195.30 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
1 Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) China 3,125.97 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
2 HSBC Holdings UK 2,617.32 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 2 0 11
3 China Construction Bank Corporation China 2,538.62 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
4 BNP Paribas France 2,486.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Japan 2,462.90 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
6 JPMorgan Chase&Co USA 2,415.69 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 12
7 Agricultural Bank of China China 2,406.24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 Credit Agricole Group France 2,356.45 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 10
9 Bank of China China 2,292.59 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
10 Deutche Bank Germany 2,225.35 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 14
11 Barclays PLC UK 2,164.60 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 11
12 Bank of America USA 2,102.27 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 2 0 13
13 Japan Post Bank Japan 1,939.89 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
14 Citigroup Inc USA  1,880.38 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 2 0 12
15 Mizuho Financial Group Japan            1,794.54 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 9
16 Societe Generale       France                1,705.90 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 8
17 Royal Bank of Scotland Group  UK      1,695.50 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 1 13
18 Groupe BPCE      France       1,551.59 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 2 2 0 12
19 Banco Santander Spain         1,540.70 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 1 14
20 Wells Fargo  USA  1,527.02 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 13
21 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Japan   1,497.16 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7
22 Lloyds Banking Group  UK        1,397.19 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
23 China Development Bank   China               1,352.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
24 UniCredit S.p.A     Italy        1,168.11 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 2 0 12
25 UBS AG   Switzerland 1,138.26 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 12
26 ING Bank N.V. Netherlands   1,087.63 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 0 2 2 0 15
27 Bank of Communications China         984.99 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
28 Credit Suisse Group Switzerland   983.78 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 11
29 Rabobank Group Netherlands  983.99 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
30 Postal Savings Bank of China    China    922.04 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel C: Global banks
Panel A: US banks
Panel B: Canadian banks
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Table 4.9 VaR Disclosure across the World in 2013 
This table is in comparison with table 2 in Pérignon and Smith (2010). There are three panels in the table which illustrate the Value-at-Risk Disclosure Index (VaRDI) 
and its individual components in 2013. The VaRDI covers 6 facets of Value-at-Risk (VaR) disclosure including 15 individual components. The VaRDI awards the 
corresponding score to the bank if the bank has disclosed the following information in its annual report: 1. Var characteristics (1 point if holding period and 1 point 
if confidence level e.g. 99%, 95%). 2. Summarized VaR characteristics (1 point if high, low, average VaR, 1 point if year-end VaR, 1 point if risk category and 1 
point if diversification). 3. Intertemporal comparison (1 point if previous year). 4. Daily VaR figures (1 point if there is a histogram of daily VaRs and 1 point if 
plotting daily VaRs in the meantime; or 1 point if there is a histogram of daily VaRs and 0 points if no plot of daily VaRs; or 0 points if no histogram of daily VaRs 
and 2 points if plotting daily VaRs). 5. Trading revenues (1 point if hypothetical trading revenue, 1 point if considering trading fees in hypothetical trading revenue, 
1 point if there is a histogram of daily trading revenues and 1 point if plotting daily trading revenues in the meantime; or 1 point if there is a histogram of daily trading 
revenues and 0 points if no plot of daily trading revenues; or 0 points if no histogram of daily trading revenues and 2 points if plotting daily trading revenues). 6. 
Exceptions (1 point if stating the number of exceptions and 1 point if explaining the exceptions; or 2 points if no exceptions). The theoretical score of VaRDI ranges 
from 0 (minimum) to 15 (maximum).  In panel C, the top global sixty banks (by the asset size) at the end of 2013 are listed with their original countries, total asset 
Rank Bank Name Country
Total Assets     
(US$ billion, 2013)
Holding 
Period 
Confidence 
Level
High, Low, 
Average
Year-End 
Var
Risk 
Category
Diversification Previous 
Year
Histogram 
Daily  VaR
Plot 
Daily Var
Hypothetical 
Revenue
No Trading 
Fees
Histogram 
Daily Rev.
Plot Daily 
Revenue
Exceptions Explanation 
Exceptions
VaRDI
31 Goldman Sachs Group     USA          911.51 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 10
32 Credit Mutuel Group               France   891.05 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
33 Nordea Bank    Sweden      870.63 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
34 Intesa Sanpaolo         Italy      864.90 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 2 1 1 13
35 Morgan Stanley   USA       832.70 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 11
36 Norinchukin Bank    Japan                823.983 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
37 Toronto-Dominion Bank  Canada     810.67 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 2 0 14
38 Royal Bank of Canada Canada     808.66 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 2 0 14
39 BBVA        Spain       804.539 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 2 2 0 13
40 CommerzbankAG Germany           759.085 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
41 National Australia Bank   Australia  772.389 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
42 Bank of Nova Scotia  Canada     698.721 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 2 0 14
43 Commenwealth Bank of Australia             Australia             697.798 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
44 Standard Charted Plc       UK           674.38 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7
45 China Merchants Bank China 663.67 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
46 KfW Group             Germany     641.891 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
47 Australia & Newzealand Banking Group   Australia   627.063 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
48 Westpac Banking Corp  Australia  625.365 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
49 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank       China        608.104 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 Industrial Bank Co. Ltd      China           607.66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
51 China CITIC Bank Corp      China     601.671 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 2 0 12
52 Danske Bank     Denmark   597.47 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 1 0 13
53 Sberbank Bank     Russia         557.176 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
54 Banco do Brazil SA    Brazil       552.67 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
55 DZ Bank AG   Germany          534.419 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 10
56 China Minsheng Banking Corp        China          533.099 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
57 ABN AMRO Group NV       Netherlands       513.765 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
58 Bank of Montreal          Canada             504.743 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 11
59 La Caixa Group  Spain    485.105 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
60 Cassa Depositi e Prestiti(CDP)            Italy       470.187 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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size (in US dollars at the end of 2013), 15 components of VaRDI and the overall score of VaRDI at the end. The information about the rank of these banks at the end 
of 2013 can be traced from the website http://www.relbanks.com/worlds-top-banks/assets-2013. Unlike panel C in table 2 of Pérignon and Smith (2010), panel C 
here has not trimmed off American and Canadian banks for a better view of the whole banking industry.  Panel A focuses on the American banking industry which 
exhibits American banks, and there are 6 American banks in the global top sixty which are JPMorgan Chase and Co, Bank of America, Citigroup Inc., Wells Fargo, 
Goldman Sachs Group and Morgan Stanley. The other 5 banks (shown in light black) listed in panel A are in the goal to make a comparison with the previous research 
of Pérignon and Smith (2010). HSBC is regarded as a British bank, therefore it has not been listed in panel A. Wachovia has been acquired by Wells Fargo in 2008, 
hence Wachovia has no data available in 2013. There are 4 Canadian banks in the global top sixty which are Toronto-Dominion Bank, Royal Bank of Canada, Bank 
of Nova Scotia and Bank of Montreal. The other 2 banks (CIBC and National Bank of Canada) listed in panel B are not within the world’s top sixty but are shown in 
the sample of Pérignon and Smith (2010).           
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Table 4.9 lists the VaRDI and its component elements for American, Canadian and 
world’s top banks in 2013. The table provided here is in comparison with table 2 in 
Pérignon and Smith (2010). Unlike table 2 in Pérignon and Smith (2010), panel C of 
table 4.9 has not trimmed off the American and Canadian banks40, in which panel C 
concludes all the world’s top sixty banks.  
The world’s top sixty banks listed in table 4.9 have covered approximately 80% of the 
banks listed in table 2 of Pérignon and Smith (2010). One significant change for the 
world’s top sixty banks in 2013 compared to 2005 is that a number of Chinese banks 
have entered into the top sixty. Among the world’s top sixty banks in 2013, there are 
twelve banks from China, and China is the country which has the largest amount of 
banks in the top sixty. By contrast to 2005, there were only four banks from China in 
the world’s top fifty.  The US is the country which has the second largest amount of 
banks in the top sixty in 2013 such that there are six banks from the US in the top sixty. 
Followed by China and the US, each of these three countries (the UK, France, and 
Japan) has five banks in the top sixty in 2013. In 2013, the countries which also have 
banks listed in the top sixty are Australia (4 banks), Brazil (1 bank), Canada (4 banks), 
Denmark (1 bank), Germany (4 banks), Italy (3 banks), Netherlands (3 banks), Russia 
(1 bank), Sweden (1 bank), Switzerland (2 banks) and Spain (3 banks).  
Because of the bankruptcy or the merger with other banks, several banks have been 
excluded from the top list. In the US sample of Pérignon and Smith (2010), Wachovia 
used to be the fourth-largest bank in the US, but Wachovia no longer exists due to the 
acquisition by Wells Fargo in 2008.  
                                                          
40 Pérignon and Smith (2010) regard a bank outside the US and Canada as an international bank. In 
Pérignon and Smith (2010), panel C of table 2 is the section including only international banks without 
American and Canadian banks. 
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In Japan, the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi used to rank 16th in the sample of 
international banks by Pérignon and Smith (2010), and the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi 
has changed its name to Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group after the merger with UFJ 
Group in 2006. In 2013, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group ranks 5th in the world’s top 
sixty banks.  
Europe is the area seeing the most banks being excluded from the top list. Many banks 
are being excluded from the top list after the impact of the 2008 financial crisis. Fortis 
Bank NV/SA in Belgium used to rank 19th in the sample of international banks by 
Pérignon and Smith (2010). After encountering severe problems during the 2008 
financial crisis, Fortis Bank NV/SA was broken up and the banking business was sold 
to BNP Paribas. In 2013, BNP Paribas in France ranks 4th in the world’s top sixty 
banks. In 2013, there is no bank from Belgium listed in the world’s top sixty. There 
are two banks from France in the sample of Pérignon and Smith (2010) which have 
been dismissed after the 2008 financial crisis. Caisse Nationale d. Caisses used to rank 
17th in the sample of international banks by Pérignon and Smith (2010). After 
suffering the trading loss of €751 million in 2008, Caisse Nationale d. Caisses merged 
with Banque fédérale des banques populaires (BFBP) in July 2009 to become Groupe 
BPCE. Another French bank called Calyon has been dissolved in 2008 and Calyon 
used to rank 28th in the sample of international banks by Pérignon and Smith (2010). 
Calyon rebranded as Crédit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank in 2010, which 
is the investment banking division of Crédit Agricole Group nowadays. In 2013, the 
French bank Crédit Agricole Group ranks 8th in the world’s top sixty banks. There are 
two banks from Germany in the international group of Pérignon and Smith (2010) but 
both had been dismissed after 2005, which are Bayerische Hypo-und Ver. and 
Dresdner Bank. Bayerische Hypo-und Ver. used to rank 27th in the sample of 
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international banks by Pérignon and Smith (2010) and it had been taken over by 
UniCredit Group in November 2005. Now the new name of these two combined 
entities is UniCredit Bank Aktiengesellschaft, and the bank is under the supervision of 
UniCredit Group in Italy. The annual report of Unicredit Bank Aktiengesellschaft 
provided after its delisting in the stock market after 2008 is a voluntary statement in 
compliance with the German Corporate Governance Code. In 2013, the UniCredit 
Group ranks 24th in the world’s top sixty banks. Another Germany bank called 
Dresdner Bank used to rank 29th in the sample of international banks by Pérignon and 
Smith (2010), after its bankruptcy in 2008, Dresdner Bank had been acquired by its 
Germany competitor Commerzbank in 2009. In 2013, Commerzbank ranks 40th in the 
world’s top banks. There are additional two banks that have been shown in the sample 
of international banks by Pérignon and Smith (2010) but have not been listed in the 
world’s top sixty banks in 2013. Though the two banks still exist, their sizes are not 
big enough to squeeze into the world’s top sixty banks in 2013. Both of the banks are 
from German, which are Landesbank Baden-Wurtte and Bayerische Landesbank.  
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Figure 4.7 Columns for VaR Disclosure in 2013 
The above columns demonstrate the VaR Disclosure Index (VaRDI) for the world’s top sixty banks in 2013. The horizontal axis represents the top sixty world banks 
by their ranks. The vertical axis represents the score of VaRDI ranging from 0 to 15. The individual column corresponded within x and y axis indicates the VaRDI 
for each individual bank. Within the top sixty banks, there are 6 American banks and 4 Canadian banks. The horizontal dotted red line (CAN VaRDI) and the 
horizontal dotted blue line (US VaRDI) represent the average scores of VaRDI for American and Canadian banks respectively.  The average score of VaRDI for the 
6 American banks is 11.83 and the average score of VaRDI for the 4 Canadian banks is 13.25. For the non-American and non-Canadian banks, this comparison 
research regards them as international banks like Pérignon and Smith (2010). The horizontal dotted black line (INT VaRDI) represents the average score of VaRDI 
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for the 50 non-American and non-Canadian banks around the world. The average score of VaRDI for the 50 non-American and non-Canadian banks is 6.72. This 
figure is in comparison with figure 3 in Pérignon and Smith (2010). 
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In order to provide an intuitive sense of the VaRDI status for the world’s top sixty 
banks, this research has produced the above bar chart which is in comparison with 
figure 3 in Pérignon and Smith (2010).   
There are three findings through table 4.9 and figure 4.7 collectively: 1.There is a 
variation in the disclosure of VaR information among the world’s top sixty banks. 2. 
The average score of VaRDI for the first half of the world’s top sixty banks is 8.57 and 
the average score of VaRDI for the second half of the world’s top sixty banks is 6.77, 
which suggests that larger banks disclose more comprehensive VaR information 
compared to smaller banks. Assuming an unequal variance, the difference between the 
first half of the world’s top sixty banks and the second half of the world’s top sixty 
banks is statistically significant at 10% confidence level. 3. The average score of 
VaRDI for the world’s top sixty banks is 7.66. There are six American banks and four 
Canadian banks within the world’s top sixty banks. The average score of VaRDI for 
the six American banks is 11.83 and the average score of VaRDI for the four Canadian 
banks is 13.25. The average score of VaRDI for the fifty non-American and non-
Canadian banks is 6.72. The average score of VaRDI for the American and Canadian 
banks is higher than the non-American and non-Canadian banks. Assuming an unequal 
variance, the difference of the average score of VaRDI between the six American 
banks and the fifty non-American and non-Canadian banks is statistically significant 
at 10% confidence level, and the difference of the average score of VaRDI between 
the four Canadian banks and the fifty non-American and non-Canadian banks is 
statistically significant at 1% confidence level.  
The first two findings that a variation status of VaR information disclosure among the 
world’s top banks and a higher disclosure level of VaR information in the larger banks 
are consistent with the statements in Pérignon and Smith (2010).  
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The third finding that the average score of VaRDI in American banks is higher than in 
international (non-American and non-Canada) banks is different from Pérignon and 
Smith (2010). In Pérignon and Smith (2010), the average score of VaRDI in Canadian 
banks is higher than the average score of VaRDI in international banks, and the 
average score of VaRDI in international banks is higher than the average score of 
VaRDI in American banks. In 2013, although the average score of VaRDI in Canadian 
banks is still higher than the average score of VaRDI in American banks, the average 
score of VaRDI in international banks is no longer higher than the average score of 
VaRDI in American banks. The average score of VaRDI in American banks has 
increased from 7.0 in 2005 to 11.83 in 2013. Meanwhile, the average score of VaRDI 
in international banks has decreased from 7.8 in 2005 to 6.72 in 2013. The world’s top 
sixty banks have been recomposed especially with the increased proportion of Chinese 
banks in the top sixty. The relatively low level of VaR disclosures amongst these 
Chinese banks is an underlying reason for the fall of the average score of VaRDI in 
the international banks. As shown in panel C of table 4.9, China Development Bank 
(China) ranked 23rd, Postal Savings Bank of China (China) ranked 30th, Shanghai 
Pudong Development Bank (China) ranked 49th, Industrial Bank Co. Ltd (China) 
ranked 50th, and China Minsheng Banking Corp (China) ranked 56th are all Chinese 
banks that newly squeezed into the top list compared to the sample in Pérignon and 
Smith (2010), but none of these Chinese banks has information disclosures about VaR. 
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Table 4.10 VaR Disclosure by Country in 2013 
There are sixteen countries with banks listed in the world’s top sixty in 2013, and the number of banks within the world’s top sixty is shown under each country in 
the table above. Panel A in table 3 presents some summary statistics for the VaRDI across different countries. Since Brazil, Denmark, Russia, and Sweden have only 
one bank listed in the world’s top sixty, the standard deviation of VaRDI is not available for these four countries. Panel B presents the percentage ratios of disclosures 
for the elements of VaRDI in the world and in each country. The VaRDI covers 6 facets of Value-at-Risk (VaR) disclosure including 15 individual elements. The 
VaRDI awards the corresponding score to the bank if the bank has disclosed the following information in its annual report: 1. Var characteristics (1 point if holding 
period and 1 point if confidence level e.g. 99%, 95%). 2. Summarized VaR characteristics (1 point if high, low, average VaR, 1 point if year-end VaR, 1 point if risk 
category and 1 point if diversification). 3. Intertemporal comparison (1 point if previous year). 4. Daily VaR figures (1 point if there is a histogram of daily VaRs and 
1 point if plotting daily VaRs in the meantime; or 1 point if there is a histogram of daily VaRs and 0 points if no plot of daily VaRs; or 0 points if no histogram of 
daily VaRs and 2 points if plotting daily VaRs). 5. Trading revenues (1 point if hypothetical trading revenue, 1 point if considering trading fees in hypothetical trading 
revenue, 1 point if there is a histogram of daily trading revenues and 1 point if plotting daily trading revenues in the meantime; or 1 point if there is a histogram of 
daily trading revenues and 0 points if no plot of daily trading revenues; or 0 points if no histogram of daily trading revenues and 2 points if plotting daily trading 
revenues). 6. Exceptions (1 point if stating the number of exceptions and 1 point if explaining the exceptions; or 2 points if no exceptions). The theoretical score of 
VaRDI ranges from 0 (minimum) to 15 (maximum). The percentage ratio is calculated by the number of banks which have reported the corresponding element 
divided by the number of banks in the world or in each country. The table is in comparison with table 3 in Pérignon and Smith (2010). 
VaR disclosure by country World Australia Brazil Canada China Denmark France Germany Italy Japan Netherlands Russia Spain Sweden Switzerland UK USA
Number of Banks 60 4 1 4 12 1 5 4 3 5 3 1 3 1 2 5 6
Panel A
Average VaRDI 7.7 5.4 1.0 13.3 3.2 13.0 6.6 7.8 9.0 5.8 8.3 7.0 9.0 7.0 12.0 9.6 11.8
Standard Deviation VaRDI 4.8 0.5 N/A 1.5 4.0 N/A 5.0 5.6 6.1 2.4 6.5 N/A 7.8 N/A 0.7 3.0 1.2
Minimum VaRDI 0.0 6.0 1.0 11.0 0.0 13.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 7.0 0.0 7.0 11.0 6.0 10.0
Maximum VaRDI 15.0 7.0 1.0 14.0 12.0 13.0 12.0 14.0 13.0 9.0 15.0 7.0 14.0 7.0 12.0 13.0 13.0
Panel B 
Holding Period 77% 100% 0% 100% 50% 100% 60% 75% 100% 80% 100% 100% 67% 100% 100% 100% 84%
Confidence Level 84% 100% 100% 100% 50% 100% 60% 100% 100% 80% 100% 100% 67% 100% 100% 100% 100%
High, Low, Average VaR 72% 100% 0% 100% 42% 100% 40% 75% 67% 60% 67% 100% 67% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Year-End VaR 73% 75% 0% 100% 33% 100% 80% 75% 67% 80% 67% 100% 67% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Risk Category 70% 100% 0% 100% 42% 100% 60% 75% 33% 40% 67% 100% 67% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Diversification 48% 100% 0% 100% 8% 100% 40% 25% 0% 0% 67% 100% 67% 100% 100% 40% 100%
Previous Year 72% 100% 0% 0% 42% 100% 80% 75% 67% 40% 33% 100% 67% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Histogram Daily VaR 15% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 33%
Plot Daily VaR 46% 0% 0% 75% 8% 100% 60% 50% 67% 20% 67% 0% 67% 0% 100% 60% 84%
Hypothetical Trading Revenue 13% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 25% 33% 0% 33% 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0%
No Trading Fees 7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 13%
Histogram Daily Trading Revenue 23% 0% 0% 75% 8% 0% 20% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 40% 67%
Plot Daily Trading Revenue 32% 0% 0% 100% 8% 100% 20% 25% 67% 0% 33% 0% 67% 0% 50% 20% 67%
Exceptions 43% 0% 0% 75% 8% 100% 40% 50% 67% 40% 33% 0% 67% 0% 50% 80% 84%
Explanation of Exceptions 8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 50% 33% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 0% 20% 0%
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The majority of the top sixty banks are from western countries which are mainly in 
Europe, North America and Australia. In South America, Brazil has one bank listed in 
the top sixty. In Asia, only China and Japan have banks listed in the top sixty.  
Summary statistics for the VaRDI across countries are presented in table 4.10. This is 
to facilitate the comparison with table 3 in Pérignon and Smith (2010). Compared to 
the world’s top sixty banks in 2005, the spread of the world’s largest banks across 
countries is more diverged, which means that there are more countries with banks 
listed in the world’s top sixty in 2013. In 2005, there are eleven countries with banks 
listed in the world’s top sixty, while in 2013, there are sixteen countries with banks 
listed in the world’s top sixty. Australia, Brazil, Denmark, Russia, and Sweden are the 
countries which have banks listed in the top sixty in 2013 but not in 2005. 
For the average score of VaRDI on the country level, Brazil has the lowest value. 
China also has a relatively low value, in which the average score of VaRDI is 3.2. 
Nevertheless, when comparing to the results in Pérignon and Smith (2010) the average 
score among Chinese banks has improved, as no Chinese banks released any 
information related to VaR in 2005. Japan has not performed well either, with an 
average score of VaRDI 4.8 which is well below the world’s average 7.7. The average 
score of VaRDI in Australia, France, Russia, and Sweden are below the world’s 
average but above the value in Japan. The highest value among these countries is 
Canada with an average score of VaRDI 13.3. The second highest value among these 
countries is Denmark with an average score of VaRDI 13.0. Another two positive 
outliers in the average score of VaRDI are Switzerland and the USA.  
American banks have demonstrated a high disclosure level related to VaR that the 
average score of VaRDI among the six top American banks in 2013 is 11.8. When 
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compared to the results in Pérignon and Smith (2010), American banks have improved 
their VaR disclosures in several aspects. First, the percentage ratios by which banks 
have disclosed in the elements of VaRDI such as plot of daily VaRs, plot of daily 
trading revenues, and exception counts have all increased. Second, while Perrignon 
and Smith (2010) report that the average score of VaRDI among top American banks 
does not differ from Germany, UK, France, Japan, etc., in contrast, the data in our 
updated sample suggests that American banks are ahead in disclosing information 
about VaR compared with most other countries. Similar to Perrignon and Smith (2010), 
our data suggests that Canada is still in the leading position in disclosing information 
about VaR.  
Generally speaking, the banks from developed economies are more transparent which 
disclose relatively more information about VaR. As a developed economy, Japan 
stands out as being different from other developed economies for its lower disclosure 
level related to VaR. The banks from emerging economies such as China and Brazil 
clearly have disclosed less information about VaR. 
4.8.5 The Operational Risk Information Disclosure in the World 
In the meantime, this research has also made a table for the status of operational risk 
disclosures across countries. Table 4.11 presents the summary statistics of ORDI for 
different countries.  
For the average score of ORDI on the country level, banks in Europe and North 
America have relatively high values. The highest average score of ORDI among these 
sixteen countries is Canada and the second highest one is Germany. Among the 
countries with higher scores of ORDI, Canada, France, Italy, Spain and the UK tend 
to disclose more in-depth information about operational risk such as data collection 
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process and operational reporting procedure. The countries with relatively low values 
are Russia, Brazil and China, which is similar to the finding in the previous section 
about VaRDI.  
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Table 4.11 Operational Risk Disclosure by Country in 2013 
There are sixteen countries with banks listed in the world’s top sixty banks in 2013, and the number of banks within the world’s top sixty is shown under each country. 
Panel A in table 2 presents some summary statistics for the ORDI across different countries. Since Brazil, Denmark, Russia, and Sweden have only one bank listed 
in the world’s top sixty, the standard deviation of ORDI is not available for these four countries. Panel B presents the percentage ratios of disclosures for the elements 
of ORDI in the world and in each country. The ORDI is an adopted index from Goyal and Wu (2007) which measures the operational risk disclosure. The ORDI 
covers 5 facets of operational risk disclosure including 14 individual components. The ORDI awards the corresponding score to the bank if the bank has disclosed 
the following information in its annual report: 1. Recognition and definition of operational risk (1 point if recognition and definition of operational risk as a risk 
exposure, 1 point if recognition and definition of reputational risk as a risk exposure and 1 point if recognition and definition of legal risk as a risk exposure). 2. 
Operational risk capital (1 point if operational risk capital is reported in percentage terms or 2 points if operational risk capital is reported in currency terms, and 1 
point if the calculation method of operational risk capital is explained under Basel II). 3. Intertemporal comparison (1 point if operational risk capital is reported for 
previous years). 4. Governance (1 point if operational risk responsibility is adopted into the governance structure, 1 point if reputational risk responsibility is adopted 
into the governance structure and 1 point if legal risk responsibility is adopted into the governance structure). 5. Methodology/reporting (1 point if operational risk 
measurement or assessment methodology, 1 point if reputational risk measurement or assessment methodology, 1 point if legal risk measurement or assessment 
methodology, 1 point if operational loss data collection process and 1 point if operational risk internal reporting procedures. 
Operational Risk Disclosure by 
country
World Australia Brazil Canada China Denmark France Germany Italy Japan Netherlands Russia Spain Sweden Switzerland UK USA
Number of Banks 60 4 1 4 12 1 5 4 3 5 3 1 3 1 2 5 6
Panel A
Average ORDI 9.2 9.3 3.0 13.0 6.6 6.0 9.2 12.5 10.3 9.6 10.3 4.0 8.7 9.0 11.5 12.0 7.8
Standard Deviation ORDI 3.8 2.1 N/A 1.8 4.4 N/A 5.4 2.1 3.8 3.6 2.9 N/A 1.2 N/A 2.1 2.0 1.9
Minimum ORDI 0.0 7.0 3.0 11.0 0.0 6.0 0.0 10.0 6.0 4.0 7.0 4.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 9.0 6.0
Maximum ORDI 15.0 11.0 3.0 15.0 12.0 6.0 14.0 15.0 13.0 13.0 12.0 4.0 10.0 9.0 13.0 14.0 11.0
Panel B 
Operational Risk 95% 100% 100% 100% 83% 100% 80% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Reputation Risk 95% 100% 0% 100% 50% 0% 40% 75% 67% 80% 100% 0% 100% 0% 50% 80% 67%
Legal Risk 72% 50% 0% 75% 50% 0% 80% 100% 100% 80% 100% 0% 67% 0% 100% 80% 100%
Portion Risk Capital 58% 100% 0% 100% 33% 100% 60% 100% 67% 60% 67% 0% 0% 100% 100% 100% 0%
Caculation Method 73% 75% 100% 100% 42% 100% 80% 100% 67% 80% 100% 0% 67% 100% 100% 80% 67%
Previous Year 50% 100% 0% 75% 8% 100% 60% 100% 67% 60% 67% 0% 0% 100% 100% 100% 0%
Operational Governance Structure 92% 100% 100% 100% 75% 100% 60% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Reputation Governance Structure 38% 50% 0% 100% 25% 0% 0% 50% 0% 0% 67% 0% 67% 0% 50% 80% 50%
Legal Governance Structure 18% 0% 0% 50% 25% 0% 40% 25% 0% 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 17%
Operational Measurement 92% 100% 0% 100% 83% 0% 80% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Reputation Measurement 45% 0% 0% 100% 50% 0% 40% 75% 67% 40% 0% 0% 100% 0% 50% 80% 17%
Legal Measurement 35% 0% 0% 50% 25% 0% 80% 75% 67% 40% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 40% 50%
Data Collection Process 60% 0% 0% 75% 25% 0% 80% 100% 100% 80% 33% 0% 100% 100% 100% 80% 50%
Operational Reporting Procedures 67% 50% 0% 75% 42% 0% 80% 50% 100% 80% 100% 100% 67% 100% 100% 80% 67%
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4.8.6 VaR Estimation Methods 
 
Figure 4.8 VaR Calculation Methods in 2013 
This pie chart demonstrates the relative frequency of VaR calculation methods used by the world’s top 
sixty banks in 2013. The figure is in comparison with figure 4 in Pérignon and Smith (2010). 
 
The relative frequency for VaR calculation methods used by the world’s top sixty 
banks in 2013 is displayed in the figure above. Compared to the result in Pérignon and 
Smith (2010), there are two significant changes: 
First, there are fewer banks not disclosing their VaR estimation methods. The 
undisclosed ratio is 19% in the year 2013 which is nearly half of the previous ratio 
35.1% in the year 2005. 81% of the banks in the sample have reported the methods of 
VaR estimation, and the remaining 19% of the banks in the sample which have not 
reported are mainly in the lower rank of the top sixty and with lower scores of VaRDI. 
The drop of the undisclosed ratio suggests that more banks have provided additional 
and in-depth information about VaR.  
Second, in comparison to 2005, among the banks which have reported the VaR 
estimation method, more banks have adopted the historical simulation in 2013. The 
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relative frequency of the historical simulation has increased from 47.4% in the year 
2005 to 63% in the year 2013. The percentage rate for the banks which use the Monte-
Carlo simulation has decreased slightly from 14% in the year 2005 to 10% in the year 
2013. In the meantime, there are 8% of the banks using other estimation methods. 
Other estimation methods are mainly the parametric model, like the hybrid model 
which combines the historical simulation with several control variables. Other 
estimation methods also include the combined use of the historical simulation and the 
Monte-Carlo simulation, for example, Standard Charted is regarded as in the other 
category, since it uses both the historical simulation and the Monte-Carlo simulation 
in the VaR estimation.  
Theoretically, each of the two VaR calculation methods has its own advantage: the 
historical simulation has a most obvious advantage which is very easy to implement; 
the Monte-Carlo simulation can use any distribution hypothesis to produce unlimited 
hypothetical return which recuperates the limitation of historical data, and the Monte-
Carlo simulation method is especially useful when we conduct the stress test. 
Pérignon and Smith (2010) indicate that the underlying reasons for the popularity of 
historical simulation models are its smooth application and reduced complexity 
compared to parametric models. Andersen et al. (2007) believe that the volatility and 
correlation are time varying for financial assets. When taking numerous risk 
parameters into modelling, it is hard to figure out the correlation between these 
parameters with a time varying feature. The historical simulation leaves out the 
challenge of figuring out the correlation between these parameters. In addition, by 
using the historical simulation, banks could accommodate large dimensional portfolios 
without considering the risk derived from an inadequate correlation measurement 
among these parameters. Jorion (2002a) finds that market risk variables slowly 
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respond to market changes, and the significant market change only happens every sixty 
days. Therefore, the risk control mechanism should adopt a smooth approach like the 
historical simulation to ensure stability and pertinent. Although there is no guarantee 
for the estimation accuracy of smooth mechanism at all times, the historical evidence 
shows that the application of smooth mechanism like the historical simulation 
performs better than the fast moving mechanism like the Monte-Carlo simulation. 
4.9 Summary 
Although there is rise and fall, generally speaking, the scores of both the VaRDI and 
the ORDI have increased across the world’s top banks during the period 1996-2013. 
This statistical finding suggests that the banking industry around the world is on the 
trend of enhanced risk disclosures. In addition, similar to the finding in Goyal and Wu 
(2008), developed economies are still in the leading position of risk information 
disclosures compared to emerging economies. 
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Chapter 5  
Market Valuation and the Disclosure of Information 
about Exposure to Risk  
Empirical Evidence from the Banking Industry 
5.1 Introduction 
Increased information disclosure may provide support to market valuation. Baumann 
and Nier (2003) provide evidence that increased information disclosure is associated 
with higher levels of market valuation for banks. However, this evidence is more than 
a decade old and whether the empirical result of Baumann and Nier (2003) is still 
applicable in a post-crisis world is a worthwhile question for investigation. Baumann 
and Nier (2003) focus on a broad aspect of financial information disclosures, while 
this research focuses on the requirements placed on banks by the Basel Accord II to 
disclose information about the market and operational risk41 specifically. Focusing on 
risk disclosures in the banking industry as the research theme is motivated by the 
importance of the banking system in our economy.  
                                                          
41 The Basel Accord I requires the bank to mainly disclose credit risk information. The Basel Accord II 
adds requirements for the disclosure of information about the market and operational risk exposures as 
two mandatory elements (detailed information can be traced through the Basel Committee website 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/). 
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In this chapter, the disclosures of market and operational risk information are measured 
using two indices, the Value-at-Risk disclosure index (VaRDI) designed by Perignon 
and Smith (2010) and the operational risk disclosure index (ORDI) designed by Goyal 
and Wu (2007). The original information regarding the market and operational risk is 
extracted from public documents such as annual reports and SEC filings42. 
This chapter is outlined as follows. Sections two provides an introduction to the risk 
information disclosure by banking institutions and the potentially beneficial impact of 
such disclosures on market valuation. The third section briefly outlines the indices 
used to measure the level and quality of market and operational risk information 
disclosure by the banking industry. A more detailed description of these two indices is 
presented in chapter four. Section four introduces the regression analysis and the 
control variables employed in the estimation of the impact of risk information 
disclosure on market valuation. Sample selection, sample period and data sources are 
presented in the fifth section. Section six presents empirical results, while section 
seven presents additional robustness checks with the impacts of financial crisis and 
country development status. Section eight discusses these results and provides a 
comparison with previous research. The final section provides a brief summary and 
some concluding comments. 
5.2 Background and Literature Review 
5.2.1 Background 
The banking industry is one of the most important sectors in our economy. The impact 
of the 2008 financial crisis derived from the banking industry was severe. While 
                                                          
42 SEC stands for the US Securities and Exchange Commission. A SEC filing is a financial report or 
other formal documents submitted to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Public 
companies are required to submit regular SEC filings. 
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adventure is embedded in human nature and there is still a culture to encourage risk-
taking for an extra return among the financial world, it is important that this risk-taking 
is carefully managed.  
The Basel Committee in Switzerland has organized a forum for global central banks 
to formulate regulations in order to improve information transparency, in which the 
primary goal of doing so is to improve the health of the banking industry and prohibit 
systemic risk. In order to facilitate the goal of providing increased safeguards to the 
banking system, the Basel Committee proposed the Basel Accord II in 2004 which is 
an updated requirement of the Basel Accord I. The major difference between the Basel 
Accord I and the Basel Accord II is that the Basel Accord II adds the market and 
operational risk as mandatory disclosures, whist the Basel Accord I mainly includes 
credit risk as a mandatory disclosure. Since the appearance of the Basel Accord II, 
more central banks around the world have advocated their supervised banks to adopt 
and comply with the requirements in the Basel Accord II. Caprio (2013) finds that 
during the period of 2004-2008 most higher-income countries and even middle-
income countries had adopted the Basel Accord II as their guideline for risk 
information disclosures. However, Caprio (2013) questions why this enhanced 
information disclosure in the banking industry within the period 2004-2008 had not 
prevented us from being hit by the 2008 financial crisis.  
5.2.2 Broad Literature Supporting the Positive Relationship between Information 
Disclosure and Market Valuation 
Increased information disclosure could affect trading volume, which would affect 
market valuation as well. Dye (1985) analyses the impact of information disclosure on 
market valuation, finding that shareholders prefer companies which choose to disclose 
relatively large amounts of information. Those companies which choose to disclose 
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relatively little information will suffer reduced demands for their equities and therefore 
experience lower equity prices. A company which captures the market’s attention by 
favourable information will experience an increased demand for its stock, and 
consequently have a reduction in its cost of capital.  
Research suggests that higher market valuations are associated with lower costs of 
capital, since a lower discount rate will raise the current value of an asset, all else being 
equal. Increased information disclosure helps to reduce cost of capital, since investors 
tend to require a lower return rate for the equities with information transparency. Both 
the quantity and the quality of information disclosure affect cost of capital (e.g. 
Akerlof, 1995; Easley and O'hara, 2004; Francis et al., 2005; Poshakwale and Courtis, 
2005; Lambert et al., 2007; Dhaliwal et al., 2014). However, after exploring the cross-
sectional association between firms’ cost of capital and the information disclosures in 
firms’ annual reports, Botosan (1997) finds that the evidence of the negative 
association between cost of capital and information disclosure only exists for firms 
with a lower analyst following. 
Moreover, there exists evidence showing that information opacity could negatively 
affect trading volume and subsequently increase cost of capital. Bhattacharya et al. 
(2002) explore the link between earning opacity and trading volume in different 
countries. Three dimensions of the earning opacity are measured which are earning 
aggressiveness, loss avoidance, and earning smoothing. Controlling for the influence 
of other financial variables, Bhattacharya et al. (2002) find that an increase in the 
earning opacity is linked with a reduction in the stock trading volume and an increase 
in the cost of equity across a broad range of industries including the banking industry.  
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A direct empirical test conducted by Jiao (2011) examines the relationship between 
information disclosure and market valuation for a global sample consisting of 40 
industries for the period of 1979-1996 and documents a positive relationship between 
information disclosure and market valuation. The information disclosure level is 
measured by the annual survey of Association for Investment Management and 
Research (AIMR)43. The market valuation is measured by Tobin’s Q-Ratio. Cordella 
and Yeyati (1998) assert that enhanced information disclosure may reduce information 
asymmetry hence reduce the associated agency costs. The asymmetric information 
could also lead to adverse selection, in which bank managers or insiders have better 
knowledge than the financial market about the true value of a bank. Akerlof (1995), 
and Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) also suggest that increased information 
disclosures would reduce the costs associated with adverse selection by providing 
relatively equal information for all market participants. 
Regional findings across the globe have confirmed the general statement which argues 
that information disclosure is helpful to increase the market valuation of a firm. 
Ousama et al. (2011) examine the impact of intellectual capital disclosure on market 
valuation by a sample of listed companies in Bursa Malaysia during the period of 
2002–2006, and find that the intellectual capital disclosure has a significantly positive 
impact on the market valuation of these listed companies. A disclosure index is used 
in order to measure the extent of intellectual capital disclosure in the annual reports of 
these listed companies. By testing a sample consisting of 129 manufacturing 
companies listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) for the year 2010, Uyar and 
                                                          
43 The Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR) is the former institution of 
Chartered Financial Analysts (CFA) Institute. The CFA Institute is a global association of investment 
professionals which aims to lead the investment profession globally by promoting the highest standards 
of ethics, education, and professional excellence for the ultimate benefit of society. The CFA Institute 
is established in the US with more than 123,000 chartered financial analysts globally. 
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Kilic (2012) find that voluntary disclosure is value‐relevant which affects firm value. 
This implies that market investors value voluntary disclosure. The more information 
firms disclose voluntarily, the higher value they have in the eyes of market investors. 
Therefore, the firm views this as an incentive to disclose more information to the 
market. Tsalavoutas and Dionysiou (2014) test a sample consisting of 150 listed 
companies in Greece for the year 2005 and find that the degree of compliance with the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 44  by a firm is value relevant, 
which suggests that the level and degree of compliance with IFRS is positively and 
significantly related to the market valuation of a firm. This finding is particularly 
meaningful for policymakers and regulatory institutions when considering the 
potential impacts of mandatory disclosure requirements. Saka and Oshika (2014) 
prove that the information disclosure of corporate carbon emission has a positive 
impact on the market valuation of a firm, in which the sample comprises 150 
companies in Japan. This finding might be important and beneficial for companies 
including the carbon emission as a component of the nonfinancial disclosure. A similar 
study regarding the environmental information disclosure is conducted by Plumlee et 
al. (2015) which examines the relationship between the voluntary environmental 
disclosure by a firm and the value of a firm in the US. The value of a firm is measured 
in three ways: stock price, expected future cash flows, and implied cost of equity. The 
voluntary environmental disclosure of a firm is measured using a disclosure index 
which reflects the guidelines of the Global Reporting Initiative45  framework. The 
                                                          
44 The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is designed as a common global framework 
for business which assists companies in understanding and communicating with each other. The IFRS 
becomes more important as the increased trend of international business and trading. The IFRS 
gradually replaces many regional accounting standards. The main principles lying within the IFRS are 
comparable, understandable, reliable and relevant. 
45 The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is an international independent organization which aims to let 
the world realize the impacts of climate change, corruption, and human rights. It was established in the 
United States as a non-profit organization with the support of United Nations in 1997. The GRI released 
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result provides evidence that the voluntary environmental disclosure is in general 
positively associated with the firm’s value. Moreover, both the type and the nature of 
environmental disclosures are informative in affecting the firm’s value. Therefore, 
disclosing broader environmental issues with quality reporting nature is extremely 
crucial in increasing the market valuation of a firm. 
5.2.3 Literature Supporting the Positive Relationship between Information 
Disclosure and Market Valuation in the Banking Industry 
Using Tobin’s Q-Ratio to measure the market valuation and controlling for the 
differences in size, dividend payment, cost-to-income ratio, loan ratio, leverage ratio, 
beta, loan growth, and return on equity, the regression analysis conducted by Baumann 
and Nier (2003) provides evidence that the information disclosure by banks is 
positively related to their market valuations. Three disclosure indices are used to 
measure the information disclosure, in which the first index is the Center for 
International Financial Analysis Research (CIFAR) index of transparency, the second 
index only considers whether the bank has been listed on the US stock market, and the 
third index is the self-designed index by Baumann and Nier (2003) comprising 
seventeen categories related to information disclosures. Each of the three aggregate 
indices has been placed into the regression model along with control variables. Each 
of the three coefficients with respect to these three aggregate indices is positively 
associated with the market valuation, but the coefficient of the index that considers 
whether the bank has been listed on the US stock market does not show any statistical 
significance. Baumann and Nier (2003) believe that the underlying reason for a higher 
market valuation by increasing the level of information disclosure is a reduction in 
                                                          
its draft version of the Sustainability Reporting Guidelines in 1999, and the first full version of the 
guidelines was released in 2000. 
131 
 
asymmetric information. The asymmetric information could result in agency costs, in 
which the action taken by bank managers would maximize their personal interests 
instead of maximizing banks’ interests. Such agency cost derived with respect to risk 
is imperfectly observed by outside investors, which would subsequently affect bank’s 
market valuation. 
For banking information disclosure, operational risk information has not received as 
much attention as credit risk information and market risk information in the past. After 
the emergence of the Basel Accord II, the importance of operational risk information 
has gradually been noted by the financial world. Motivated by the global recognition 
of the importance of operational risk information disclosure, Helbok and Wagner 
(2006) examine the operational risk disclosure through the annual reports of 49 banks 
around the world within the period 1998-2001. Helbok and Wagner (2006) compare 
the banks which have disclosed the operational risk information and the banks which 
have not disclosed the operational risk information, and find that the extent and content 
of disclosure about operational risk are negatively correlated with a bank's capital ratio 
and profitability ratio. Therefore, Helbok and Wagner (2006) argue that financial 
institutions with a lower equity/asset ratio and/or profitability ratio pay greater 
attention to disclosing operational risks, whereas those with higher ratios choose not 
to do so. The rationale behind this is that, the distressed bank wants to ease the 
worrying mood in the market by showing its strong operational regulation. The 
increased information disclosure of the distressed bank helps the market to get the 
knowledge of its prepared position confronting operational risk, and rebuild 
confidence in it.  
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Risk information is one part of sensitive information for banks. The modified guidance 
of banking estimation sensitivity disclosure advocated by the SFAS46 asks banks to 
release more sensitive information, which is in a hope to better assist market 
participants in interpreting financial information and forecasting future share prices. 
By analysing a sample consisting of 180 US commercial banks from 2003-2005, Bhat 
(2008) finds that risk information disclosure has a positive effect on stock’s fair value. 
Baht (2008) quantifies the risk information disclosure of these banks and uses a 
regression model to analyse the statistical significance of the quantified variable. A 
positive correlation is found between the market valuation of a bank and the level of 
risk information disclosure.  
A higher rating for a bank indicates a higher market valuation of a bank. Using bank-
level ratings for 39 countries, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008) find that banks receive 
higher ratings from Moody's Investors Service are better complied with the core 
principles of the Basel Accord. This result is robust even by controlling the factors of 
institutional quality, macroeconomic variables, sovereign ratings, and reverse 
causality. Specifically, the countries with stringent standards in the disclosure of 
financial information have more highly rated banks, as the stringent disclosure of high-
quality information strengthens the monitoring by regulators and markets alike. 
Therefore, banks aiming to upgrade their ratings should consider to enhance 
information disclosure by complying with the core principles of the Basel Accord.  
                                                          
46 The SFAS stands for the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards, which details policies and 
accounting rules in the financial report of a company. 
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5.3 Measuring Risk Information Disclosure  
The most relevant paper in tackling the association between market valuation and 
information disclosure is Baumann and Nier (2003) which uses three aggregate 
disclosure indices to measure the information disclosure. The first aggregate index 
uses the transparency index from the Center for International Financial Analysis 
Research (CIFAR), the second index only considers whether the bank has been listed 
on the US stock market, and the third index is their self-designed index comprising 
seventeen categories of company information. The Center for International Financial 
Analysis Research (CIFAR) index of transparency is an aggregate index measuring 
the information transparency across countries that the index is based on the disclosure 
level of domestic companies and non-financial companies. The US listing index 
considers whether the company is listed on the US stock market. It is assumed that the 
US listing might be associated with a higher quality and quantity of information 
disclosure, since the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires companies 
to obey the strict regulations of US GAAP47 as part of the Form 20-F48 filing.  
The self-designed aggregate index in Baumann and Nier (2003) has covered 17 
categories related to bank’s performance. The 17 categories are loans by maturity, 
loans by type, loans by counterparty, problem loans, problem loans by type, securities 
by holding purpose, deposits by maturity, deposit by type of customer, money market 
funding, long-term funding, reserves, capital, contingent liabilities, off-balance sheet 
items, non-interest income and loan loss provisions. For the 17 categories in the index, 
                                                          
47 GAAP or US GAAP is the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles which is adopted by the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
48 The Form 20-F is an information report required by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
that asks all foreign companies which have been listed on the stock exchanges of the United States to 
submit to the US government. The SEC implicitly requires the foreign company to submit the Form 20-
F within six months after the end of the company's fiscal year. The reporting standards and the eligibility 
requirements of Form 20-F are stated in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  
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0 is assigned if there is no entry for the corresponding category, and 1 is assigned if 
there is an entry for the corresponding category except for the categories of securities 
by type and capital index. For the category of securities by type, 0 is assigned if there 
is no entry, 1 is assigned if there is an entry of coarse breakdown and 2 is assigned if 
there is an entry of detailed breakdown. For the category of capital index, 0 is assigned 
if there is no entry, 1 is assigned if there is one entry, 2 is assigned if there are two 
entries and 3 is assigned if there are three or more entries. The maximum point when 
adding all the points in these 17 categories is 21.  
In this research, two aggregate indices (VaRDI and ORDI) are used to measure the 
information disclosures of market risk and operational risk respectively. 
5.3.1 The Index to Measure the Market Risk Information Disclosure 
The VaRDI is an index proposed by Perignon and Smith (2010) in order to measure 
the market risk information disclosure in the banking industry. A comprehensive 
discussion of VaRDI is provided in section 4.3 or in Perignon and Smith (2010). The 
VaRDI has 6 categories which monitor 6 facets of the VaR reporting quantity and 
quality. The theoretical score of VaRDI ranges from 0 (minimum) to 15 (maximum):  
1. VaR characteristics (maximum 2 points): 1 point – the holding period (e.g. 1 day, 1 
week), 1 point – the confidence level (e.g. 95%, 99%).  
2. VaR statistics (maximum 4 points): 1 point – the high, low or average VaR, 1 point 
– the year-end VaR, 1 point – the VaR risk category (e.g. currency, option, equity), 1 
point – considering the diversification effect.  
3. Intertemporal comparison (maximum 1 point): 1 point – compared with the previous 
year VaR.  
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4. Daily VaR graph (maximum 2 points): 1 point – the histogram about daily VaRs, or 
2 points – the plot of daily VaRs49.  
5. Trading revenues (maximum 4 points): 1 point – the hypothetical revenue, 1 point 
– the revenues deducted from the trading costs, 1 point – the histogram of daily 
revenues or 2 points – the plot of daily revenues50.  
6. Back-testing (maximum 2 points): 1 point – the number of exceptions or 2 points – 
zero exception, 1 point – the explanation of exceptions. 
5.3.2 The Index to Measure the Operational Risk Information Disclosure 
The ORDI is an index proposed by Goyal and Wu (2007) in order to measure the 
operational risk information disclosure in the banking industry. A comprehensive 
discussion of ORDI is provided in section 4.4 or in Goyal and Wu (2007). The ORDI 
has 5 categories which monitor 6 facets of the reporting quantity and quality of 
operational risk. The theoretical score of ORDI ranges from 0 (minimum) to 15 
(maximum): 
1. Recognition and definition of operational risk (maximum 3 points): 1 point – 
recognition and definition of operational risk as a risk exposure, 1 point – recognition 
and definition of reputational risk as a risk exposure, 1 point – recognition and 
definition of legal risk as a risk exposure.  
2. Operational risk capital (maximum 3 points): 1 point – operational risk capital 
reported in percentage terms or 2 points – operational risk capital reported in currency 
                                                          
49 If a bank releases both the histogram and the plot of daily VaRs at the same time, the VaRDI will not 
allocate 1 point to 4a and 2 points to 4b, instead it only allocate to each category 4a and 4b 1 point 
respectively. The maximum points for the category of daily VaR graph will not exceed 2 points. 
50 If a bank releases both the histogram and the plot of daily revenues at the same time, the VaRDI will 
not allocate 1 point to 5c and 2 points to 5d, instead it only allocate to each category 5c and 5d 1 point 
respectively. The maximum points for the category of daily VaR graph will not exceed 4 points. 
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terms, 1 point – the calculation method of operational risk capital explained under 
Basel II.  
3. Intertemporal comparison (maximum 1 point): 1 point – operational risk capital 
reported for previous years.  
4. Governance (maximum 3 points): 1 point – operational risk responsibility adopted 
into the governance structure, 1 point – reputational risk responsibility adopted into 
the governance structure and 1 point – legal risk responsibility adopted into the 
governance structure.  
5. Methodology/reporting (maximum 5 points): 1 point – operational risk 
measurement or assessment methodology, 1 point – reputational risk measurement or 
assessment methodology, 1 point – legal risk measurement or assessment methodology, 
1 point – operational loss data collection process, 1 point – operational risk internal 
reporting procedure. 
5.4 Research Design 
This research aims to investigate the relationship between the disclosures of risk 
information by a bank and the market valuation of the bank. The disclosures of risk 
information for market and operation are quantified by the indices VaRDI and ORDI 
respectively. The market valuation can be measured by Tobin’s Q-Ratio used in 
previous literature such as Baumann and Nier (2003) and Jiao (2011). 
                        𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐹 (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1)                         (5.1) 
As shown in equation (5.1), the regression model used in testing the association 
between market valuation and the disclosure level of risk information has added 
several control variables which are in the Z-vector. Baumann and Nier (2003) suggest 
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that the variables which may impact the market valuation of a bank include GDP 
growth of a country, size, dividend, cost-to-income, loan, leverage, beta and return on 
asset. Ousama et al. (2011) suggest that the variables which may affect the market 
valuation of a firm include book value, net profit, size, and leverage. Uyar and Kilic 
(2012) suggest that the variables which may impact the market valuation of a firm 
include size, leverage, profit, growth and return on asset. Calomiris and Nissim (2014) 
suggest that the variables which may impact the market valuation of a bank include 
loan, leverage, non-interest income, non-interest expense, size, interest rate exposure, 
book capital ratio and dividend. Khlif and Hussainey (2016) find that corporate size, 
leverage ratio, and profitability and risk factor are positively associated with risk 
reporting. Although the variables in Khlif and Hussainey (2016) are not directly linked 
with market valuation, it is still worth taking into account these variables. Since these 
variables have affected risk information disclosure, they may indirectly affect market 
valuation. 
Combining the ideas regarding the control variables of market valuation in the 
previous literature, this research has chosen eight control variables into the regression 
model: log size, dividend ratio, cost-to-income ratio, loan ratio, leverage ratio, beta, 
loan growth, and return on asset. The logarithm of total assets considers the factor of 
the bank size that may capture the potential economic scale. A higher dividend ratio 
indicates a higher future cash flows that may have a positive impact on market 
valuation. However, excessive dividend payments would dampen the bank’s long-term 
development. Therefore, a higher dividend ratio may also have a negative impact on 
market valuation. A higher cost-to-income ratio suggests that the bank is operating 
inefficiently; hence, it might be associated with a lower market valuation. On the other 
hand, a higher return on asset ratio suggests a good operational status of a bank that 
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may be associated with a higher market valuation. This is because that the return on 
asset reflects structural factors, such as the competition level within a country, and 
these structural factors are likely to remain into the future. Additionally, the return on 
asset ratio is thought to be linked to the professional level of management such that a 
high return on asset ratio signals a high level of expertise by managers. The loan ratio 
and the loan growth could signal the potential risk of a bank but could also signal the 
potential growth of a bank. The leverage ratio is an indebted status reflecting the 
bank’s solvency issue, though this ratio is not important if the Modigliani-Miller 
theorem51 is being held. A bank’s beta is a measurement of the riskiness of a bank. 
Equity investors have an appetite for upside unlimited potential gains, hence risk-
seeking investors may favour the banks which are sensitive to market movements, 
while risk adverse investors would be the opposite. 
5.5 Data 
5.5.1 Research Sample 
This research uses the world’s top sixty banks as the sample to look at the impact of 
risk information disclosure on the market valuation. The rank of the world’s top sixty 
banks52 are based on their asset size at the end of 2013. While most of the world’s top 
sixty banks are listed on various stock exchanges, there are still ten banks among this 
                                                          
51 The Modigliani–Miller theorem is a theory about capital structure and a forming basis for capital 
structure in modern finance. The theory states that under a certain market price situation like the 
classical random walk, with the absence of taxes, agency costs, bankruptcy costs, and asymmetric 
information, and in an efficient market, the value of a firm is unaffected by its financial structure. Since 
the value of a firm depends on neither its dividend policy nor its decision to raise capital by issuing 
stock or selling debt, the Modigliani–Miller theorem is often called the capital structure irrelevance 
principle. For example, two firms which are identical except for their financial structures, one is 
financed by equity only, and the other one is leveraged which is financed partly by equity and partly by 
debt. The Modigliani–Miller theorem argues that the values of these two firms are exactly the same. 
52 Further information regarding the rank of the world’s top sixty banks can be traced through the 
website http://www.relbanks.com/worlds-top-banks/assets-2013. 
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group not being listed. These unlisted banks53 are relatively small banks. Some large 
banks are not listed on the market, the possible reason for the large bank not being 
listed is that the large bank is newly established through mergence and has not fully 
prepared to go into the market like Group BPCE54. Therefore, the sample employed 
excludes any unlisted banks and covers the remaining listed banks.  
5.5.2 Research Sample Period 
The time period of VaRDI and ORDI is from the year 1996 to the year 2013, since the 
earliest available online public report is around the year 199655 which defines the 
starting period of our sample. The corresponding period of Tobin’s Q-Ratio is from 
the year 1997 to the year 2014. 
5.5.3 Data Sources 
The market risk information and the operational risk information are measured by the 
designed indices VaRDI and ORDI respectively. Both the VaRDI and the ORDI 
extract the data from banks’ public documents. This research has mainly fetched up 
the original public documents from three sources: 
 Bank official websites, which contain the original annual reports and the 
related crucial information. 
                                                          
53 The ten banks out of the top sixty not being listed on the market are: Japan Post Bank (from Japan, 
ranked 13th), Groupe BPCE (from France, ranked 18th), Rabobank Group (from Netherlands, ranked 
29th), Postal Savings Bank of China (from China, ranked 30th), Credit Mutuel Group (from France, 
ranked 32nd), Norinchukin Bank (from Japan, ranked 36th), KfW Group (from Germany, ranked 46th), 
DZ Bank AG (from Germany, ranked 55th), La Caixa Group (from Spain, ranked 59th), and Cassa 
Depositi e Prestiti (from Italy, ranked 60th). 
54 As a result of the 2008 financial crisis, Caisse Nationale des Caisses D'épargne (CNCD) and Banque 
Fédérale des Banques Populaires (BFBP) merged in 2009 to become the second largest bank in France 
known as Group BPCE. 
55 The year 1996 and the year 1997 have only limited data, which is why chapter 4 has not included 
these two years in the research to look at the information disclosure status among these world’s top 
banks.  
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 http://www.sec.gov/, which is the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
official website. The data stream of the website contains 10-K56, 10-Q57 and 
20-F58 forms for American companies. 
 https://bankscope.bvdinfo.com/ which is the database specially designated for 
the banking industry containing comprehensive information about banks, such 
as the original annual reports of 11,000 global banks. 
The market-to-book ratio (Tobin’s Q-Ratio), dividend ratio, cost-to-income ratio, loan 
ratio, leverage ratio, beta, loan growth and return on asset related to these banks are all 
obtained from datastream59.  
5.6 Empirical Results 
 
Figure 5.1 The Plot of the Average Annual Market Valuation  
The figure above plots the average annual market valuations across all the sixty banks during the period 
1997-2014. The market valuation is measured by Tobin’s Q-Ratio. These sixty banks are the world’s 
largest sixty banks ranked by asset size in 2013. The data panel is unbalanced. 
                                                          
56 The 10-K form is an annual comprehensive financial report required by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission to give shareholders detailed information about the company listed in the US 
stock market. 
57 The 10-Q form is a quarterly comprehensive financial report required by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission to give shareholders detailed information about the company listed in the US 
stock market. 
58 The 20-F form is a comprehensive financial report required by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission to give shareholders detailed information about the foreign company listed in the US stock 
market. 
59  Datastream is a database for the financial and economic research provided by the company of 
Thomson Reuters. 
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From the figure plotted above, it is easy to observe that there is a sharp decline in the 
average market valuation across these banks in 2008. The financial crisis is the 
suspected cause of this sharp decline of market valuation. After this sharp decline in 
2008, the average market valuation has been hardly lifted. 
 
Table 5.1 The Statistical Summary of Variables Used in the Market Valuation Analysis 
The table above demonstrates the basic statistical description of variables used in this research for the 
fifty banks around the world. The fifty banks are selected from the world’s top sixty banks (by asset 
size in 2013), in which the selection criteria take account of whether the bank has been listed on the 
market and whether the bank has appropriate data assisting the analysis. The sample period for Tobin’s 
Q-Ratio is from the year 1997 to the year 2014, and the sample period of the index (VaRDI or ORDI) 
and the control variables is from the year 1996 to the year 2013. The properties of data which are mean, 
standard deviation, 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile are displayed accordingly to each data 
type.  
 
5.6.1 Control Variables in the Market Valuation Analysis 
 
Table 5.2 The Correlation among the Control Variables Used in the Market Valuation Analysis 
The table above shows the correlations among the control variables used in the market valuation analysis. 
The sample period for the control variables is from 1996 to 2013, in which the control variables are 
related to the fifty listed banks out of the world’s top sixty banks. 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Minimum 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentaile Maximum
Dependent Variable
Tobin's Q-Ratio 760 1.73 1.02 0.12 1.00 1.64 2.20 9.60
Disclosure Variables
VaRDI 758 6.43 4.76 0.00 0.00 7.00 11.00 15.00
ORDI 758 5.86 4.13 0.00 2.00 6.00 9.00 15.00
Control Variables
Log Size 810 8.97 0.79 5.24 8.57 8.90 9.26 11.41
Dividend Ratio 783 3.33 2.87 0.00 1.65 3.13 4.44 34.67
Cost-to-Income Ratio 782 6.52 72.95 -1478.03 2.99 4.52 7.91 943.34
Loan Ratio 690 55.06 15.25 11.02 44.92 57.91 66.10 85.53
Leverage Ratio 809 555.00 926.47 -21861.98 266.63 430.99 759.54 4588.28
Beta 768 1.28 0.52 -0.85 0.67 1.08 1.53 3.82
Loan Growth 706 15.29 65.14 -59.39 1.28 8.28 16.95 1592.20
Return on Asset 696 1.20 1.40 -15.13 0.67 1.08 1.53 15.99
Log Size Dividend Ratio
Cost-to-Income 
Ratio
Loan Ratio Leverage Ratio Beta Loan Growth
Return on 
Asset
Log Size 1.00
Dividend Ratio -0.04 1.00
Cost-to-Income Ratio 0.03 0.04 1.00
Loan Ratio -0.21 0.12 0.00 1.00
Leverage Ratio -0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.12 1.00
Beta 0.14 -0.16 -0.03 -0.30 0.03 1.00
Loan Growth -0.03 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 1.00
Return on Asset -0.07 -0.08 -0.04 0.35 0.00 -0.11 0.08 1.00
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Table 5.1 shows the summary statistics for the control variables used in the market 
valuation analysis. In order to avoid the multicollinearity problem, the correlations 
between these variables are tested and shown in table 5.2. The correlations between 
these variables are weak, which suggests that there is no evidence of a potential 
multicollinearity problem across these control variables. 
 
Table 5.3 The Coefficients of Control Variables in the Market Valuation Regression Analysis 
The table above shows the coefficients of control variables in the market valuation regression analysis. 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q-Ratio which measures the market valuation. The sample period of 
Tobin’s Q-Ratio is from the year 1997 to the year 2014, and the sample period of the index (VaRDI or 
ORDI) and the control variables is from the year 1996 to the year 2013. The regression analysis takes 
into account the year fixed effects. The data panel is unbalanced. The coefficient estimates are obtained 
using the ordinary least squares estimation. The robust t-statistic is in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The first column contains all the control 
variables in the regression analysis, and the second column only includes the significant control 
variables from the first column in the regression analysis. 
 
In table 5.3, the first column shows a basic model that includes all the control variables, 
in which the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q-Ratio in the measurement of market 
valuation. The coefficient estimates are obtained using the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation. This regression has taken into account the time differences, in which the 
Dependant Variable: Tobin's Q-Ratio
Log Size -0.0973** -0.1075***
(-2.05) (-5.15)
Dividend Ratio -0.0313*** -0.0336***
(-3.03) (-3.27)
Cost-to-Income Ratio 0.0001
(0.07)
Loan Ratio 0.0088
(1.41)
Leverage Ratio 0.0001*** 0.0001**
(3.02) (2.16)
Beta -0.1910*** -0.1946***
(-3.49) (-2.98)
Loan Growth 0.0002
(0.59)
Return on Asset 0.0345* 0.0398*
(1.73) (1.80)
Constant 2.4428*** 2.4767***
(5.12) (5.15)
Year Fixed Effects Included Included
Observations 593 593
Adjusted R-Squared 0.423 0.446
Coefficients 
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Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of the year random effects leading to the year 
fixed effects.  
The log size has a negative relationship with the market valuation, which suggests that 
large banks have a higher market valuation than small banks. The dividend ratio has a 
negative relationship with the market valuation. The underlying reason might be that 
market investors prefer a bank which retains dividend for its long-term development. 
The leverage ratio has a positive relationship with the market valuation, which 
suggests that a higher indebted bank is favourably valued by the market. The beta is in 
a negative relationship with the market valuation, which suggests that market investors 
prefer less risky banks. The return on asset ratio is positively related to the market 
valuation, which complies with intuition that a bank with strong financial performance 
attracts more attention from investors. The cost-to-income ratio is not a significant 
variable in explaining the variation of market valuation. The two variables (loan ratio 
and loan growth) related to the loan status in a bank show no statistically significant 
power in explaining the variation of market valuation.  
In order to improve the estimation efficiency, this research has deleted insignificant 
control variables in the general model. This step of trimming the insignificant control 
variables, and later using the parsimonious model in the regression analysis to test the 
disclosure impact, is similar to that followed in previous studies such as Berman et al. 
(1999) and Baumann and Nier (2003). The significant control variables are retained 
and the coefficients regarding the parsimonious model are shown in the second column 
of table 5.3. The signs of these variables in the parsimonious model continue to be the 
same as in the general model.  
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5.6.2 The Effect of Risk Information Disclosure on the Market Valuation 
 
Table 5.4 The Coefficients of the Variables in the Market Valuation Regression Analysis 
The table above shows the coefficients of the variables in the market valuation regression analysis. The 
dependent variable is Tobin’s Q-Ratio which measures the market valuation. Both of the regressions 
include the control variables, in which the parsimonious model is used to introduce the control variables. 
The data panel is unbalanced. The sample period of Tobin’s Q-Ratio is from the year 1997 to the year 
2014, and the sample period of the index (VaRDI or ORDI) and the control variables is from the year 
1996 to the year 2013. The regression analysis takes into account the year fixed effects. The coefficient 
estimates are obtained using the ordinary least squares estimation. The robust t-statistic is in parenthesis. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
In order to assess the effect of risk information disclosure on the market valuation, the 
risk information disclosure indices (VaRDI and ORDI) are included in the 
parsimonious model respectively. Since the correlation between VaRDI and ORDI is 
relatively high at 0.66, the VaRDI and ORDI are placed into the model one at a time 
to avoid the multicollinearity problem. The parsimonious model concludes five control 
variables: log size, dividend ratio, leverage ratio, beta and return on asset. The 
empirical results are shown in table 5.4, which indicate that both the VaRDI and ORDI 
Dependent Variable: 
Tobin's Q-Ratio
Coefficients
Dependent Variable: 
Tobin's Q-Ratio
Coefficients
VaRDI -0.0126** ORDI -0.0226***
(-2.01) (-2.66)
Log Size -0.0062* Log Size -0.0112*
(-1.81) (-1.87)
Dividend Ratio -0.0301*** Dividend Ratio -0.0293***
(-2.76) (-2.72)
Leverage Ratio 0.0001** Leverage Ratio 0.0001**
(2.47) (2.14)
Beta -0.2447*** Beta -0.2579***
(-3.88) (-4.18)
Return on Asset 0.0175* Return on Asset 0.0133*
(1.73) (1.69)
Constant 2.1717*** Constant 2.1902***
(6.34) (6.43)
Year Fixed Effects Included Year Fixed Effects Included
Observations 593 Observations 593
Adjusted R-squared 0.4502 Adjusted R-squared 0.4655
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have significantly negative relationships with the market valuation. Both the market 
risk information disclosure and the operational risk information disclosure are 
associated with reductions in the market valuation for the banking industry. One score 
increase in the VaRDI is associated with a reduction of around three hundredths in the 
market valuation, while one score increase in the ORDI is associated with a reduction 
of around seven hundredths in the market valuation. Alongside the VaRDI and ORDI, 
all the control variables show a statistical significance in explaining the variation of 
market valuation and maintained their signs as the same in the previous parsimonious 
model. 
5.7 The Robustness Test 
5.7.1 The Impact of Global Financial Crisis  
The previous test based on the whole sample period presents evidence that the risk 
information disclosure indices (VaRDI and ORDI) are significantly and negatively 
related to the market valuation. This finding is in contrast to the results provided in 
previous literature such as Bhattacharya et al. (2002), Baumann and Nier (2003), 
Helbok and Wagner (2006), and Jiao (2011) which analyse the relationship between 
market valuation and information disclosure, asking whether firms that disclose 
relatively large amounts of information would have higher market valuation than firms 
that disclose relatively little. One possible reason for the divergence between the 
current research and the previous ones is the impact of the 2008 financial crisis. The 
existing empirical test is based on a sample gathered over the period 1997 to 2014. The 
financial crisis emerged in the middle of 2007. Shown in figure 5.1, the average market 
valuation is seriously hammered in 2008 and this impact even persists till 2014. In 
order to test for the effect of the exogenous shock of the financial crisis, we introduce 
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the period dummy variable 𝐷𝑝, which takes the value 0 up to and including 2007 and 
takes the value 1 after 2007.  
This research adds the period dummy variable and its interaction variable with the 
disclosure index into the previous estimation model (equation 5.1). The new equation 
is shown below, where 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖𝑡  stands for the market valuation, 𝑢𝑖,𝑡  is the 
constant term, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 stands for the disclosure index (VaRDI or ORDI), 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 is the 
vector of control variables, the additive dummy variable is 𝐷𝑝𝑡,  the interaction 
dummy variable is 𝐷𝑝𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ,  𝜀𝑖𝑡  is the error term, and ai and bi are the 
corresponding coefficients. The control variables in vector 𝑍𝑖 are log size, dividend 
ratio, leverage ratio, beta and return on asset. The correlation analysis has been 
conducted previously to ensure that there exists no multicollinearity problem. 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑖 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝑎𝑖𝐷𝑝𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖𝐷𝑝𝑡𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡             (5.2) 
If the financial crisis and its post-period have a significant impact on the market 
valuation, it will potentially change the intercept by an amount of 𝑎𝑖 or potentially 
change the coefficient of disclosure index by an amount of 𝑏𝑖 or both. If the coefficient 
of disclosure index changed, the relationship between the risk information disclosure 
and the market valuation would be affected60.  
So in order to test whether the financial crisis has impacted the relationship, a joint 
hypothesis test is performed. The null hypothesis is written as 𝐻0: 𝑎𝑖 =  𝑏𝑖 = 0 while 
the alternative hypothesis is  𝐻1: 𝐻0  is false. If the F-test
61  fails to reject the null 
                                                          
60 The main effect variable and the interaction variable could be analyzed separately if the statistically 
significant levels between them are different. 
61 In the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), the F-test can be used to assess whether the combined impact 
of a subset of independent variables has a significant impact on the dependent variable. The equation of 
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hypothesis, it means that the financial crisis and its post-period has no statistically 
significant role to play in this model. If the F-test rejects the null hypothesis, it means 
that the variables of the financial crisis and its post-period are statistically significant 
in this model. In this scenario, this research will go further to see whether and how the 
association between the risk information disclosure and the market valuation has been 
affected by the financial crisis. This technique is in principle an altered Chow test to 
determine whether this is a stable regression model for the whole period.  
When 𝑋𝑖  measures the impact of the information disclosure about exposure to the 
market risk via the VaRDI, the test statistic is 𝐹𝑚,𝑛−𝑘−1 =  𝐹2,593−8−1 = 42.3865 with 
the corresponding P-value 0.0000. This result strongly rejects the null hypothesis  𝐻0: 
𝑎𝑖 =  𝑏𝑖 = 0  and suggests that the financial crisis has caused a structural change in 
the original model (equation 5.1). The coefficients and their corresponding t-ratios of 
the VaRDI, the additive dummy variable and the interaction dummy variable under 
the new model are shown below: 
                                                          
F-test can be written as 𝐹𝑚,𝑛−𝑘−1 =  
(𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆−𝑈𝑅𝑆𝑆)/𝑚
𝑈𝑅𝑆𝑆/(𝑛−𝑘−1)
, where RRSS stands for the Residual Sum of Squares 
for the Restricted model, URSS stands for the Residual Sum of Squares for the Unrestricted model, m 
is the number of restricted variables, n is the number of total observations, and k is the number of all 
independent variables. 
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Table 5.5 The Coefficients of the Market Risk Information Disclosure (VaRDI) and the Period 
Dummy Related Variables  
The table above shows the coefficients of the variables of market risk information disclosure (measured 
by the VaRDI) and the coefficients of dummy related variables in the market valuation regression 
analysis. The period dummy variable defines the year before 2007 (including 2007) as 0 and the year 
after 2007 as 1. The dependent variable is the annual market valuation which is measured by Tobin’s 
Q-Ratio. Besides the variables of VaRDI, period dummy, and period dummy*VaRDI, the other control 
variables are log size, dividend ratio, leverage ratio, beta and return on asset that these control variables 
have been proven to be statistically significant variables in explaining the variation of market valuation. 
The sample period of Tobin’s Q-Ratio is from the year 1997 to the year 2014, and the sample period of 
the index (VaRDI or ORDI) and the control variables is from the year 1996 to the year 2013. The 
regression analysis takes into account the year fixed effects. The data panel is unbalanced. The 
coefficient estimates are obtained using the ordinary least squares estimation. The robust t-statistic is in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
Table 5.5 can be compared to the VaRDI part of table 5.4. In table 5.4, the coefficient 
of VaRDI is -0.0217 and statistically significant at 1% level, which suggests that over 
the whole sample period 1997–2014, the market risk information disclosure is 
significantly and negatively associated with the market valuation of a bank. In table 
5.5, after the inclusion of additive and interaction dummy variables, the empirical 
result suggests that the VaRDI is statistically significant determinant of the market 
Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q-Ratio Coefficients Observations
Adjusted      
R-squared
VaRDI -0.0217*** 593 0.4627
(-2.83)
Period Dummy -0.8261***
(-4.35)
Period Dummy * VaRDI -0.0356***
(-3.41)
Log Size -0.0806
(-0.58)
Dividend Ratio -0.0355***
(-3.89)
Leverage Ratio -0.0001
(-1.16)
Beta -0.2868***
(-4.67)
Return on Asset 0.0321*
(1.70)
Constant 2.2052***
(6.09)
Year Fixed Effects Included
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valuation. That is to say, when the period dummy variable is equal to zero, the market 
risk information disclosure has a statistically significant and negative impact on the 
market valuation. When the period dummy variable is equal to one, it brings down the 
intercept by an amount of eight tenths and this impact is statistically significant at 1% 
level. The coefficient of the interaction dummy variable (period dummy*VaRDI) is -
0.0356 and statistically significant at 1% level. That is to say, after the financial crisis, 
the association between the market valuation and the market risk information 
disclosure turns to be negative with statistical significance. A one unit increase in the 
score of VaRDI is associated with a reduction of around four hundredths in the market 
valuation.  
When 𝑋𝑖  measures the impact of the information disclosure about exposure to the 
operational risk via the ORDI, the test statistic is 𝐹𝑚,𝑛−𝑘−1 =  𝐹2,593−8−1 =
40.7658 with the corresponding P-value 0.0000. This test result strongly rejects the 
null hypothesis  𝐻0: 𝑎𝑖 =  𝑏𝑖 = 0  and suggests that the financial crisis has caused a 
structural change of the original model (equation 5.1). The coefficients and their 
corresponding t-ratios of the ORDI, the additive dummy variable and the interaction 
dummy variable under the new model are shown below: 
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Table 5.6 The Coefficients of the Operational Risk Information Disclosure (ORDI) and the 
Period Dummy Related Variables for the Association Analysis between Market Valuation and 
Operational Risk Information Disclosure 
The table above shows the coefficients for the variables of market risk information disclosure (measured 
by the ORDI) and the coefficients of the dummy related variables in the market valuation regression 
analysis. The period dummy variable defines the year before 2007 (including 2007) as 0 and the year 
after 2007 as 1. The dependent variable is the annual market valuation which is measured by Tobin’s 
Q-Ratio. Besides the variables of ORDI, period dummy, and period dummy*ORDI, the other control 
variables are log size, dividend ratio, leverage ratio, beta and return on assets that these control variables 
have been proven to be statistically significant variables in explaining the variation of market valuation. 
The sample period of Tobin’s Q-Ratio is from the year 1997 to the year 2014, and the sample period of 
the index (VaRDI or ORDI) and the control variables is from the year 1996 to the year 2013. The 
regression analysis takes into account the year fixed effects. The data panel is unbalanced. The 
coefficient estimates are obtained using the ordinary least squares estimation. The robust t-statistic is in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
Table 5.6 can be compared to the ORDI part of table 5.4. In table 5.4, the coefficient 
of ORDI is -0.0396 and statistically significant at 5% level, which suggests that over 
the whole sample period 1997–2014, the operational risk information disclosure is 
significantly and negatively associated with the market valuation of a bank. In table 
5.6, the coefficient of ORDI still remains negative with statistical significance even 
after adding the additive dummy variable and the interaction dummy variable. That is 
Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q-Ratio Coefficients Observations
Adjusted      
R-squared
ORDI -0.0396** 593 0.4768
(-2.25)
Period Dummy -0.6758***
(-5.33)
Period Dummy * ORDI 0.0279*
(1.72)
Log Size -0.0049
(-0.13)
Dividend Ratio -0.0355***
(-3.43)
Leverage Ratio 0.0000
(0.71)
Beta -0.3208***
(-5.30)
Return on Asset 0.0272
(1.43)
Constant 2.1208***
(5.96)
Year Fixed Effects Included
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to say, when the period dummy variable is equal to zero which is the period before the 
financial crisis, the operational risk information disclosure has a significantly negative 
impact on the market valuation, in which one unit increase in the score of ORDI is 
associated with a reduction of around seven hundredths in the market valuation. The 
period dummy variable is the added intercept which is -0.6758 and statistically 
significant at 1% level. That is to say, after the financial crisis, the market valuation 
has been on average reduced seventy-eight hundredths. The coefficient of interaction 
dummy variable (period dummy*VaRDI) is 0.0279 and statistically significant at 10% 
level. When the period dummy variable is equal to one which is the period after the 
financial crisis, the coefficient of ORDI would be equal to (-0.0396+0.0279) which is 
-0.0118. That is to say, after the financial crisis, one unit increase in the score of ORDI 
is associated with a reduction of around one hundredth in the market valuation. The 
associations between the ORDI and the market valuation in two separate periods 
(before the financial crisis and after the financial crisis) are both negative with 
statistical significance. 
In this section, this research has taken the financial crisis into consideration and added 
related variables into the previous association testing model (equation 5.1). Two added 
variables are the period dummy variable and its interaction variable with the disclosure 
index. The F-test shows that the combined effects of the two added variables are 
statistically significant in either case, when the disclosure index uses the VaRDI or the 
ORDI. Therefore, this research tabulates the coefficient results in table 5.5 and table 
5.6 for both cases respectively. The financial crisis has a significant effect to reduce 
the average market valuation of a bank under either the disclosure index uses the 
VaRDI or the disclosure index uses the ORDI. When the disclosure index measures 
the market risk information via the VaRDI, a significantly negative association 
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between the market valuation and the market risk information is presented after the 
financial crisis which is the period from 2008 to 2014. When the disclosure index 
measures the operational risk information via the ORDI, significantly negative 
associations between the market valuation and the operational risk information are 
presented for both periods (before the financial crisis: 1997-2007 and after the 
financial crisis: 2008-2014). Generally speaking, the risk information disclosure is in 
a significantly negative association with the market valuation even after adding the 
additional period dummy related variables.  
5.7.2 The Impact of Country Development Status 
In the previous section, this research has proved that the period dummy related 
variables have a combined significance when adding to equation 5.1. Afterwards, this 
research takes a further step to see what impact the financial crisis brings to the 
association analysis between risk information disclosure and market valuation. Overall 
speaking, both the market risk information disclosure (measured by the VaRDI) and 
the operational risk information disclosure (measured by the ORDI) still present 
significantly negative associations with the market valuation after adding the 
additional period dummy related variables. 
In this section, this research intends to investigate the association between risk 
information disclosure and market valuation that differs with the country development 
status. The banks in the current research sample are from sixteen countries worldwide, 
in which most of the countries are developed: Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA. 
There are fourteen banks from emerging countries: China, Russia, and Brazil. 
Emerging countries are assumed to be different from developed countries in terms of 
information transparency, legal system comprehensiveness, financial market 
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regulation, and maturity. The country dummy variable 𝐷𝑐 divides the sample into two 
parts, which is the developed country denoted as the value 0 and the emerging country 
denoted as the value 1. 
Equation 5.2 has been proven to be an efficient model in the association analysis, thus 
the emerging country related dummy variables would be added to equation 5.2. There 
are three new emerging country related dummy variables adding into the equation, 
which are the emerging country dummy variable, the interaction variable between 
emerging country dummy variable and disclosure index (VaRDI or ORDI), and the 
interaction variable between emerging country dummy variable and period dummy 
variable. The new equation is shown below, where 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖𝑡 stands for the market 
valuation, 𝑢𝑖,𝑡  is the constant term, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 stands for the disclosure index (VaRDI or 
ORDI),  𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 is the vector of control variables, the additive dummy variables are 
𝐷𝑝𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑐𝑡,  the interaction dummy variables are 𝐷𝑝𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1,  𝐷𝑐𝑖 ∗
𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝐷𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑝𝑡,  𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term, and 𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖  𝑑𝑖, 𝑒𝑖 are the corresponding 
coefficients. The control variables under the vector 𝑍𝑖  stand for all the significant 
variables in explaining the variation of market valuation in table 5.3, in which the 
control variables included here are log size, dividend ratio, leverage ratio, beta and 
return on asset. The correlation analysis has been conducted previously to ensure that 
there exists no multicollinearity problem. 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑖 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝑎𝑖𝐷𝑝𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖𝐷𝑝𝑡𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝑖𝐷𝑐𝑡 +
𝑑𝑖𝐷𝑐𝑡𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖𝐷𝑝𝑡𝐷𝑐𝑡 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡            (5.3) 
If the three new added variables which are 𝐷𝑐𝑡, 𝐷𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝐷𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑝𝑡 are not 
statistically redundant in equation 5.3, it will have the power to alter the intercept and 
the coefficient of information disclosure index. There are four different cases if 
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equation 5.3 holds: emerging country before the financial crisis, emerging country 
after the financial crisis, developed country before the financial crisis and developed 
country after the financial crisis. 
Firstly, in order to test whether the three newly added variables are statistically 
redundant, a joint hypothesis test is performed. The model associated with the null 
hypothesis restricts the coefficients (𝑐𝑖, 𝑑𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑖) of additive dummy variables and 
interaction dummy variables to zero. If the F-test62 fails to reject the null hypothesis, 
it means that the three newly added variables are statistically redundant. In this 
scenario, this research will finish the test and conclude the finding that there is no 
difference for the association between emerging countries and developed countries. If 
the F-test rejects the null hypothesis, it means that the country dummy related variables 
have played a role in this model. In this scenario, this research will take a further look 
to see the difference between developed countries and emerging countries for the 
association analysis. 
When 𝑋𝑖 measures the information disclosure about exposure to the market risk via 
the VaRDI, the test statistic is 𝐹𝑚,𝑛−𝑘−1 =  𝐹3,593−11−1 = 19.2543  with the 
corresponding P-value 0.0000. This test result strongly rejects the null hypothesis 𝑐𝑖 =
𝑑𝑖 =  𝑒𝑖 = 0 and suggests that there is a difference between emerging countries and 
developed countries for the association between the market risk information disclosure 
and the market valuation. Therefore, this research takes a further look at what kind of 
difference lying between emerging countries and developed countries for this 
                                                          
62 In the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), the F-test can be used to assess whether the combined impact 
of a subset of independent variables has a significant impact on the dependent variable. The equation of 
F-test can be written as 𝐹𝑚,𝑛−𝑘−1 =  
(𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆−𝑈𝑅𝑆𝑆)/𝑚
𝑈𝑅𝑆𝑆/(𝑛−𝑘−1)
, where RRSS stands for the Residual Sum of Squares 
for the Restricted model, URSS stands for the Residual Sum of Squares for the Unrestricted model, m 
is the number of restricted variables, n is the number of total observations, and k is the number of all 
independent variables. 
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association. The new coefficients and their corresponding t-ratios of the VaRDI, the 
additive dummy variables, and the interaction dummy variables are shown below: 
 
Table 5.7 The Coefficients of Market Risk Information Disclosure (VaRDI), Period Dummy 
Related Variables and Country Dummy Related Variables for the Association Analysis between 
Market Valuation and Market Risk Information Disclosure 
The table above shows the coefficients of the variables for market risk information disclosure (measured 
by the VaRDI), period dummy related variables and country dummy related variables. The period 
dummy variable defines the year before 2007 (including 2007) as 0 and the year after 2007 as 1. The 
emerging country dummy variable defines the bank originated from emerging country as 1 and the bank 
originated from developed country as 0. The dependent variable is the annual market valuation which 
is measured by Tobin’s Q-Ratio. Besides these variables, the other control variables are log size, 
dividend ratio, leverage ratio, beta and return on asset that these control variables have been proven to 
be statistically significant variables in explaining the variation of market valuation. The sample period 
of Tobin’s Q-Ratio is from the year 1997 to the year 2014, and the sample period of the index (VaRDI 
or ORDI) and the control variables is from the year 1996 to the year 2013. The regression analysis takes 
into account the year fixed effects. The data panel is unbalanced. The coefficient estimates are obtained 
using the ordinary least squares estimation. The robust t-statistic is in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q-Ratio Coefficients Observations
Adjusted      
R-squared
VaRDI -0.0239** 593 0.4637
(-2.23)
Period Dummy -0.5047***
(-3.80)
Period Dummy * VaRDI -0.0178
(1.37)
Emerging Country Dummy -0.0575*
(-1.69)
Emerging Country Dummy * VaRDI 0.0114
(0.71)
Emerging Country Dummy * Period Dummy 0.5351**
(2.37)
Log Size -0.0254
(-0.66)
Dividend Ratio -0.0351***
(-3.30)
Leverage Ratio -0.0001*
(-1.93)
Beta -0.2655***
(-4.21)
Return on Asset 0.0313*
(2.01)
Constant 2.1121***
(5.44)
Year Fixed Effects Included
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When Dc = 0 and Dp = 0, that is the case for the developed country before the financial 
crisis. Under this case, the only left variable is the VaRDI with the coefficient of -
0.0239 at the 5% statistical significance. This result suggests that the market risk 
information disclosure is negatively associated with the market valuation for 
developed countries before the financial crisis that one score increase in the VaRDI is 
associated with a reduction in the market valuation around two hundredths with 5% 
statistical significance, all else being equal.  
When Dc = 1 and Dp = 0, that is the case for the emerging country before the financial 
crisis. Under this case, there are three variables left which are VaRDI, Dc and 
Dc*VaRDI. The variable of Dc*VaRDI is not statistically significant, therefore this 
variable may be omitted from analysis. The result suggests that the disclosure of 
market risk information is negatively associated with the market valuation for 
emerging countries before the financial crisis, in which one score increase in the 
VaRDI is associated with a reduction in the market valuation by nearly two hundredths 
at the 5% statistical significance, all else being equal. Since the coefficient of emerging 
country dummy variable is -0.0575 at the 10% statistical significance, the market 
valuation in an emerging country is on average six hundredths lower than in a 
developed country before the financial crisis, all else being equal. 
When Dc = 0 and Dp = 1, that is the case for the developed country after the financial 
crisis. Under this case, there are three variables left which are VaRDI, Dp and 
Dp*VaRDI. The variable of Dp*VaRDI is not statistically significant, and may be 
omitted from analysis. The results suggest that the disclosure of market risk 
information is negatively related to the market valuation for the developed country 
after the financial crisis, in which one score increase in the VaRDI is associated with 
a reduction in the market valuation by nearly two hundredths, all else being equal. The 
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market valuation after the financial crisis is on average fifty hundredths lower than 
before the financial crisis for the developed country. 
When Dc = 1 and Dp = 1, that is the case for the emerging country after the financial 
crisis. Under this case, all the five variables are left. The variables of Dp*VaRDI and 
Dc*VaRDI are not statistically significant, therefore these two variables may be 
omitted from analysis. The result suggests that the market risk information disclosure 
is negatively associated with the market valuation for emerging countries after the 
financial crisis that one score increase in the VaRDI is associated with a reduction in 
the market valuation nearly two hundredths with 10% statistical significance, all else 
being equal. The intercept is changed by the combination of Dp, Dc and Dp*Dc and 
all the three variables are statistically significant at the 1% statistical significance, and 
the sum of these three coefficients is (-0.5047-0.0575+0.5351) which is equal to -
0.0271. The average market valuation after the financial crisis is around three 
hundredths lower before the financial crisis for the emerging country. 
When measuring the disclosure of operational risk information using the ORDI, the 
test statistic is 𝐹𝑚,𝑛−𝑘−1 =  𝐹3,593−11−1 = 16.2856 with the corresponding P-value 
0.0000. This test result strongly rejects the null hypothesis 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖 =  𝑒𝑖 = 0  and 
suggests that there is a difference between emerging countries and developed countries 
for the association between the operational risk information disclosure and the market 
valuation. Therefore, this research takes a deep look at what kind of difference lying 
between emerging countries and developed countries for this association. The new 
coefficients and their corresponding t-ratios of the ORDI, the additive dummy 
variables, and the interaction dummy variables under the new model are shown below: 
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Table 5.8 The Coefficients of Operational Risk Information Disclosure (ORDI), Period Dummy 
Related Variables and Country Dummy Related Variables for the Association Analysis between 
Market Valuation and Operational Risk Information Disclosure 
The table above shows the coefficients of the variables for operational risk information disclosure 
(measured by the ORDI), period dummy related variables and country dummy related variables. The 
period dummy variable defines the year before 2007 (including 2007) as 0 and the year after 2007 as 1. 
The emerging country dummy variable defines the bank originated from emerging country as 1 and the 
bank originated from developed country as 0. The dependent variable is the annual market valuation 
which is measured by Tobin’s Q-Ratio. Besides these variables, the other control variables are log size, 
dividend ratio, leverage ratio, beta and return on assets that these control variables have been proven to 
be statistically significant variables in explaining the variation of market valuation. The sample period 
of Tobin’s Q-Ratio is from the year 1997 to the year 2014, and the sample period of the index (VaRDI 
or ORDI) and the control variables is from the year 1996 to the year 2013. The regression analysis takes 
into account the year fixed effects. The data panel is unbalanced. The coefficient estimates are obtained 
using the ordinary least squares estimation. The robust t-statistic is in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
When Dc = 0 and Dp = 0, that is the case for the developed country before the financial 
crisis. Under this case, the only left variable is the ORDI with no statistical significance. 
Although this is not with statistical significance, this result still suggests that the 
Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q-Ratio Coefficients Observations
Adjusted      
R-squared
ORDI -0.0071 593 0.4709
(-0.56)
Period Dummy -0.9917***
(-6.85)
Period Dummy * ORDI -0.0732
(-1.15)
Emerging Country Dummy -0.0655*
(-1.79)
Emerging Country Dummy * ORDI 0.0166
(0.78)
Emerging Country Dummy * Period Dummy 0.9376***
(4.51)
Log Size -0.0002
(-0.01)
Dividend Ratio -0.0367***
(-3.58)
Leverage Ratio -0.0001*
(-1.69)
Beta -0.3172***
(-5.12)
Return on Asset 0.0310*
(1.66)
Constant 1.7786***
(4.69)
Year Fixed Effects Included
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operational risk information disclosure is negatively associated with the market 
valuation for developed countries before the financial crisis that one score increase in 
the ORDI is associated with a reduction in the market valuation seven hundredths.  
When Dc = 1 and Dp = 0, that is the case for the emerging country before the financial 
crisis. Under this case, there are three variables left which are ORDI, Dc and Dc*ORDI. 
The variable of emerging country dummy is statistically significant with a coefficient 
of -0.0655, meaning that the market valuation in the emerging country is six 
hundredths lower compared to developed countries, all else being equal.  
When Dc = 0 and Dp = 1, that is the case for the developed country after the financial 
crisis. Under this case, there is one variable left which is Dp with statistical 
significance at 1% level. The market valuation after the financial crisis is on average 
one unit lower than before the financial crisis for developed countries. 
When Dc = 1 and Dp = 1, that is the case for the emerging country after the financial 
crisis. Under this case, three variables are left which are Dp, Dc and Dp*Dc. The 
intercept is changed by the combination of Dp, DC and Dp*Dc and all these three 
variables are statistically significant, therefore the overall change of the intercept is (-
9917-0.0655+0.9376) which is equal to -0.1196. The market valuation after the 
financial crisis is on average nearly eleven hundredths lower before the financial crisis 
for emerging countries. 
In this section, this research intends to find any difference between developed 
countries and emerging countries for the association between the risk information 
disclosure (measured by the VaRDI or the ORDI) and the market valuation. Except 
the emerging country after the financial crisis that the operational risk information 
disclosure (measured by the ORDI) is not with statistical significance, the other 
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associations between the market risk information disclosure (measured by the VaRDI) 
and the market valuation or between the operational risk information disclosure 
(measured by the ORDI) and the market valuation are all significantly negative.  
All else being equal, being an emerging country alone seems to have a lower market 
valuation compared to a developed country, which has been indicated by the 
significantly negative coefficient of emerging country dummy variable when 𝑋𝑖 
measures the market risk information disclosure via the VaRDI or the operational risk 
information disclosure via the ORDI.  
5.8 Discussion 
After controlling for the variable differences, the regression analysis suggests that the 
VaRDI and ORDI are significantly and negatively related to the market valuation of a 
bank. A further step of introducing dummy variables related to the financial crisis and 
the country development status has generally confirmed this finding. 
The empirical finding in the current research is not in line with the general opinion 
which suggests a significantly positive relationship exists between information 
disclosure and market valuation. In previous research such as Bhattacharya et al. (2002) 
and Baumann and Nier (2003), the research period ends before the year 2005. After 
the year 2005, much more attention has been paid to risk regulation in the banking 
industry, and the global banking industry has gone through numerous reforms as well. 
This period difference between the current research and the previous research has 
probably caused the current empirical findings to deviate from the previous ones.  
Baumann and Nier (2003) assert that increased information disclosure is helpful to 
increase the market valuation of a bank. The current research uses a very similar 
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methodology to that employed by Baumann and Nier (2003), and treats information 
disclosure as the independent variable and market valuation as the dependent variable. 
In this scenario, it is assumed that the difference in market valuation is due to the 
difference in information disclosure. Though the findings in Baumann and Nier (2003) 
in general have suggested that information disclosure by a bank is helpful in increasing 
the bank’s market valuation, Baumann and Nier (2003) do find that the information 
disclosure about loans by maturity, deposits by maturity, and deposits by type of 
customer is in a negative relationship with the market valuation of a bank. Baumann 
and Nier (2003) suspect that the market expects the bank to have a maturity mismatch 
between loans and deposits, hence the bank is unable to increase its market valuation 
by disclosing more information about the maturity structure of assets and liabilities. 
Baumann and Nier (2003) argue that risk information disclosure regarding loans is 
beneficial for the banking industry, while risk information disclosure regarding interest 
rate risk is less likely to be beneficial for the banking industry. Therefore, 
policymakers should particularly encourage risk information disclosure with respect 
to loans. 
The empirical results generated by Jordan et al. (1999) show that the increased 
information disclosure by banks during the period of the banking crisis in the US has 
had negative impacts on banks’ stock price and banks’ deposit ratio such that both the 
stock price and the deposit ratio would decline if the bank increases its information 
disclosure during the period of the banking crisis. Jordan et al. (1999) believe that the 
market have the ability to uncover a bank’s problems through information disclosures, 
and the information disclosure by one bank may also has an impact on the market 
valuation of other similar banks. Given that our sample period has covered the 2008 
financial crisis and the event study conducted previously has also indicated a negative 
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impact on stock price, the finding in the current research regarding the negative 
relationship between information disclosure and market valuation is in line with the 
finding of Jordan et al. (1999). 
Meanwhile, an intriguing study by Helbok and Wagner (2006) seems to shed new light 
on the association between market valuation and information disclosure. Helbok and 
Wagner (2006) use regression analysis which puts the information disclosure as the 
dependent variable and puts the equity-to-asset ratio and profitability ratio as the 
independent variables. In this scenario, it is assumed that the difference in the level of 
information disclosure is due to the difference in the equity-to-asset ratio and 
profitability ratio. Their finding indicates that operational risk information disclosure 
by a bank is negatively associated with the bank’s equity-to-book ratio and profitability 
ratio. A motivation and incentive theory is put forward to justify this negative 
association that a distressed bank tends to disclose more information with respect to 
operational risk in order to ease the anxiety of investors and assure the soundness of a 
bank’s operation. Lang and Lundholm (1993) also put the information disclosure level 
as the dependent variable as Helbok and Wagner (2006) did, and put market valuation 
along with stock return and analyst forecast into the independent variables. However, 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) find a positive association between information disclosure 
level and market valuation. The empirical evidence provided by Lang and Lundholm 
(1993) regarding the association between information disclosure level and market 
valuation is in contradiction with Helbok and Wagner (2006), though both Lang and 
Lundholm (1993) and Helbok and Wagner (2006) argue that information disclosure is 
helpful in boosting firms’ market valuation based on their own theories. Market 
valuation could be linked with the demand for a stock. Bhattacharya et al. (2002) find 
that an increase in earnings opacity is associated with a decrease in stock demand after 
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controlling other influences. This finding seems somehow in line with what the current 
research has found. Plumlee et al. (2015) find that enhanced environmental disclosure 
is generally beneficial for firms’ market valuation, but there are still inconsistent 
results in their findings. Indeed, there exists mixed evidence in the association analysis 
between information disclosure and market valuation, though the previous research 
generally attempts to encourage the information disclosure by claiming that 
information disclosure is helpful to boost market valuation. 
The additional robustness tests by considering the impacts of financial crisis and 
country development status have confirmed the negative association between risk 
information disclosure and market valuation. Furthermore, the robustness test shows 
that the financial crisis has a significantly detrimental impact on market valuation, 
which complies with intuition. The market valuation for the banking industry has been 
dramatically and persistently declined over the last decade. Calomiris and Nissim 
(2014) believe that the extent and persistence of decline in the market valuation of the 
banking industry cannot be explained by the delayed recognition of losses particularly 
caused by the financial crisis. Rather, the decline is the value of intangibles – such as 
customer relationship and market sentiment – along with other unrecognized 
contingent obligations. This downward shift in the market valuation reflects a 
combination of changed economic circumstances (e.g., low interest rate; mergence 
within the banking industry) and changed regulatory policies. Together, these changes 
in the economic environment after the financial crisis have affected the investors’ 
relationship with the banking industry. The market perceptions when valuing banks to 
certain issues have also changed after the financial crisis. For example, prior to the 
financial crisis, higher leverage was associated with greater value, but during and after 
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the crisis, as default risk and regulatory concerns came to the fore, lower leverage turns 
out to be associated with greater value. 
The robustness test also shows that before the financial crisis the market valuation for 
the banking industry in developed countries is higher than the market valuation for the 
banking industry in emerging countries, and after the financial crisis the market 
valuation for the banking industry in emerging countries is higher than the market 
valuation for the banking industry in developed countries. The market valuation for 
the banking industry in developed countries, therefore, has been negatively affected 
more severely by the impact of the financial crisis. Despite not directly addressing the 
differences of market valuation among countries, some papers may still give clues for 
the reason of market valuation differences among countries. For example, Errunza and 
Senbet (1984) demonstrate that costless international corporate intermediation through 
direct foreign investment facilitates the formation of a perfect market and brings down 
the barriers of international capital flows faced by investors. This cost efficiency 
movement is a positive factor in increasing market valuation which is caused by a 
closed international involvement. Lang et al. (2003) investigate the relationship 
between the cross-listing in the United States and the information disclosure of non-
US firms, and find that firms that cross-listed on US markets have greater analyst 
coverage and increased forecast accuracy than firms which are not cross-listed on US 
markets. Lang et al. (2003) also find that a positive change in analyst coverage and 
forecast accuracy occurs around the time of cross-listing onto US markets. A higher 
market valuation is observed when the cross-listing happens. The movement of cross-
listing onto US markets is viewed as complying with a strict and comprehensive 
standard of accounting information disclosure enforced by the US government. Bai et 
al. (2004) advocate that high concentration of outside shareholding and issuing shares 
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to foreign investors have positive effects on market valuation, while a large 
shareholding by interval investors such as CEOs or vice chairmen have negative 
effects on market valuation.  
5.9 Summary 
This chapter has investigated the association between risk information disclosures and 
market valuation in the banking industry. Two composite indices (VaRDI and ORDI) 
are used to measure the market risk and operational risk information disclosure 
respectively. Tobin’s Q-Ratio is used to measure the market valuation of the banking 
industry. Since the correlation between the VaRDI and the ORDI is relatively high at 
0.66, the disclosure index has been put to the test with the regression model one at a 
time in order to avoid the multicollinearity problem. Under the regression analysis by 
controlling variable differences, each of the two composite indices (VaRDI and ORDI) 
appears to be in a significantly negative relationship with the market valuation. 
Additional tests with respect to the impacts of financial crisis and country development 
status have generally confirmed this finding. 
This empirical evidence implies that the risk information disclosure is negatively 
related to the market valuation of a bank meaning that an increase in information 
disclosure with exposures to the market and operational risk is associated with a 
reduction in the market valuation of a bank. However, this empirical argument is not 
in line with the claims in previous studies such as Baumann and Nier (2003), which 
argue that the information disclosure is associated with an increase in the market 
valuation of a bank, though the current research has used a similar methodology with 
Baumann and Nier (2003) to retest the association. 
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This empirical evidence triggers doubt regarding the positive association between 
information disclosure and market valuation, which encourages future research to 
further test this association. Meanwhile, the finding in the current research might also 
make individual banks to rethink their policies and reassess their risk information 
disclosure regimes, since the information disclosure about exposure to risk may be not 
that beneficial on market valuation in all conditions as suggested in previous studies, 
and the information disclosure about exposure to risk is also costly to produce in 
practice. On the other hand, maintaining a certain amount of risk information 
disclosures is crucial for monitoring risk in the banking industry. A task achieving a 
balance between these two issues might be laid out for banking managers in 
commercial banks and banking regulators in central banks collectively to think about. 
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Chapter 6  
Does the Disclosure of Information about Exposure 
to Risk Mitigate Stock Return Volatility?  
Empirical Evidence from the Banking Industry 
6.1 Introduction 
The relationship between information disclosure and stock return volatility is a 
debatable issue. Though the majority of studies suggest that increased information 
disclosures are associated with lower levels of volatility in stock returns (e.g. Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993; Baumann and Nier, 2004; Aman, 2011), there still exists evidence 
suggesting that increased information disclosures are associated with higher levels of 
volatility in stock returns (e.g. Ross, 1989; Kalev et al., 2004; Mugaloglu and Erdag, 
2013). Indeed, what information disclosures will affect stock return volatility is clearly 
an important topic to revisit. The sample of the banking industry is employed to test 
this intriguing question.  
The disclosures of market and operational risk information are measured by two 
indices: the Value-at-Risk disclosure index (VaRDI) designed by Perignon and Smith 
(2010) and the operational risk disclosure index (ORDI) designed by Goyal and Wu 
(2007). The original information regarding the market and operational risk is extracted 
from public documents such as annual reports and SEC63 filings. 
                                                          
63 SEC stands for the US Securities and Exchange Commission. 
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The remaining chapter is outlined as follows. Section two provides an introduction to 
the banking risk information disclosure and its potential to yield reductions in the 
volatility of bank’s stock returns. The third section briefly outlines the indices used to 
measure the level and quality of disclosures for market and operational risk 
information in the banking industry. A more detailed description of these two indices 
is presented in chapter four. Section four introduces the regression analysis and the 
control variables employed in testing the impact of risk information disclosures on the 
volatility of bank’s stock returns. Sample selection, sample period and data sources are 
presented in the fifth section. Section six presents the empirical results, while section 
seven provides additional robust tests with the impacts of financial crisis and country 
development status. Section eight discusses the results and compares the results with 
previous research. The final section summarizes this chapter and provides concluding 
comments. 
6.2 Background and Literature Review 
6.2.1 Background 
This research is fundamentally important as the banking industry is crucial for 
economic stability. The impact of the 2008 financial crisis was huge and severely 
affected the global economy. While adventure is embedded into human nature and 
there is still a culture to encourage risk-taking for an extra return in the financial world, 
it is important that this risk-taking is carefully managed. In this sense, the banking 
industry is vulnerable to market and operational risks, so any disclosure that reduces 
the risk should be valuable to investors in making asset allocation decisions.  
In order to facilitate the goal of providing increased safeguards to the banking system, 
the Basel Committee proposed the Basel Accord II in 2004 which is an updated 
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requirement for risk information disclosures over the provision of the previous Basel 
Accord I in 1988. The major difference between the first and the second Basel Accord 
is that the Basel Accord II adds the disclosures of market and operational risk to the 
mandatory monitoring, while the Basel Accord I only takes credit risk as the 
mandatory monitoring. Traditionally, the risk that a borrower fails to meet his 
contractual obligation to the lender was regarded as the biggest threat facing a bank. 
There has been relatively thorough discussion among the existing literature on credit 
risk and how to manage credit risk in the banking industry (e.g. Berger and Udell, 1990; 
Wong, 1997; Altman and Saunders, 1998; Jiménez and Saurina, 2004; Jiménez and 
Saurina, 2006, inter alias). After the 2008 financial crisis, central banks around the 
world emphasized the importance of information disclosures by suggesting the use of 
the Basel Accord as the benchmark in determining the quality and quantity of 
information disclosed by the banking industry. In some countries such as the US and 
Canada, the disclosure of market and operational risk information is no longer a 
voluntary procedure but a mandatory legal requirement.  
6.2.2 Literature in Support of the Negative Relationship between Information 
Disclosure and Stock Return Volatility 
Using the data from the Financial Analysts Federation, Lang and Lundholm (1993) 
find evidence suggesting a negative correlation between information disclosure and 
stock return volatility. In the multiple regression analysis, their dependent variable is 
the information disclosure level and the independent variables include stock return 
volatility, firm size, stock earning, and market valuation of equity. Besides a negative 
correlation between information disclosure and stock return volatility, the empirical 
results also show that the relationship between information disclosure level and firm 
size is positive implying that bigger firms generally disclose more information, and 
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the relationship between disclosure level and stock return is also positive implying that 
firms with positive stock returns generally disclose more information.  
The volatility of stock returns can be illustrated by the sensitivity of trading volume to 
the changes in the financial environment. Linsmeier et al. (2002) compare the 
sensitivity of trading volume to the changes of economic variables before and after the 
company first released its FRR NO. 48 64  report. The set of economic variables 
considered by Linsmeier et al. (2002) includes inflation, interest rates, exchange rate, 
and energy prices. Linsmeier et al. (2002) prove that the sensitivity of trading volume 
to the changes of these economic variables is lower after the company released the 
FRR NO. 48. The absence of FRR NO. 48 makes the sensitivity of trading volume 
higher to the changes of these economic variables, since the information opacity leads 
to diversified opinions about these changes’ impacts on stock price, which 
subsequently leads to higher stock return volatility. The information in the FRR NO. 
48 helps investors to better analyse the financial status of a company and achieve 
similar opinions about the valuation of a company, which could stabilise the stock 
price of a company. 
Baumann and Nier (2004) test the correlation between the information transparency 
level and the stock return volatility of 600 banks in 31 countries over the period 1993-
2000. The transparency level is measured through three indices, and each of the three 
indices is a self-sufficient measurement of information transparency: the first one is an 
index composited by the Center for International Financial Analysis Research (CIFAR) 
which measures the transparency level for all industries globally in the 1990s; the 
                                                          
64 The Financial Reporting Release NO. 48 (FRR NO. 48) is a mandatory disclosure required by the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The FRR NO. 48 mainly focus on the market risk 
information of a company. 
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second index is a dummy variable which identifies whether a bank is listed on the US 
stock market; the third index is designed by Baumann and Nier (2004) which contains 
items which may affect stock return volatility including loans by maturity, loans by 
type, loans by counterparty, problem loans, problem loans by type, securities by type, 
securities by holding purpose, deposits by maturity, deposits by type of customer, 
money market funding, long-term funding, reserves, capital, contingent liabilities, off-
balance sheet items, non-interest income and loan loss provisions. Each of the three 
indices is individually regressed with additional control variables to test the 
relationship between stock return volatility and information disclosure. Baumann and 
Nier (2004) employ the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to obtain the results, 
and the results show that in general, each of the three indices is significantly and 
negatively related to the stock return volatility. That is to say, a higher disclosure level 
is associated with a lower level of stock return volatility. A more specific regression 
analysis is conducted in order to further test the disclosure impacts of individual items. 
For the individual items composing the third index, information disclosures about 
securities by type, securities by holding period, deposits by type of customer, long-
term funding, contingent liabilities, off-balance sheet items and non-interest income 
are all associated with reduced levels of stock return volatility. 
The standard deviation of stock returns is one of the approaches to measure stock 
return volatility. After controlling for other bank characteristics such as company size, 
trading volume, profit, and operational situation, the regression analysis conducted by 
Hirtle (2007) suggests that the coefficient estimate for the disclosure index is 
statistically and significantly different to zero and negative in sign, which means that 
the bank stock return volatility is negatively correlated with the amount of information 
disclosed by a bank. The disclosure index is designed in a similar fashion to the index 
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designed by Pérignon and Smith (2010). As shown in equation (6.1), the volatility of 
stock i at time t+1 could be explained by the information disclosed at time t and a 
vector of control variables  𝑋. 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are the corresponding coefficients for the 
disclosure index and the vector of control variables respectively.  𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 is the error 
term of volatility for stock i at time t+1. Hirtle (2007) uses this regression model to 
provide evidence that enhanced information disclosures have a significant role in 
reducing the volatility of bank’s stock returns. 
                             𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1                          (6.1) 
Ball (2009) finds that comprehensive information disclosure plays an important role 
in preventing the excessive volatility of stock returns. The stock price is efficient in a 
statistical sense if it is the minimum variance forecast of future stock price. A 
comprehensive information disclosure helps stock price to reflect its intrinsic value, 
which means that there will be minimal adjustments needed in future stock price to 
accommodate additional information release. However, if only partial information is 
disclosed, the current stock price will inefficiently reflect its intrinsic value. Therefore, 
the future stock price may require large movements to compensate for new information, 
which may lead to high levels of stock return volatility. Volatility is an underlying risk 
for market participants, hence sufficient information disclosure is very crucial for the 
stability of our financial system.  
Aman (2011) explores the association between the public information of a firm and 
the stock return volatility of a firm through a sample of Japanese firms. The public 
information of a firm examines the credibility of a firm’s information disclosures in 
terms of quality and quantity through the channel of media coverage. The empirical 
result suggests that greater amounts of media coverage are related to lower levels of 
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stock return volatility of a firm, in which this association is more significant for the 
media coverage of earnings report.  
By using a sample of more than 90,000 firm observations over the period of 1962–
2001, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) find that poor quality financial reporting is 
associated with higher levels of stock return volatility, which implies that enhanced 
financial reporting would mitigate information asymmetries of a firm’s performance 
and reduce the stock return volatility of a firm. The control variables included in the 
test are cash flow operating performance, cash flow variability, stock return 
performance, growth, leverage and firm size. This empirical finding is robust even 
considering inter-temporal changes in information disclosures about value-relevant, 
inter-temporal changes in information disclosures about future cash flows, and 
differences in investors’ professional level. This empirical finding is also applicable 
for various cases and scenarios including high-technology firms, new listing firms, 
firm-years with losses, financial distress, mergers and acquisitions. 
Kim et al. (2014) investigate whether enhanced corporate social responsibility 
mitigates or contributes to stock price crash risk, in which the crash risk signals the 
severe stock return volatility. The corporate social responsibility is measured through 
seven categories which are diversity, community, corporate governance, environment, 
employee relations, human rights and products. The empirical result suggests that if 
firms commit to high standards of information transparency and comply with strict 
regulations, they would face a lower chance of crash risk. On the other hand, if firms 
commit to poor standards of information transparency and evade shareholders’ 
scrutiny, they will face a higher chance of crash risk. This empirical evidence supports 
the mitigating effect of information disclosures on crash risk. Additionally, the 
mitigating effect of enhanced corporate social responsibility on crash risk is more 
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salient for firms which have less effective corporate governance such as the firm with 
a lower corporate rating. A similar analysis conducted by Harjoto and Jo (2015) by a 
sample of US public firms during the period 1993-2009 also confirms the finding of 
Kim et al. (2014), which indicates that overall intensified corporate social 
responsibility disclosures would reduce the analyst dispersion of earnings forecasts 
and subsequently reduce stock return volatility. However, the mitigating effect of 
enhanced corporate social responsibility on stock return volatility is barely observed 
for the firms with higher standards of accounting and financial disclosures. 
Bushee and Friedman (2016) produce evidence that higher-quality information 
disclosures are associated with lower levels of stock return volatility. The underlying 
reason for this might be less sensitive moods of investors. Higher quality information 
disclosures mitigate the investor’s mood sensitiveness through pointing noise investors 
to trade towards information-based analysis and facilitating sophisticated investors in 
arbitrage activities. In addition, since the noise transactions deviate the stock price 
from its fundamental value, information disclosure plays an important role in 
enhancing market efficiency by reducing these noise transactions. 
6.2.3 Literature in Contradiction to the Negative Relationship between 
Information Disclosure and Stock Return Volatility 
There also exists evidence which suggests that increased information disclosure is 
associated with higher levels of stock return volatility. Ross (1989), Kim and 
Verrecchia (1991), and Atiase and Bamber (1994) argue that, in an informationally 
efficient market, increased information disclosure has the potential to bring about 
increased stock return volatility. Kalev et al. (2004) employ firm news announcements 
as the proxy for information arrival and investigates the information–volatility 
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relationship by a sample of Australian companies. The empirical result by Kalev et al. 
(2004) reveals a significantly positive relationship between the amount of news 
arrivals and the stock return volatility, even after controlling for potential impacts of 
trading volume and opening volatility. This empirical finding of the positive 
relationship is in favour of the argument which suggests that information disclosure 
would increase stock return volatility. By combining the use of event study and 
regression analysis, Bailey et al. (2006) investigate the changes of stock return 
volatilities and trading volumes for non-US firms listed on the US stock market before 
and after these non-US firms complied with US market regulations, in which 
complying with US market regulations is considered as the step of improved 
information disclosures. Bailey et al. (2006) find that both the stock return volatility 
and the trading volume have been significantly increased after these non-US firms 
complied with US market regulations. Complying with US market regulations 
sometimes needs these non-US firms to alter the composition of ownership and this 
action is suspected to disperse the interpretation of company performance. A higher 
trading volume would be unavoidable if there are dispersed interpretations of company 
performance. Bailey et al. (2006) conclude that enhanced information disclosures 
would hardly give these non-US firms listed on the US markets any meaningful benefit 
in terms of mitigating stock return volatility. Mugaloglu and Erdag (2013) use the 
GARCH (1, 1) model to test the impact of public disclosures on stock return volatility. 
On the contrary to the initial expectation of the mitigating effect of public disclosures 
on stock return volatility, Mugaloglu and Erdag (2013) find that the stock return 
volatility is, in reality, escalated by increased corporate disclosures. 
Additionally, through the regression analysis by controlling the variables of trading 
volume, size, dividend yield, earning-to-price ratio, book-to-price ratio and stock 
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rating, Bushee and Noe (2000) find that higher information disclosure has almost no 
effect on a company’s stock return volatility in the long term, whilst in the short term 
an improvement in disclosure by a company has the power to increase its stock return 
volatility. Bushee and Noe (2000) believe that there are two types of investors 
(institutional investor vs transient investor)65 in the market whose actions could affect 
stock return volatility, and these two types of investors have opposite impacts on stock 
return volatility. The net effects of these two types of investors on stock return 
volatility cancel out in the long term, which means that increased information 
disclosures have no impact on stock return volatility in the long term. Transient 
investors respond more quickly and more aggressively than institutional investors, 
which is the key reason of increased stock return volatility in the short term. Therefore, 
Bushee and Noe (2000) make the caveat of the short-term impact for the company 
managers when considering to increase information disclosures of their companies.  
Moreover, Lee and Liu (2011) argue that the relationship between information 
disclosure and stock return volatility is either U-shaped or negative. The information 
disclosure of a company measured by Lee and Liu (2011) includes trading information, 
price impact, analyst earning forecast error, analyst earning forecast dispersion, trading 
history, and institutional ownership. Two control variables are included in the analysis 
which are firm profitability and size. 
                                                          
65 One type of investors is the institutional investor who is attracted to the company with a higher level 
of information transparency, and the institutional investor favours the company with a higher level of 
information transparency. The institutional investor is generally a long-term investor who helps to 
decrease stock return volatility. The other type of investors is the transient investor who holds a short-
term investment strategy towards the newly disclosed information, therefore the transient investor 
increases stock return volatility. 
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6.3 Measuring Risk Information Disclosure  
A highly relevant paper in tackling the relationship between information disclosure 
and stock return volatility in the banking industry is Baumann and Nier (2004). 
Baumann and Nier (2004) have focused on a broad aspect of information disclosures 
for the banking industry including loans by maturity, loans by type, loans by 
counterparty, problem loans, problem loans by type, securities by type, securities by 
holding purpose, deposits by maturity, deposits by type of customer, money market 
funding, long-term funding, reserves, capital, contingent liabilities, off-balance-sheet 
items, noninterest income and loan loss provisions. This research focuses on the newly 
requirements concerning risk information disclosures outlined in the Basel Accord II 
for the banking industry, namely the market risk information disclosure and the 
operational risk information disclosure. The disclosures of market and operational risk 
information are measured by the Value-at-Risk disclosure index (VaRDI) designed by 
Perignon and Smith (2010) and the operational risk disclosure index (ORDI) designed 
by Goyal and Wu (2007) respectively.  
6.3.1 VaRDI: An Index to Quantify Market Risk Information Disclosure 
The VaRDI is an index proposed by Perignon and Smith (2010) to measure the 
disclosure of market risk information in the banking industry. A comprehensive 
discussion regarding the VaRDI can be seen in section 4.3 or in Perignon and Smith 
(2010). Briefly, the VaRDI has 6 categories which monitor 6 facets of the VaR 
reporting quantity and quality. The theoretical score of VaRDI ranges from 0 
(minimum) to 15 (maximum).  
1. VaR characteristics (maximum 2 points): 1 point – the holding period (e.g. 1 day, 1 
week), 1 point – the confidence level (e.g. 95%, 99%).  
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2. VaR statistics (maximum 4 points): 1 point – the high, low or average VaR, 1 point 
– the year-end VaR, 1 point – the VaR risk category (e.g. currency, option, equity), 1 
point – considering the diversification effect.  
3. Intertemporal comparison (maximum 1 point): 1 point – compared with the previous 
year VaR.  
4. Daily VaR graph (maximum 2 points): 1 point – the histogram about daily VaRs, or 
2 points – the plot of daily VaRs66.  
5. Trading revenues (maximum 4 points): 1 point – the hypothetical revenue, 1 point 
– the revenues deducted from the trading costs, 1 point – the histogram of daily 
revenues or 2 points – the plot of daily revenues67.  
6. Back-testing (maximum 2 points): 1 point – the number of exceptions or 2 points – 
zero exception, 1 point – the explanation of exceptions. 
6.3.2 ORDI: An Index to Quantify Operational Risk Information Disclosure 
The ORDI is an index originally proposed by Goyal and Wu (2007) to measure the 
disclosures of operational risk information. A comprehensive discussion regarding the 
ORDI is provided in section 4.4 or in Goyal and Wu (2007). The ORDI has 5 
categories which monitor 6 facets of the reporting quantity and quality of operational 
risk. The theoretical score of ORDI ranges from 0 (minimum) to 15 (maximum).  
1. Recognition and definition of operational risk (maximum 3 points): 1 point – 
recognition and definition of operational risk as a risk exposure, 1 point – recognition 
                                                          
66 If a bank releases both the histogram and the plot of daily VaRs at the same time, the VaRDI will not 
allocate 1 point to 4a and 2 points to 4b, instead it only allocate to each category 4a and 4b 1 point 
respectively. The maximum points for the category of daily VaR graph will not exceed 2 points. 
67 If a bank releases both the histogram and the plot of daily revenues at the same time, the VaRDI will 
not allocate 1 point to 5c and 2 points to 5d, instead it only allocate to each category 5c and 5d 1 point 
respectively. The maximum points for the category of daily VaR graph will not exceed 4 points. 
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and definition of reputational risk as a risk exposure, 1 point – recognition and 
definition of legal risk as a risk exposure.  
2. Operational risk capital (maximum 3 points): 1 point – operational risk capital 
reported in percentage terms or 2 points – operational risk capital reported in currency 
terms, 1 point – the calculation method of operational risk capital explained under 
Basel II.  
3. Intertemporal comparison (maximum 1 point): 1 point – operational risk capital 
reported for previous years.  
4. Governance (maximum 3 points): 1 point – operational risk responsibility adopted 
into the governance structure, 1 point – reputational risk responsibility adopted into 
the governance structure and 1 point – legal risk responsibility adopted into the 
governance structure.  
5. Methodology/reporting (maximum 5 points): 1 point – operational risk 
measurement or assessment methodology, 1 point – reputational risk measurement or 
assessment methodology, 1 point – legal risk measurement or assessment methodology, 
1 point – operational loss data collection process, 1 point – operational risk internal 
reporting procedure. 
6.4 Research Design 
6.4.1 Measuring Stock Return Volatility 
An accurate measurement of stock return volatility is crucial for the evaluation and 
implementation of asset pricing as well as trading and hedging strategies. The 
traditional way of measuring the lagged stock return volatility is the standard deviation 
of stock returns. Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) state that the traditional standard 
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deviation of stock returns has explained little of the variation and provided a crude 
measurement for the ex-post volatility. An accurate forecast of volatility needs a more 
precise model in obtaining the past return volatility. A newly quadratic model that the 
realized volatility discussed by Andersen et al. (2001), and Barndorff‐Nielsen and 
Shephard (2002) provides a superior explanation of asset return volatility compared to 
the traditional standard deviation model. Andersen et al. (2003) find that the realised 
volatility does a good job in measuring volatility especially in studies employing high-
frequency data such as intraday data. Andersen et al. (2005) argue that the realised 
volatility is not only useful for the measurement of volatility in the ex-post 
observations but also useful for the estimation of the latent volatility in the future. 
Shown by equation (6.2), the realised variance at time t where the time t could be a 
minute, a day, a month, or a year is calculated as the sum of squared returns over the 
intervals within the period t. The sub-period interval may be shortened by enlarging 
M, and when M approaches infinitely, the interval size approaches zero68. The realised 
volatility is simply the square root of realised variance.  
                              𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 = ∑ 𝑟𝑡,𝑗
2𝑀
𝑗=1                                   (6.2) 
                              𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 =  √𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡                            (6.3) 
 It is stated by Mandelbrot (1966) that financial asset returns are leptokurtic, and have 
displayed significant volatility clustering and persistence in which a high volatility 
period is likely to be followed by a high volatility period, and vice versa. Therefore, 
Engle (1982), Bollerslev et al. (1992), and Bollerslev et al. (1994) have proposed and 
empirically tested the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic (ARCH) model for 
                                                          
68 Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) state that in theory, as the interval increases to infinitesimal, the 
measurement would converge to the genuine measurement of the latent volatility, however in practice, 
this is infeasible when considering data limitation, market microstructure features, nonsynchronous 
trading pattern, discrete price observations, bid-ask spreads, etc. 
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forecasting the volatility of asset returns. Shown in equation 6.4, the stock return 
variance at time t depends upon a constant term 𝛽0 along with other lagged stock return 
variance till time (t-i). Furthermore, an enhanced model of ARCH – Generalized 
ARCH (GARCH) is proposed by Bollerslev (1986). Shown in equation 6.5,  
∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝜀𝑡−𝑖
2  is often called the ARCH term which obtains the impacts of lagged shocks 
or innovations in stock returns, and  ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1 𝜎𝑡−𝑖
2  is often called the GARCH term 
which obtains the lagged stock return variance. Furthermore, Andersen et al. (2001) 
find that the autocorrelation within realised volatilities is very strong, hence the 
underlying theory of ARCH/GARCH model is still plausible for the realised volatility, 
which suggests that the current volatility is affected by the previous volatility.  
                                                𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝜀𝑡−𝑖
2                                           (6.4) 
                                     𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜔0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝜀𝑡−𝑖
2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1 𝜎𝑡−𝑖
2                              (6.5) 
In the current research, the stock return volatility is on an annual basis and measured 
by the realised volatility. The data of weekly stock price is used to get the annual 
realised volatility. The log-return is employed in estimating the realised volatility, 
where log-return is calculated as 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = ln(𝑝𝑖,𝑡 /𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1) that 𝑝𝑖,𝑡  is the stock price at 
time t which has been adjusted for the payments of dividends, and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the stock 
return at time t. 
6.4.2 The Empirical Framework 
This research aims to investigate the relationship between information disclosure 
about exposure to risk and stock return volatility using regression analysis. The stock 
return volatility is the dependent variable and measured by the realised volatility, while 
the disclosures of risk information for market and operation are independent variables 
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that are regressed into the regression model one at a time due to the concern of the 
multicollinearity problem, in which the disclosures of risk information for market and 
operation are quantified by the indices VaRDI and ORDI respectively.  
Other than the independent variables of information disclosures, several control 
variables are included in previous literature as additional independent variables to 
explain the variation of stock return volatility. A similar test conducted by Baumann 
and Nier (2004) grasps bank size, dividend ratio, cost-income ratio, leverage ratio, loan 
growth, loan ratio, return on assets and beta as control variables. Huang et al. (2011) 
add the variables of return on asset (ROA), debt ratio, firm size, export ratio and 
turnover rate in the empirical test for the correlation analysis between stock return 
volatility and corporate governance. Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) control the 
variables of operating performance, stock return performance, size, book-to-market 
ratio and leverage in the empirical test for the correlation analysis between financial 
reporting quality and stock return volatility. Besides the variables regarding company 
structure, Lee and Liu (2011) add the control variables of company profitability and 
size along with the level of information availability of a firm to test the impact of 
information disclosures on stock return volatility. Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) 
find that trading volume has a significant explanatory power for stock return variance. 
Similar to the finding in Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990), the research conducted by  
Chen et al. (2001) and Linsmeier et al. (2002) suggests that there is a dynamic 
relationship between stock return volatility and trading volume, in which stock return 
volatility could cause the change of trading volume and trading volume could also 
cause the change of stock return volatility. Bollerslev and Mikkelsen (1996) state that 
there is a mean-reverting phenomenon in stock return volatility in which highly 
volatile movements in stock returns would slowly decay and dissipate in the long term, 
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hence the ARCH/GARCH model will be more efficient in function by employing the 
recent lag terms. Most commonly, one period lagged stock return volatility is added as 
an explanatory variable to explain the current stock return volatility (e.g. Kalev et al., 
2004; Kasman et al., 2011; Li et al., 2011). Several macroeconomic variables including 
industrial production, real retail sales, money supply, exchange rate and inflation have 
been considered to add into the ARCH/GARCH model in order to improve the fitness 
of the model by Morelli (2002), but the explanatory power of these selected 
macroeconomic variables is disappointedly weak, which implies that including 
macroeconomic models in the volatility analysis especially under the concept of 
ARCH/GARCH is not essential. Khlif and Hussainey (2016) find that corporate size, 
leverage ratio, and profitability and risk factor are potential variables affecting risk 
reporting. As the risk reporting under the current research refers to the VaRDI or ORDI 
index, it is worth taking some of these potential variables into account when running 
regressions to find the relationship between stock return volatility and risk reporting. 
Corporate size and leverage ratio are common factors affecting stock return volatility, 
which are also identified by other papers. Profitability could be measured by the return 
on asset variable. 
Combing the ideas of the control variables in the previous literature which may affect 
stock return volatility, this research employs nine firm-characteristic control variables 
along with the firm lagged stock return volatility into the regression model. The firm-
characteristic control variables are bank size, dividend ratio, cost-to-income ratio, 
leverage ratio, loan growth, loan ratio, return on asset, beta and trading volume. The 
logarithm of total asset considers the factor of bank size that may capture the potential 
economic scale, in which smaller banks are likely to experience higher stock return 
volatility than larger banks. Higher dividend ratio may indicate higher future cash 
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flows that would have a mitigating effect on stock return volatility. Dividend ratio 
could signal the quality of a bank that would also affect the stock return volatility of a 
bank. However, the research conducted by Baskin (1989) and Campbell and Hentschel 
(1992) indicates that the announcement of dividend could possibly trigger higher stock 
return volatility. The bank with higher dividend ratio might have more dividend 
announcements than the bank with lower dividend ratio, which could lead to higher 
stock return volatility for the bank with higher dividend ratio. Higher cost-to-income 
ratio suggests that the bank is operating inefficiently, therefore higher cost-to-income 
ratio may lead to higher stock return volatility. On the other hand, higher return on 
asset suggests good operating status of a bank and may lead to lower stock return 
volatility. The loan ratio and the loan growth signal the potential risk of a bank and its 
future growth. The leverage ratio is an indebted status reflecting the bank’s solvency 
issue, though this ratio is not important if the Modigliani-Miller theorem69 is being 
held. Beta is a measurement of the riskiness of a bank that would affect the stock return 
volatility of a bank, since the stock return volatility is often caused by investors’ 
uncertainty about the underlying asset risk. Higher trading volume is often related to 
higher stock return volatility. The concept of ARCH/GARCH suggests that the current 
stock return volatility depends upon previous stock return volatility, hence including 
the lagged stock return volatility would improve the explanatory power of the model. 
Furthermore, time differences are taken into account here. The Hausman test will 
perform later in order to choose between the year random effects and the year fixed 
                                                          
69 The Modigliani–Miller theorem is a theory about capital structure in modern finance. The theory 
states that under certain market price situation such as the classical random walk, with the absence of 
taxes, agency costs, bankruptcy costs, and asymmetric information, and in an efficient market, the value 
of a firm is unaffected by how the firm is financed, since the value of the firm depends on neither its 
approach nor its dividend policy to raise capital (issuing stock or selling debt). The Modigliani–Miller 
theorem is also called the capital structure irrelevance principle. Two firms which are identical except 
for their financial structures, one is financed by equity only, and the other one is leveraged that is 
financed partly by equity and partly by debt. The Modigliani–Miller theorem argues that the values of 
these two firms are exactly the same. 
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effects. The model is shown below, where u is the constant term, all the firm-
characteristic control variables are included in vector z,  𝜎 stands for the stock return 
volatility, 𝑋 is the disclosure index (VaRDI or ORDI), and 𝜀 is the error term. 
          𝜎𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑖𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑖 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠70 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡              (6.6) 
6.5 Data 
6.5.1 Research Sample 
This research chooses the world’s top sixty banks as the sample to look at the impact 
of risk information disclosure on stock return volatility. The rank of the world’s top 
sixty banks71 are based on their asset size at the end of 2013. While most of the world’s 
top sixty banks are listed on various stock exchanges, there are ten banks among this 
group not being listed on the stock market for various reasons. These ten unlisted 
banks72 are mainly small banks, though some large banks are not being listed on the 
stock market. The possible reason for the large bank not being listed is that the large 
bank is newly established through mergence and has not fully prepared to go into the 
market like Group BPCE73. Therefore, the sample employed excludes any unlisted 
banks and covers the remaining fifty listed banks. 
                                                          
70 The Hausman test will perform later in order to choose between the year random effects and the 
year fixed effects. 
71 Further information regarding the rank of the world’s top sixty banks can be traced through the 
website http://www.relbanks.com/worlds-top-banks/assets-2013. 
72 The ten banks out of the top sixty not listed on the market are: Japan Post Bank (from Japan, ranked 
13th), Groupe BPCE (from France, ranked 18th), Rabobank Group (from Netherlands, ranked 29th), 
Postal Savings Bank of China (from China, ranked 30th), Credit Mutuel Group (from France, ranked 
32nd), Norinchukin Bank (from Japan, ranked 36th), KfW Group (from Germany, ranked 46th), DZ 
Bank AG (from Germany, ranked 55th), La Caixa Group (from Spain, ranked 59th), and Cassa Depositi 
e Prestiti (from Italy, ranked 60th). 
73 As a result of the 2007 financial crisis, Caisse Nationale des Caisses D'épargne (CNCD) and Banque 
Fédérale des Banques Populaires (BFBP) merged in 2009 to become the second largest bank in France 
known as Group BPCE. 
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6.5.2 Research Sample Period 
The time period of VaRDI and ORDI is from 1996 to 2013, since the earliest available 
online public report is around the year 199674 which defines the starting period of our 
sample. The corresponding period of stock return volatility is from 1997 to 2014. 
6.5.3 Data Sources  
The market risk information and the operational risk information are measured by the 
designed indices VaRDI and ORDI. Both the VaRDI and the ORDI extract the data 
from banks’ public documents. This research has mainly fetched up the original public 
documents from three sources: 
 Bank official websites, which contain the original annual reports and the 
related crucial information. 
 http://www.sec.gov/ which is the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
official website. The data stream of the website contains 10-K75, 10-Q76 and 
20-F77 forms for American companies. 
 https://bankscope.bvdinfo.com/ which is the database specially designated for 
the banking industry containing comprehensive information about banks, such 
as the original annual reports of 11,000 worldwide banks. 
                                                          
74 The year 1996 and the year 1997 have only limited data, which is why chapter 4 has not included 
these two years in the research to look at the information disclosure status among the world’s top banks.  
75 The 10-K form is an annual comprehensive financial report required by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission to give shareholders detailed information about the listed American company. 
76 The 10-Q form is a quarterly comprehensive financial report required by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission to give shareholders detailed information about the listed American company. 
77 The 20-F form is a comprehensive financial report required by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission to give shareholders detailed information about the listed foreign company. 
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The stock price, dividend ratio, cost-to-income ratio, loan ratio, leverage ratio, beta, 
loan growth, return on asset and trading volume related to these banks are all obtained 
from datastream78. 
6.6 Empirical Results 
 
Figure 6.1 The Plot of the Average Annual Stock Return Volatility  
The two lines above plot the average annual stock return volatilities using the methods of realised 
volatility and standard deviation respectively for all the sixty banks during the period 1997-2014. The 
realised volatility and the standard deviation are both calculated through weekly stock returns. These 
sixty banks are the world’s largest sixty banks ranked by asset size in 2013. The data panel is unbalanced. 
 
Since the stock return volatility could be also measured using the standard deviation, 
two comparable lines depicting the average realised volatility and the average standard 
deviation are drawn across all the top sixty banks during the period 1997-2014. There 
is no visual difference between the shapes of these two lines. A statistical correlation 
check confirms the visual institution which indicates that the correlation between the 
realised volatility and the standard deviation is 0.997. This highly correlated statistical 
ratio between the realised volatility and the standard deviation has additionally proven 
the suitable status of the realised volatility to replace the standard deviation when 
measuring the stock return volatility. Considering the approximation of these two 
volatility measurements and the accuracy of realised volatility suggested by the 
                                                          
78 Datastream is a database for the financial and economic research data provided by Thomson Reuters. 
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previous research, the current research adopts the realised volatility as the only 
approach to measure the stock return volatility. 
As indicated by the figure above, the stock return volatility is particularly high for the 
year 2008 and 2009, which is in line with the tumultuous event of the 2008 financial 
crisis.  
 
Table 6.1 The Statistical Summary of Variables Used in the Stock Return Volatility Analysis 
The table above demonstrates the basic statistical description of variables used in this research for the 
50 banks around the world. The 50 banks are selected from the world’s top 60 banks (by asset size in 
2013), in which the selection criteria take account of whether the bank has been listed on the market 
and whether the bank has appropriate data assisting the analysis. The sample period of the realised 
volatility is from 1997 to 2014, and the sample period of the index (VaRDI or ORDI) and the control 
variables is from 1996 to 2013. The properties of the data which are mean, standard deviation, 25 th 
percentile, median, and 75th percentile are displayed accordingly to each data type. The annual stock 
return volatility is calculated by the annual realised volatility, in which the annual realised stock return 
volatility is calculated through weekly stock returns.  
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile
Dependent Variable
Realised Volatility 783 0.37 0.21 0.22 0.32 0.45
Disclosure Variables
VaRDI 758 6.43 4.76 0.00 7.00 11.00
ORDI 758 5.86 4.13 2.00 6.00 9.00
Control Variables
Log Size 810 8.97 0.79 8.57 8.90 9.26
Dividend Ratio 783 3.33 2.87 1.65 3.13 4.44
Cost-to-Income Ratio 782 6.52 72.95 2.99 4.52 7.91
Loan Ratio 690 55.06 15.25 44.92 57.91 66.10
Leverage Ratio 809 555.00 926.47 266.63 430.99 759.54
Beta 768 1.28 0.52 0.67 1.08 1.53
Loan Growth 706 15.29 65.14 1.28 8.28 16.95
Return on Asset 696 1.20 1.40 0.67 1.08 1.53
Trading Volume (in million) 763 5491.00 19000.00 809.00 2289.00 9358.00
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6.6.1 Firm-Characteristic Control Variables in the Stock Return Volatility 
Analysis 
 
Table 6.2 The Correlation among the Control Variables Used in the Stock Return Volatility 
Analysis 
The table above shows the correlations among the firm-characteristic control variables used in the stock 
return volatility analysis. The sample period of the control variables is from 1997 to 2014, in which the 
control variables are related to the fifty listed banks out of the world’s top sixty banks. 
 
Table 6.1 shows the summary statistics for all the variables used in the stock return 
volatility analysis. In order to avoid the multicollinearity problem among these control 
variables, the correlations among them are tested and shown in table 6.2. The 
correlations between these control variables are weak, which suggests that there is no 
evidence of a potential multicollinearity problem across these control variables. 
Log Size Dividend Ratio
Cost-to-Income 
Ratio
Loan Ratio Leverage Ratio Beta Loan Growth
Return on 
Asset
Trading 
Volume
Log Size 1.00
Dividend Ratio -0.04 1.00
Cost-to-Income Ratio 0.03 0.04 1.00
Loan Ratio -0.21 0.12 0.00 1.00
Leverage Ratio -0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.12 1.00
Beta 0.14 -0.16 -0.03 -0.30 0.03 1.00
Loan Growth -0.03 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 1.00
Return on Asset -0.07 -0.08 -0.04 0.35 0.00 -0.11 0.08 1.00
Trading Volume 0.39 -0.02 -0.15 0.10 -0.16 0.06 -0.01 0.02 1.00
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Table 6.3 The Coefficients of the Control Variables in the Stock Return Volatility Regression 
Analysis 
The table above shows the coefficients of the control variables and the one-period lagged realised 
volatility in the stock return volatility regression analysis. The dependent variable is the annual realised 
volatility which is calculated using the return data sampled on a weekly interval. The sample period of 
the realised volatility is from 1997 to 2014, and the sample period of the index (VaRDI or ORDI) and 
the control variables is from 1996 to 2013. The regression analysis takes into account the year fixed 
effects. The coefficient estimates are obtained using the ordinary least squares estimation. The data 
panel is unbalanced. The robust t-statistic is in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The first column contains all the control variables in the 
regression analysis, and the second column only includes the significant control variables from the first 
column into the regression analysis. 
 
In table 6.3, the first column shows a general model that includes all the control 
variables along with the lagged stock return volatility, in which the dependent variable 
is the annual realised volatility which is calculated using weekly stock returns. This 
regression model is based on the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. Furthermore, 
Dependent Variable: Realised Volatility
Log Size -0.0031
(-1.53)
Dividend Ratio 0.0103* 0.0123*
(1.72) (1.67)
Cost-to-Income Ratio -0.0002*** -0.0002***
(-3.29) (-3.33)
Loan Ratio 0.0000
(0.03)
Leverage Ratio 0.0000
(0.13)
Beta 0.0967*** 0.0961***
(7.24) (8.32)
Loan Growth 0.0000
(-0.19)
Return on Asset -0.0172** -0.0183*
(-2.17) (-1.75)
Trading Volume 0.0000
(0.70)
Lagged Real ised Volati l i ty (-1) 0.3854*** 0.3905***
(9.75) (10.62)
Constant 0.0660 0.0912
(0.78) (1.53)
Year Fixed Effects Included Included
Observations 566 566
Adjusted R-Squared 0.622 0.617
Coefficients 
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this regression has taken into account the time differences, in which the Hausman test 
rejects the null hypothesis of the year random effects leading to the year fixed effects.  
The current research deletes those insignificant control variables from the model. The 
significant control variables are retained and the coefficients regarding the 
parsimonious model are shown in the second column of table 6.3. The signs of these 
variables in the parsimonious model are consistent with those in the general model. By 
including only the control variables with statistical significance in the regression 
analysis, this research makes the estimation model more efficient that several papers 
such as Berman et al. (1999) and Baumann and Nier (2004) also modify the model in 
this way.  
6.6.2 The Effect of Risk Information Disclosure on Stock Return Volatility 
 
Table 6.4 The Coefficients of the Variables in the Stock Return Volatility Regression Analysis 
The table above shows the coefficients of the variables in the stock return volatility regression analysis. 
The dependent variable is the annual realised volatility which is calculated through weekly stock returns. 
The sample period of the realised volatility is from 1997 to 2014, and the sample period of the index 
(VaRDI or ORDI) and the control variables is from 1996 to 2013. The regression analysis takes into 
Dependent Variable:             
Realised Volatility
Coefficients
Dependent Variable:             
Realised Volatility
Coefficients
VaRDI -0.0035*** ORDI -0.0041***
(-3.04) (-2.72)
Dividend Ratio 0.0122 Dividend Ratio 0.0126
(1.09) (1.29)
Cost-to-Income Ratio -0.0002*** Cost-to-Income Ratio -0.0003**
(-3.36) (-3.15)
Beta 0.1077*** Beta 0.1022***
(8.61) (8.39)
Return on Asset -0.0108* Return on Asset -0.0129**
(-1.77) (-2.06)
Lagged Realised Volatility (-1) 0.3589*** Lagged Realised Volatility (-1) 0.3707***
(8.85) (9.24)
Constant 0.1143 Constant 0.1192*
(1.03) (1.79)
Year Fixed Effects Included Year Fixed Effects Included
Observations 566 Observations 566
Adjusted R-squared 0.6257 Adjusted R-squared 0.6243
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account the year fixed effects. The coefficient estimates are obtained using the ordinary least squares 
estimation. Both of the regressions include the control variables into analysis, in which the parsimonious 
model is used to introduce the control variables. The data panel is unbalanced. The robust t-statistic is 
in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
In order to assess the effect of risk information disclosure on stock return volatility, 
the risk information disclosure indices (VaRDI and ORDI) are placed into the 
parsimonious model. Since the correlation between VaRDI and ORDI is relatively 
high at 0.66, the VaRDI and the ORDI are placed into the model one at a time to avoid 
the multicollinearity problem. The parsimonious model concludes five explanatory 
variables which are dividend ratio, cost-to-income ratio, beta, return on asset and 
lagged realised volatility. The empirical results are shown in table 6.4, which turns out 
that the risk information disclosure (VaRDI or ORDI) is negatively associated with the 
stock return volatility. One score increase in the VaRDI is associated with around four 
thousandth reduction in the stock return volatility, while one score increase in the 
ORDI is also associated with around four thousandth reduction in the stock return 
volatility. Except for the variable of dividend ratio, all the control variables have 
shown a statistical significance in explaining the variation of stock return volatility and 
maintained their signs as the same in the previous parsimonious model. 
6.7 The Robustness Test 
6.7.1 The Impact of Global Financial Crisis  
The existing empirical evidence is based on a sample gathered over the period 1997 to 
2014. One crucial concern is the impact of the financial crisis which happened in 
2007/2008 on the validity of empirical results. There exists observed evidence in 
previous research which indicates that the stock market volatility is abnormally high 
in certain historical periods. Schwert (1989) notes that the stock return volatility is 
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extremely high during the Great Recession of 1929-1939 in the US that this amplified 
market fluctuation is unable to be explained by any stock valuation model. As shown 
in figure 6.1, the year 2008 and the year 2009 have experienced abnormally high 
volatility compared to other years. Whether the volatility caused by the financial crisis 
has an impact on our results is a worthwhile issue to be tackled. This research adopts 
a standard approach by introducing a dummy variable which tests for the effect of the 
exogenous shock of the financial crisis. The financial crisis dummy variable 𝐷𝑓 takes 
unity for 2008 and 2009 and takes the value 0 for other years. 
This research adds the financial crisis dummy variable and its interaction variable with 
the disclosure index into the previous estimation model (equation 6.4). The new 
equation is shown below, where the dependent variable is still the realised volatility in 
which symbolled by 𝜎,  u is the constant term, 𝑍 is the vector of firm-characteristic 
control variables which include dividend ratio, cost-to-income ratio, beta and return 
on asset,  𝑋 stands for the disclosure index (VaRDI or ORDI), the additive financial 
crisis dummy variable is 𝐷𝑓,   and 𝜀 is the error term.  
𝜎𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑖𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑖 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝑎𝑖𝐷𝑓𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖𝐷𝑓𝑡𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡          (6.7) 
If the financial crisis has a significant impact on the stock return volatility, it will 
potentially change the intercept by an amount of 𝑎𝑖  or potentially change the 
coefficient of disclosure index by an amount of 𝑏𝑖  or both. If the coefficient of 
disclosure index changed, the association between risk information disclosure and 
stock return volatility would be affected79.  
                                                          
79 The main effect variable and the interaction variable could be analyzed separately if the statistically 
significant levels between them are different. 
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So in order to test whether the financial crisis has impacted the relationship, a joint 
hypothesis test is performed. The null hypothesis is written as  𝐻0: 𝑎𝑖 =  𝑏𝑖 = 0 while 
the alternative hypothesis is  𝐻1: 𝐻0  is false. If the F-test
80  fails to reject the null 
hypothesis, it means that the financial crisis has no statistically significant role to play 
in this model. If the F-test rejects the null hypothesis, it means that the financial crisis 
is statistically significant in this model. In this scenario, this research will go further to 
see whether and how the association between the risk information disclosure and the 
stock return volatility has been affected by the financial crisis. This technique is in 
principle an altered Chow test to determine whether this is a stable regression model 
for the whole period.  
When 𝑋𝑖 measures the information disclosure about exposure to the market risk via 
the VaRDI, the test statistic is 𝐹𝑚,𝑛−𝑘−1 =  𝐹2,566−8−1 = 169.58  with the 
corresponding P-value 0.0000. This test result strongly rejects the null hypothesis 
𝐻𝑂: 𝑎𝑖 =  𝑏𝑖 = 0 and suggests that the financial crisis has caused a structural change 
in the original model (equation 6.4). The coefficients and their corresponding t-ratios 
of VaRDI and other explanatory variables under the new model are shown below: 
                                                          
80 In the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), the F-test can be used to assess whether the combined impact 
of a subset of independent variables has a significant impact on the dependent variable. The equation of 
F-test can be written as 𝐹𝑚,𝑛−𝑘−1 =  
(𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆−𝑈𝑅𝑆𝑆)/𝑚
𝑈𝑅𝑆𝑆/(𝑛−𝑘−1)
, where RRSS stands for the Residual Sum of Squares 
for the Restricted model, URSS stands for the Residual Sum of Squares for the Unrestricted model, m 
is the number of restricted variables, n is the number of total observations, and k is the number of all 
independent variables. 
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Table 6.5 The Coefficients of the Market Risk Information Disclosure (VaRDI) and the 
Financial Crisis Dummy Related Variables for the Association Analysis between Stock Return 
Volatility and Market Risk Information Disclosure 
The table above shows the coefficients of the variables of market risk information disclosure (measured 
by the VaRDI) and the coefficients of other related variables in the stock return volatility regression 
analysis. The financial crisis dummy variable defines the year 2008 and 2009 as unity and other years 
as the value 0. The dependent variable is the annual realised stock return volatility. Besides the variables 
of VaRDI, financial crisis dummy, and financial crisis dummy*VaRDI, the other explanatory variables 
are dividend ratio, cost-to-income ratio, beta, return on asset and lagged realised volatility. The sample 
period of the realised volatility is from 1997 to 2014, and the sample period of the index (VaRDI or 
ORDI) and the control variables is from 1996 to 2013. The regression analysis takes into account the 
year fixed effects. The coefficient estimates are obtained using the ordinary least squares estimation. 
The data panel is unbalanced. The robust t-statistic is in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
Table 6.5 can be compared to the VaRDI part of table 6.4. In table 6.4, the coefficient 
of VaRDI is -0.0048, which suggests that over the whole sample period 1997–2014, 
the operational risk information disclosure is negatively associated with the stock 
return volatility of a bank. In table 6.5, after the inclusion of the additive and the 
interaction dummy variables, the empirical result shows that the coefficient of VaRDI 
continues to be negative and the coefficient of VaRDI is also statistically significant 
at 1% level. That is to say, the market risk information disclosure is associated with a 
Dependent Variable: Realised Volatility Coefficients Observations
Adjusted                  
R-squared
VaRDI -0.0048*** 566 0.7578
(-3.20)
Financia l  Cris is  Dummy 0.2702***
(2.68)
Financia l  Cris is  Dummy * VaRDI 0.0061
(1.51)
Dividend Ratio 0.0026
(0.81)
Cost-to-Income Ratio -0.0002**
(-7.16)
Beta 0.1155***
(3.36)
Return on Asset -0.0104
(-1.51)
Lagged Real ised Volati l i ty (-1) 0.3160***
(2.93)
Constant 0.0850**
(2.02)
Year Fixed Effects Included
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reduction in the stock return volatility even after considering the exogenous shock of 
the financial crisis. When the financial crisis dummy variable is equal to one, it raises 
the stock return volatility by an amount of three tenths approximately and this impact 
is statistically significant at 1% level. That is to say, during the period 2008-2009, the 
stock return volatility is higher than other years which is in compliance with intuition. 
The coefficient of interaction dummy variable (financial crisis dummy*VaRDI) is not 
statistically significant which may be omitted from analysis.  
When 𝑋𝑖 measures the information disclosure about exposure to the operational risk 
via the ORDI, the test statistic is 𝐹𝑚,𝑛−𝑘−1 =  𝐹2,581−8−1 = 187.54 with the 
corresponding P-value 0.0000. This test result strongly rejects the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝑎𝑖 =  𝑏𝑖 = 0 and suggests that the financial crisis has caused a structural change 
of the original model (equation 6.4). The coefficients and their corresponding t-ratios 
of ORDI and other explanatory variables under the new model are shown below: 
 
Dependent Variable: Realised Volatility Coefficients Observations
Adjusted                  
R-squared
ORDI -0.0058*** 566 0.7762
(-3.96)
Financia l  Cris is  Dummy 0.2942***
(3.23)
Financia l  Cris is  Dummy * ORDI 0.0040
(1.14)
Dividend Ratio 0.0036
(1.30)
Cost-to-Income Ratio -0.0002**
(-6.38)
Beta 0.1178***
(3.24)
Return on Asset -0.0135*
(-1.72)
Lagged Real ised Volati l i ty (-1) 0.3028***
(2.68)
Constant 0.0904**
(2.17)
Year Fixed Effects Included
197 
 
Table 6.6 The Coefficients of the Operational Risk Information Disclosure (ORDI) and the 
Financial Crisis Dummy Related Variables for the Association Analysis between Stock Return 
Volatility and Market Risk Information Disclosure 
The table above shows the coefficients of the variables of operational risk information disclosure 
(measured by the ORDI) and the coefficients of other related variables in the stock return volatility 
regression analysis. The financial crisis dummy variable defines the year 2008 and 2009 as unity and 
other years as the value 0. The dependent variable is the annual realised stock return volatility. Besides 
the variables of ORDI, financial crisis dummy, and financial crisis dummy*ORDI, the other explanatory 
variables are dividend ratio, cost-to-income ratio, beta, return on asset and lagged realised volatility. 
The sample period of the realised volatility is from 1997 to 2014, and the sample period of the index 
(VaRDI or ORDI) and the control variables is from 1996 to 2013. The regression analysis takes into 
account the year fixed effects. The coefficient estimates are obtained using the ordinary least squares 
estimation. The data panel is unbalanced. The robust t-statistic is in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
Table 6.6 can be compared to the ORDI part of table 6.4. In table 6.4, the coefficient 
of ORDI is -0.0058, which suggests that over the whole sample period 1997 – 2014, 
the operational risk information disclosure is negatively associated with the stock 
return volatility of a bank. In table 6.5, after the inclusion of the additive and the 
interaction dummy variables, the empirical result shows that the coefficient of ORDI 
continues to be negative and the coefficient of ORDI is also statistically significant at 
1% level. That is to say, the operational risk information disclosure is associated with 
a reduction in the stock return volatility even after considering the exogenous shock of 
the financial crisis. When the financial crisis dummy variable is equal to one, it raises 
the stock return volatility by an amount of three tenths approximately and this impact 
is statistically significant at 1%. That is to say, during the period 2008-2009, the stock 
return volatility is higher than other years which is in compliance with intuition. The 
coefficient of interaction dummy variable (financial crisis dummy*ORDI) is not 
statistically significant which may be omitted from analysis.  
This section has solved one crucial concern about the potential impact of the financial 
crisis on the association analysis between the risk information disclosure (measured 
by the VaRDI or ORDI respectively) and the stock return volatility, and found that the 
financial crisis has played a significant impact which has significantly brought up the 
198 
 
stock return volatility. Additionally, this research maintains its initial finding regarding 
the VaRDI and ORDI which suggests that the risk information disclosures with regards 
to market and operation are associated with reductions on the stock return volatility. 
The impact of reduction in the stock return volatility by risk information disclosures 
becomes more statistically apparent after considering the financial crisis. 
6.7.2 The Impact of Country Development Status 
In the previous section, this research has investigated whether the financial crisis has 
played a significant role in the association analyse by adding financial crisis related 
dummy variables into the initial estimation models. The result shows that the financial 
crisis has significantly increased the stock return volatility, which complies with 
intuition. Additionally, the risk information disclosures continue to be negatively 
associated with the stock return volatility and the reduction power is more statistically 
significant after including the financial crisis related variables.  
In this section, this research continues to explore another potential dummy factor 
which may affect the associations by using the same technique in the previous section. 
This country dummy variable 𝐷𝑐  divides the sample into two parts, which is the 
developed country denoted as the value 0 and the emerging country denoted as the 
value 1. 
The banks in the current research sample are from sixteen countries worldwide, in 
which most of the countries are developed: Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA. 
There are fourteen banks from emerging countries: China, Russia, and Brazil. 
Emerging countries are assumed to be different from developed countries in terms of 
information transparency, legal system comprehensiveness, financial market 
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regulation, and maturity, etc. Whether these assumed differences have made any 
impact on these associations are discussed below. 
This research has proved that the financial crisis dummy related variables have a 
combined significance when adding to equation 6.4, which means that equation 6.5 in 
hypothesis is an efficient model, therefore this research will adopt equation 6.5 as the 
new baseline model. In order to test whether there is any difference for the association 
between emerging countries and developed countries, this research adds the emerging 
country dummy variable and its interaction variable which is the interaction term 
between emerging country dummy variable and disclosure index (VaRDI or ORDI) 
into equation 6.5. The new equation is shown below, where the dependent variable is 
still the realised volatility symbolled by 𝜎,  u is the constant term, 𝑍 is the vector of 
firm-characteristic control variables which include dividend ratio, cost-to-income ratio, 
beta and return on asset,  𝑋 stands for the disclosure index (VaRDI or ORDI), the 
additive financial crisis dummy variable is 𝐷𝑓, the country development dummy 
variable is 𝐷𝑐,  and 𝜀 is the error term.  
𝜎𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑖𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑖 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝑎𝑖𝐷𝑓𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖𝐷𝑓𝑡𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝑖𝐷𝑐𝑡 +
                      𝑑𝑖𝐷𝑐𝑡𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖𝐷𝑝𝑡𝐷𝑐𝑡 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                 (6.8) 
If the three new added variables (𝐷𝑐𝑡, 𝐷𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝐷𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑝𝑡) are not statistically 
redundant in equation 6.6, it will have the power to alter the intercept and the 
coefficient of information disclosure index. There are four different cases if equation 
6.6 holds: emerging country without the financial crisis, emerging country during the 
financial crisis, developed country without the financial crisis and developed country 
during the financial crisis. 
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Firstly, in order to test whether the three newly added variables are statistically 
redundant, a joint hypothesis test is performed. The model associated with the null 
hypothesis restricts the coefficients (𝑐𝑖, 𝑑𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑖) of additive dummy variable and 
interaction dummy variables to zero. If the F-test81 fails to reject the null hypothesis, 
it means that the three newly added variables are statistically redundant. In this 
scenario, this research will finish the test and conclude the finding that there is no 
difference for the association between emerging countries and developed countries. If 
the F-test rejects the null hypothesis, it means that the country dummy related variables 
have played a role in this model. In this scenario, this research will take a further look 
to see the difference between developed countries and emerging countries for the 
association analysis. 
When 𝑋𝑖 measures the information disclosure about exposure to the market risk via 
the VaRDI, the test statistic is 𝐹𝑚,𝑛−𝑘−1 =  𝐹3,566−11−1 = 17.8922  with the 
corresponding P-value 0.0000. This test result strongly rejects the null hypothesis 𝑐𝑖 =
𝑑𝑖 =  𝑒𝑖 = 0 and suggests that there is a difference between emerging countries and 
developed countries for the association between the market risk information disclosure 
and the stock return volatility. Therefore, this research takes a further look at what kind 
of difference lying between emerging countries and developed countries for the 
association. The new coefficients and their corresponding t-ratios for VaRDI and other 
explanatory variables are shown below: 
                                                          
81 In the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), the F-test can be used to assess whether the combined impact 
of a subset of independent variables has a significant impact on the dependent variable. The equation of 
F-test can be written as 𝐹𝑚,𝑛−𝑘−1 =  
(𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆−𝑈𝑅𝑆𝑆)/𝑚
𝑈𝑅𝑆𝑆/(𝑛−𝑘−1)
, where RRSS stands for the Residual Sum of Squares 
for the Restricted model, URSS stands for the Residual Sum of Squares for the Unrestricted model, m 
is the number of restricted variables, n is the number of total observations, and k is the number of all 
independent variables. 
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Table 6.7 The Coefficients of Market Risk Information Disclosure (VaRDI), Financial Crisis 
Dummy Related Variables and Country Dummy Related Variables for the Association Analysis 
between Stock Return Volatility and Market Risk Information Disclosure 
The table above shows the coefficients of the variables of market risk information disclosure (measured 
by the VaRDI) and the coefficients of other related variables in the stock return volatility regression 
analysis. The financial crisis dummy variable defines the year 2008 and 2009 as unity and other years 
as the value 0. The emerging country dummy variable defines the bank originated from emerging 
country as 1 and the bank originated from developed country as 0. The dependent variable is the annual 
realised stock return volatility. Besides the variables of VaRDI, financial crisis dummy, financial crisis 
dummy*VaRDI, emerging country dummy, emerging country dummy*VaRDI and emerging country 
dummy*financial crisis dummy, the other explanatory variables are dividend ratio, cost-to-income ratio, 
beta, return on asset and lagged realised volatility. The sample period of the realised volatility is from 
1997 to 2014, and the sample period of the index (VaRDI or ORDI) and the control variables is from 
1996 to 2013. The regression analysis takes into account the year fixed effects. The coefficient estimates 
are obtained using the ordinary least squares estimation. The data panel is unbalanced. The robust t-
statistic is in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively. 
 
As shown in table 6.7, by adding the emerging country dummy related variables, the 
coefficient of VaRDI remains negative in explaining the variation of stock return 
volatility, which suggests that the market risk information disclosure is associated with 
Dependent Variable: Realised Volatility Coefficients Observations
Adjusted                   
R-squared
VaRDI -0.0010 566 0.7723
(-0.74)
Financia l  Cris is  Dummy 0.3244***
(7.55)
Financia l  Cris is  Dummy * VaRDI 0.0009
(0.26)
Emerging Country Dummy 0.0488***
(2.62)
Emerging Country Dummy * VaRDI 0.0024
(0.61)
Emerging Country Dummy * Financia l  Cris is  Dummy -0.1392
(-0.91)
Dividend Ratio 0.0017
(0.29)
Cost-to-Income Ratio -0.0002**
(-6.35)
Beta 0.1304***
(3.99)
Return on Asset -0.0155*
(-1.91)
Lagged Real ised Volati l i ty (-1) 0.2837**
(2.44)
Constant 0.0455
(1.31)
Year Fixed Effects Included
202 
 
a reduction in the stock return volatility even after considering the exogenous shock of 
the financial crisis and the difference of country development status. The coefficient 
of the financial crisis dummy variable is positively significant which again confirms 
the intuition that the financial crisis has exacerbated the stock return volatility. The 
coefficient of emerging country dummy variable is 0.0488 with statistical significance 
at 1% level, which suggests that all else being equal the stock return volatility of a 
bank in emerging countries is on average around five-hundredths higher than in 
developed countries. All interactions related to these dummy variables are not 
statistically significant which may be omitted from analysis. 
When 𝑋𝑖 measures the information disclosure about exposure to the operational risk 
via the ORDI, the test statistic is 𝐹𝑚,𝑛−𝑘−1 =  𝐹3,566−11−1 = 22.9534  with the 
corresponding P-value 0.0000. This test result strongly rejects the null hypothesis 𝑐𝑖 =
𝑑𝑖 =  𝑒𝑖 = 0 and suggests that there is a difference between emerging countries and 
developed countries for the association between the operational risk information 
disclosure and the stock return volatility. Therefore, this research takes a further look 
at what kind of difference lying between emerging countries and developed countries 
for the association. The new coefficients and their corresponding t-ratios for ORDI 
and other explanatory variables are shown below: 
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Table 6.8 The Coefficients of Operational Risk Information Disclosure (ORDI), Financial Crisis 
Dummy Related Variables and Country Dummy Related Variables for the Association Analysis 
between Stock Return Volatility and Operational Risk Information Disclosure 
The table above shows the coefficients of the variables of operational risk information disclosure 
(measured by the ORDI) and the coefficients of other related variables in the stock return volatility 
regression analysis. The financial crisis dummy variable defines the year 2008 and 2009 as unity and 
other years as the value 0. The emerging country dummy variable defines the bank originated from 
emerging country as 1 and the bank originated from developed country as 0. The dependent variable is 
the annual realised stock return volatility. Besides the variables of ORDI, financial crisis dummy, 
financial crisis dummy*ORDI, emerging country dummy, emerging country dummy*ORDI and 
emerging country dummy*financial crisis dummy, the other explanatory variables are dividend ratio, 
cost-to-income ratio, beta, return on asset and lagged realised volatility. The sample period of the 
realised volatility is from 1997 to 2014, and the sample period of the index (VaRDI or ORDI) and the 
control variables is from 1996 to 2013. The regression analysis takes into account the year fixed effects. 
The coefficient estimates are obtained using the ordinary least squares estimation. The data panel is 
unbalanced. The robust t-statistic is in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
As shown in table 6.8, by adding the emerging country dummy related variables, the 
coefficient of ORDI remains negative and statistically significant in explaining the 
variation of stock return volatility, which suggests that the operational risk information 
Dependent Variable: Realised Volatility Coefficients Observations
Adjusted                   
R-squared
ORDI -0.0047** 566 0.7661
(-2.25)
Financia l  Cris is  Dummy 0.3449***
(6.37)
Financia l  Cris is  Dummy * ORDI 0.0005
(0.09)
Emerging Country Dummy 0.0731***
(2.96)
Emerging Country Dummy * ORDI 0.0018
(0.32)
Emerging Country Dummy * Financia l  Cris is  Dummy -0.0926
(-0.74)
Dividend Ratio 0.0040*
(1.67)
Cost-to-Income Ratio -0.0002***
(-6.32)
Beta 0.1393***
(4.19)
Return on Asset -0.0175**
(-2.18)
Lagged Real ised Volati l i ty (-1) 0.254**
(2.18)
Constant 0.0674*
(1.88)
Year Fixed Effects Included
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disclosure is associated with a reduction in the stock return volatility even after 
considering the exogenous shock of the financial crisis and the difference of country 
development status. The coefficient of the financial crisis dummy variable is positively 
significant, which again confirms the intuition that the financial crisis has exacerbated 
the stock return volatility. The coefficient of emerging country dummy variable is 
0.0731 with statistical significance at 1% level, which suggests that all else being equal 
the stock return volatility of a bank in emerging countries is on average around seven-
hundredths higher than in developed countries. All interactions related to these dummy 
variables are not statistically significant which may be omitted from analysis. 
This section aims to find any difference between developed countries and developing 
countries for the association between the risk information disclosure (measured by the 
VaRDI or ORDI) and the stock return volatility. It turns out that those banks from an 
emerging country display higher average stock return volatility than banks from 
developed countries, all else being equal. The financial crisis again has been proven to 
elaborate the stock return volatility significantly, which complies with intuition. Most 
importantly, it confirms that risk information disclosures have mitigating impacts on 
the stock return volatility even after considering the exogenous shock of the financial 
crisis and the difference of country development status. 
6.7.3 Re-Estimating Stock Return Volatility via the GARCH (1, 1) Model 
As shown in equation 6.5, the variance of asset returns could be explained by the 
GARCH model which assumes that the current variance of asset returns (𝜎𝑡
2) is a 
weighted function of a long-term average value (𝜔0), information about volatility 
during the previous periods (∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝜀𝑡−𝑖
2 ) and the variance from the model during the 
previous periods (∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1 𝜎𝑡−𝑖
2 ).  
205 
 
In order to further test the robustness of the existing evidence, this part will re-estimate 
the stock return variance of those banks by employing the GARCH (1, 1) model, in 
which the conditional variance is calculated based on the one-period ahead relevant 
information. The square root of the stock return variance calculated by the GARCH (1, 
1) model will be placed into equation 6.8 as the stock return volatility (𝜎𝑖,𝑡) for bank i 
in year t. By doing so, a new set of panel data will be established for the regression 
analysis. The regression analysis has concluded the selected control variables and 
taken account of the impact of the financial crisis and the difference of country 
development status. 
 
Table 6.9 The Coefficients of the Variables in the Stock Return Volatility (measured via the 
GARCH (1, 1) Model) Regression Analysis  
The table above shows the coefficients of the variables in the stock return volatility regression analysis. 
The financial crisis dummy variable defines the year 2008 and 2009 as unity and other years as the value 
0. The emerging country dummy variable defines the bank originated from emerging country as 1 and 
the bank originated from developed country as 0. The dependent variable is the annual conditional stock 
return volatility estimated via the GARCH (1, 1) model. The sample period of the volatility is from 
1997 to 2014, and the sample period of the index (VaRDI or ORDI) and the control variables is from 
1996 to 2013. The regression analysis takes into account the year fixed effects. The coefficient estimates 
are obtained using the ordinary least squares estimation. The data panel is unbalanced. The robust t-
Dependent Variable: Conditional Volatility Coefficients Dependent Variable: Conditional Volatility Coefficients
VaRDI -0.0012 ORDI -0.0035**
(-0.85) (-2.14)
Financial Crisis Dummy 0.2971*** Financial Crisis Dummy 0.3264***
(6.56) (7.49)
Financial Crisis Dummy * VaRDI 0.0011 Financial Crisis Dummy * ORDI -0.0014
(0.28) (-0.34)
Emerging Country Dummy 0.0687*** Emerging Country Dummy 0.0652***
(3.47) (2.99)
Emerging Country Dummy * VaRDI 0.0008 Emerging Country Dummy * ORDI 0.0003
(0.24) (0.09)
Emerging Country Dummy * Financial Crisis Dummy -0.1024*** Emerging Country Dummy * Financial Crisis Dummy -0.1164***
(-2.62) (-3.23)
Dividend Ratio 0.0059*** Dividend Ratio 0.0062***
(3.15) (3.28)
Cost-to-Income Ratio -0.0002*** Cost-to-Income Ratio -0.0002**
(-2.78) (-2.52)
Beta 0.1102*** Beta 0.1111***
(9.06) (9.24)
Return on Asset -0.0155*** Return on Asset -0.0179**
(-2.69) (-3.05)
Lagged Conditional Volatility (-1) 0.4257*** Lagged Conditional Volatility (-1) 0.4137***
(12.12) (12.08)
Constant 0.0126 Constant 0.0296
(0.53) (1.26)
Year Fixed Effects Included Year Fixed Effects Included
Observations 566 Observations 566
Adjusted R-squared 0.7618 Adjusted R-squared 0.7785
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statistic is in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively. 
 
Similar to previous tests, in order to avoid the multicollinearity problem between the 
VaRDI and ORDI, these two indices are regressed into the model one at a time. The 
empirical results are shown in table 6.9, which turns out that the risk information 
disclosure (VaRDI or ORDI) is negatively associated with the stock return volatility, 
though only the association between the stock return volatility and the operational risk 
information disclosure is with statistical significance. One score increase in the ORDI 
is associated with around four thousandth reduction in the stock return volatility. All 
the control variables have played the same roles in affecting the stock return volatility 
when comparing with the previous tests. 
Since the coefficient of the financial crisis dummy variable is negative and statistically 
significant under either of the regressions, it indicates that the 2008 financial crisis has 
played a powerful role in escalating stock return volatility, which is complied with 
intuition and the previous robustness tests. Since the coefficient of the emerging 
country dummy variable is positive and statistically significant under either of the 
regressions, it indicates that those banks from emerging countries display higher 
average stock return volatility than banks from developed countries, all else being 
equal, which is also complied with the previous robustness tests. As the coefficient of 
the interaction dummy variable (financial crisis dummy*VaRDI or financial crisis 
dummy*ORDI) is negative and statistically significant, which suggests that the 
financial crisis has hit those banks in emerging countries relatively light compared to 
developed countries, all else being equal. 
This section has further confirmed the previous findings by re-estimating stock return 
volatility via the GARCH (1, 1) model. Similar to before, the empirical results show 
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that the risk information disclosure has mitigated the stock return volatility, the 
financial crisis has raised the stock return volatility, while banks originated from 
emerging countries have a higher stock return volatility compared to banks originated 
from developed countries. 
6.8 Discussion 
The empirical evidence conducted in the current research shows that the information 
disclosures with exposures to the market and operational risk are associated with lower 
levels of stock return volatility. After considering the exogenous shock of the financial 
crisis and the difference of country development status, and re-estimating stock return 
volatility via the GARCH (1, 1) model, this negative association between risk 
information disclosures and stock return volatility remains.  
This empirical finding supports the view that information disclosures have a mitigating 
effect on stock return volatility (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Baumann and Nier, 
2004; Aman, 2011). The suspected reason for the mitigating effect on stock return 
volatility by enhanced information disclosures is reduced uncertainty especially with 
the avoidance of one-time news shock. Alexander (1991) notices that a firm with a 
legal settlement is likely to disclose more information in a timely manner, as the firm 
tries to avoid a one-time big change in stock price caused by the legal settlement.  
Whilst the literature providing supportive evidence for the mitigating effect of 
increased information disclosures on stock return volatility, there still exists evidence 
in conflict with this argument (e.g. Ross, 1989; Atiase and Bamber, 1994; Kalev et al., 
2004) which claims that increased information disclosure has the potential to 
exacerbate stock return volatility. The literature in support of this view believes that 
the market itself only responds to the newly arrived information if the market is 
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informationally efficient. No-arbitrage martingale analysis is used by Ross (1989) to 
study the effect of changes in the rate of information flow on asset prices, in which 
this kind of analysis is firstly applied to developing asset pricing tools under a 
continuous time setting. In an arbitrage-free economy, stock return volatility is directly 
related to the rate of information flow to the market, therefore Ross (1989) claims that 
information flow elaborates stock return volatility.  
Besides these two opposite arguments, the research conducted by Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000) and Bushee and Noe (2000) provides evidence stating that a higher level of 
information disclosure has nearly no impact on a company’s stock return volatility. 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) test the companies that voluntarily adopt the international 
accounting standards to see whether the adoption of international accounting standards 
has brought any benefit to these companies. The international accounting standard is 
typically regarded as a high requirement of accounting information disclosure, which 
is highly valued by investors. Two significant changes of the adoption are reductions 
in bid–ask spread and increments in daily stock turnover. However, there is no 
significant change with regard to share price volatility. Bushee and Noe (2000) 
investigate whether a firm's disclosure practices affect the composition of its 
institutional investor ownership and its stock return volatility, which indicates that 
firms with higher AIMR disclosure 82  rankings tend to have greater institutional 
ownership, but the institutional investors attracted by greater information disclosure 
have played no role in affecting stock return volatility.  
By looking at the risk information disclosures from the banking industry, the current 
research suggests that enhanced information disclosures are associated with lower 
                                                          
82  It is an annual measurement of the level of information disclosure practices published by the 
Association for Investment and Management Research (AIMR). 
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levels of stock return volatility and adds weight to the argument claiming that 
information disclosure mitigates stock return volatility. Another contribution point is 
that the data period has spanned over nearly twenty years and included the turbulent 
period of the 2008 financial crisis, which provides much more time updated and 
financial crisis related empirical evidence. 
During the robustness test, the empirical evidence also shows that emerging countries 
are on average having higher stock return volatility than developed countries. De 
Santis (1997) demonstrates that the level of volatility in emerging markets is 
significantly higher than that of most developed markets. However, the exposure to 
high country-specific risk does not necessarily appear to be rewarded with higher 
expected returns. A higher risk-reward relation is detected in the emerging markets of 
Latin America but not in the emerging markets of Asia. A certain level of international 
integration and liberalization is formed in emerging markets, but there is no evidence 
showing that the market integration and liberalization increases stock return volatility. 
The event study of credit rating changes conducted by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) 
shows that fragile and enclosed financial markets are affected more severely by the 
changes of credit ratings, and a downgrade credit rating would normally cause higher 
market volatility than an upgrade credit rating. Rashid Sabri (2004) shows that 
emerging markets are unstable compared to developed markets, especially emerging 
markets need more time to recover from price deep falling compared to developed 
markets. The empirical results provided by Chiou et al. (2010) show that the stocks in 
emerging countries have higher stock return volatility than the ones in developed 
countries. Pointed out by Chiou et al. (2010), besides the difference of economy 
development, one suspected reason for the difference of the stock return volatilities 
between emerging countries and developed countries is legal system. The financial 
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markets in countries governed by the English common law are less risky and more 
mean-variance efficient than the countries governed by the civil laws. Moreover, the 
stock return volatility in the countries governed by the French–Spanish civil law is 
significantly higher than any other civil law countries. Countries governed by 
Scandinavian civil law have the best risk-adjusted return performance among all the 
civil law countries. The empirical results show that high quality of legal system, strong 
legal protection of investors' rights, and reliable social/political environment are 
related to lower stock volatility and higher risk-return performance. Li et al. (2011) 
indicate that the stock return volatility in emerging markets could be mitigated by 
introducing large foreign ownerships especially the ownership originated from 
developed countries, which provides indirect evidence indicating the higher stock 
return volatility in emerging markets. The underlying implication for global investors 
is that they should carefully compose their mean-variance investment portfolio when 
entering the emerging markets. Even though De Santis (1997) claims that the return-
to-risk relation is uncertain in emerging markets, Hassan et al. (2003) suggest that the 
inclusion of assets from emerging markets into the diversified investment portfolio 
will at least reduce the portfolio risk even if it does not increase the expected return. 
Moreover, Hassan et al. (2003) point out that the correlation of the stock return 
volatilities between emerging countries and developed countries is relatively low 
compared to the correlation of the stock return volatilities among developed countries, 
in which the contagion effect is more obvious among developed countries. 
6.9 Summary 
This chapter has investigated the association between risk information disclosure and 
stock return volatility in the banking industry, in which the risk information stands for 
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the market risk information or the operational risk information. Two composite indices 
(VaRDI and ORDI) are used to measure the risk information disclosures respectively. 
The annual stock return volatility is calculated by the realised volatility, in which the 
realised volatility is calculated from weekly stock returns. Under the regression 
analysis by controlling the lagged volatility and firm-characteristic variables, both of 
the two composite indices (VaRDI and ORDI) turn out to be in a negative relationship 
with stock return volatility, which suggests that enhanced risk information disclosure 
has a mitigating impact on stock return volatility. Further robustness tests have all 
confirmed this finding by considering the exogenous shock of the financial crisis and 
the difference of country development status, and re-estimating stock return volatility 
via the GARCH (1, 1) model. This research provides additional and up-to-date 
evidence to the debatable issue regarding the impact of information disclosures on 
stock return volatility. Additionally, since this research is focused on the banking 
industry, banking policymakers around the world can use this finding as an incentive 
to build a more transparent and less volatile business environment.  
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Chapter 7    
Conclusion 
7.1 Summary 
This thesis investigates issues surrounding information disclosures in the banking 
industry. Selection of the banking industry as the research proxy to investigate the 
impacts of information disclosures reflects the important role the banking industry 
plays in our economy. 
Chapter 2 contextualises the thesis by surveying the issues surrounding banking 
information disclosures. Through the survey, this research has been informed about 
the important role of banking information disclosure in maintaining systemic stability 
and the status of banking information disclosure over the past few decades.  
Chapter 3 provides a general picture of the short-term impact of banking information 
disclosure on stock price using the event study. Annual report disclosure is used as the 
occasion to conduct the event study. The empirical result suggests that on average 
there is a negative impact on stock price by the release of annual reports in the banking 
industry over the period 1997-2014, which implies that the market generally views the 
information within the annual reports as bad news over the period 1997-2014. 
Moreover, the negative response to the annual report release exhibits a time-lagged 
manner, which is unable to support the efficient market hypothesis. Two suspected 
reasons are proposed to explain the time-lagged manner. One is drawn from the 
behaviour perspective, which suggests that the market is, in general, reluctant to accept 
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bad news and thus needs more time to assimilate bad news into stock pricing. The 
other is the intuitive speculation, which assumes that the depth and amount of 
information in banks’ annual reports needs more time and effort to be digested by the 
market compared to a relatively simple feature event such as dividend payment or 
stock split. 
Chapter 4 narrows down the research scope by focusing on the risk information 
disclosure status in the banking industry. As the 2008 financial crisis derived from the 
banking industry is still within living memory, focusing on risk information 
disclosures in the banking industry is especially meaningful in the sense that it helps 
to build a safer business environment. In addition, compared to the Basel Accord I, 
which only specifies the disclosure of credit risk information in the banking industry, 
the newly proposed Basel Accord II incorporates the disclosures of market and 
operational risk information into regulations. Therefore, this research pays particular 
attention to the disclosure status of market and operational risk information in the 
banking industry. This research adopts the Value-at-Risk disclosure index (VaRDI) 
from Pérignon and Smith (2010) to measure market risk information disclosure in the 
banking industry, and adopts the operational risk disclosure index (ORDI) from Goyal 
and Wu (2007) to measure operational risk information disclosure in the banking 
industry. The values of the VaRDI and ORDI suggest that the banking industry around 
the world moves towards enhanced risk disclosures over the period 1996-2013. 
Meanwhile, developed economies are still in the leading position of risk information 
disclosures compared to emerging economies. 
Chapter 5 investigates the relationship between market valuation (measured by 
Tobin’s Q-Ratio) and risk information disclosures (measured by the VaRDI and ORDI) 
in the banking industry and finds that there is a negative relationship between them. 
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Additional robustness tests which take account of the impacts of financial crisis and 
country development status have confirmed the finding. 
Chapter 6 investigates the relationship between stock return volatility (measured by 
the realised stock return volatility) and risk information disclosures (measured by the 
VaRDI and ORDI) in the banking industry, and finds that there is a negative 
relationship between them. Additional robustness tests which take account of the 
impacts of financial crisis and country development status have confirmed the finding. 
7.2 Contributions and Implications 
There is a dearth of research investigating the short-term impact of annual report 
release on stock price by the event study. This research fills the gap by providing an 
interesting perspective on the short-term impact of annual report release, and finds that 
the annual report release could have a significant impact on stock price. Investors in 
the market can treat the finding as a potential ‘calendar effect’ and manage their risks 
more carefully around the date of annual report release. Moreover, the lagged response 
to the annual report release brings us more to think about market behaviours when 
processing complicated information and the definition of market efficiency. 
In response to the call from the Basel Committee for enhanced information disclosure 
in the banking industry for the purpose of building a safer business environment, this 
research helps to provide a comprehensive picture of the information disclosure status 
regarding the market and operational risks in the world’s top banks. It appears that all 
over the world the banking industry has increased their risk disclosures over the past 
two decades. The central banks in emerging countries, however, should make more 
efforts to implement the regulations from the Basel Accord and encourage the banks 
they supervise to disclose more in-depth risk information, since both the quality and 
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quantity of risk information disclosure in emerging countries still lags behind 
compared to developed countries. 
Contrary to the general finding in previous research, which suggests that increased 
information disclosure is associated with higher market valuation, both the event study 
and the regression analysis in this research have triggered doubts about the previous 
finding. In particular, the current research has used a similar methodology to that of 
Baumann and Nier (2003) in testing the association between information disclosure 
and market valuation, but the current research has not been able to find the 
significantly positive association between information disclosure and market valuation 
suggested by Baumann and Nier (2003). The argument that increased information 
disclosure is helpful to boost market valuation probably omits the nature of the 
information (bad news or good news), and the banks in the studying period of the 
argument were filled with good news, which leads to a biased conclusion.  
The negative relationship identified between information disclosure and stock return 
volatility provides additional and up-to-date evidence to the debatable issue whether 
increased information disclosure is helpful to mitigate market volatility. Additionally, 
since this research is focused on the banking industry, banking policymakers around 
the world can use this finding as further evidence and an incentive to build a more 
transparent and less volatile business environment. 
7.3 Limitations and Future Research 
The research scope of the current study has only covered the banking industry with its 
market and operational risk disclosures. This focused approach has its advantages but 
also has its disadvantages, as the banking industry is only one sector of our economy 
and the information content is not broad enough. Future research may use a similar 
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methodology to that adopted in the current research to test other industries, or to test 
different kinds of information disclosures.  
Due to the tedious and time-consuming work involved in composing the indices 
(VaRDI and ORDI), the research sample only includes sixty world’s top banks as 
ranked by asset size in 2013. Future research may enlarge the sample size by including 
more banks around the world. 
Due to the fact that the annual reports in electronical version are mostly available from 
1996 onwards, the research sample period has only covered the past two decades. On 
the other hand, the modern banking industry has existed for more than a century. 
Whether the findings in the current research are still applicable for other periods in the 
banking industry are worth investigating further. 
The research period of the past two decades is a period of turmoil for our economy, as 
the 2008 financial crisis has greatly shaken the global economy. Although this research 
has taken the impact of the financial crisis into account, it could not rule out the 
possibility that the severe financial crisis has still affected the empirical results in 
certain aspects. As suggested by Calomiris and Nissim (2014), the business 
environment has changed dramatically in the past decade. The banking industry 
especially has experienced combined changes of economic circumstances (e.g., low-
interest rate; mergence within the banking industry) and regulatory policies. Together, 
these changes in the economic environment have affected the investors’ relationship 
with the banking industry. The market perceptions when valuing banks to certain 
issues have also changed. For example, prior to the financial crisis, higher leverage 
was associated with greater value, but during and after the crisis, as default risk and 
regulatory concerns came to the fore, lower leverage turns out to be associated with 
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greater value. Therefore, future research may retest the findings of the current research 
in different periods without any impact of the financial crisis. 
7.4 Final Remarks 
Through this research, we have investigated the disclosure status of risk information 
in the banking industry and the disclosure impacts on market valuation and stock return 
volatility. Although, both the event study and the regression analysis have triggered 
doubts about the beneficial impact on market valuation by increased information 
disclosures, alongside the concerns of privacy and cost when disclosing information 
suggested by previous research, this research still firmly believes that the potential 
benefits of information disclosure would outweigh the disadvantages of information 
disclosure particularly considering the overall stability and safety of our economy. 
Maybe the statement by Faust and Svensson (2001) can be applied here that increased 
information disclosure in the banking industry is generally and socially beneficial but 
frequently bad for banks. 
As the evidence suggests that increased information disclosure would mitigate market 
volatility, this research strongly encourages the banking industry to maintain a higher 
level of information transparency. Meanwhile, policymakers may think about and 
reformulate relevant policies in order to make information disclosure more efficiently 
in prohibiting the systemic risk and also protecting the interest of individual banks. 
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